









Financing and economic implications 
of household energy policies · 




Financing and economic issues play a central role in the formulation of a national 
household energy policy. In the first place, an orientation towards equity objectives 
implies that affordability of services for the poor must be increased, possibly 
through a degree of subsidisation. It is, however, also essential for the long-term 
viability of the energy sector and its constituent parts, that conventional efficiency 
criteria are not excessively compromised in attempting to cater to the poor. 
Accordingly, this paper has two objectives: 
e to assess the financing requirements of policy proposals in the main energy 
sub-sectors and to propose ways of mobilising and allocating finance in areas 
where this is required, and 
e to assess the potential macro- and micro-economic impacts of policy proposals, in 
order to ensure their consistency with broader macro-economic and develop-
ment goals. 
2. The development context for energy investment 
The energy sector plays a significant role in the South African economy, particularly 
in relation to the minerals and manufacturing complex to which it provides 
important inputs. The household energy sector, however, has historically notre-
ceived much support from the state, either in terms of policy attention or fiscal 
expenditure. In fact, the bulk of government expenditure in the energy sector has 
been directed towards increasing energy self-sufficiency and towards building up 
a local nuclear capacity. Since the early 1970s, the state has expended between 40% 
and 90% of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs' budget on the nuclear 
industry, with the allocation for 1993/94 amounting to R474 million. As there is 
limited scope for increases in levels of overall government expenditure, it is more 
likely that re-allocations will be made within existing budgets to support policies 
aimed at improving the energy services of the poor. The fiscal grant to the nuclear 
industry is a potentially important source for such re-allocations. 
The energy sector has historically accounted for a large portion of fixed investment 
in the country, especially due to investments in the nuclear and synthetic fuel 
industries, as well as electricity power generation capacity. Importantly, these 
investments are much higher than those required even for the most capital-inten-
sive household energy policies such as electrification. 
3. The financing of household energy policies 
The financing implications of the five main policy areas in EPRET have been 
considered separately. 
3. 1 The financing of electrification 
The ability to finance a national electrification programme is critical to its long-term 
success. At present, problems with the financing of electrification impose severe 
constraints on accelerated electrification. On the demand side, poor households are 
generally unable to afford initial connection costs, so that suppliers generally have 
to finance connection costs and recover those costs through the tariff. However, • 
• 
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many local authorities lack any financing capacity, particularly those with supply 
rights for unelectrified townships. 
On the supply side, finance is required for two kinds of expenditure. The first and 
largest requirement is for the capital connection costs, which, although varying 
widely from case to case, are currently in the region of R3 000 per dwelling. 
Secondly, finance is needed to meet the shortfall between revenue derived from 
electricity sales and the associated costs, especially for levels of consumption which 
are below the break-even level in a single energy rate tariff system such as Eskom's 
S-tariff. Clearly, many other factors will influence the total amount of financing 
required, but an order-of-magnitude estimate of the total capital costs of electrifying 
6.6 million households by 2010, which will provide about 86% of all households 
with access to electricity, will be about R22.4 billion in 1993 Rands. 
Sources of finance 
There are several important current and potential sources of finance in the electric-
ity supply industry (ESI). These differ between Eskom and other distributors: 
• Eskom raises loan finance on local and international capital and money markets. 
Its total debt stood at about R28 billion in 1992. In 1993, it raised R600 million 
with the issue of an Electrification Bond. This is an innovative financing mecha-
nism which provides investors with a low initial return, which increases over 
time as revenue from electrified customers increases, to provide investors with 
a market-related return over the full life-time of the investment. This kind of 
mechanism will be important for the financing of accelerated electrification. 
e Eskom generates surpluses from its operations; in 1992 its retained income was 
R1.4 million. 
e Many municipal distributors generate surpluses on the trading of electricity; in 
1988/89 the national total generated in this way was about R0.9 billion. More-
over, if a national flat-rate tariff is implemented, considerably more revenue will 
be generated from long-electrified consumers. 
e Some municipal distributors raise loan finance from their own development· 
funds, external capital markets or other sources (such as DBSA loans of R230 
million in 1992). 
It is therefore clear that considerable sources of finance exist within the industry 
itself. However, notwithstanding these sources of finance, electrification will not 
proceed rapidly enough under the present structure of the distribution industry, 
because many local authority distributors (other than Eskom), lack the capacity, as 
well as financial and political integrity, to raise sufficient funds to finance electrifi-
cation. 
Establislt a national Electrification Fund 
Consequently it is proposed that a national Electrification Fund be established as 
soon as possible. Initially this should be managed by the National Electrification 
Forum (NELF} and, in the longer term, under the control of a national regulator. 
An Electrification Fund will have two main objectives: 
• the raising of bulk loan and grant finance for electrification; and 
• the allocation of finance to increase the level of access to electricity. 
The Fund should have two constituent parts: a Loan Fund and a Grant Fund. To 
illustrate how an Electrification Fund might operate, it is depicted graphically in 
Figure 1 and described briefly below. 
• Firstly, an injection of seed finance into the Grant Fund is required, to provide a 
capital base to act as a loan guarantee fund. The amount could be in the order 
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of RSOO million to Rl billion. This should come from the state, but may be 
supplemented by private and foreign donors. 
e This amount could then be used as security to attract large amounts of loan 
finance from private and public investors. Eskom's recent issue of the Electrifi-
cation Bond is an example of the kind of instrument which can attract private 
capital on favourable terms. 
e Thirdly, the Loan Fund would then on-lend to distnvutors to finance their 
electrification projects. These loans would be repaid to the Loan Fund by 
distributors as they recover their costs from subsequent electricity sales. 
e The return payable to investors in the Loan Fund would be based on a percentage 
of revenue from domestic electricity sales, subject to a guaranteed minimum 
rate of return. Any shortfalls between this minimum, and the actual return from 
electrification would be met from the Grant Fund, and guaranteed by govern-
ment so as to lower investor's risk further. The effect of this is that low-level 
consumers (generally the poorest) would be subsidised from this fund. 
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FIGURE 1 Proposed structure and operation of a 
national Electrification Fund 
It is proposed that the guiding principle for the equitable allocation of general 
subsidy finance (which has not been targeted for specific projects) is that it should 
be applied to reduce the capital connection costs of poor households. The Grant 
Fund can be utilised to achieve this objective: 
e If the Grant Fund has sufficient resources to meet current and anticipated 
shortfalls in the Loan Fund, then any additional amounts could be allocated to 
increase the number of households with access to electricity, by reducing the 
capital investment requirements to be financed by distributors and ultimately 
borne by customers. 
e In the less probable situation that the Grant Fund still has additional grant 
finance available after meeting its above obligations, then such finance could be 
applied to reduce outstanding capital commitments of poor households. This 
benefit would be passed on to customers in the form of lower tariffs. • 
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The establishment and use of an electrification fund will have several important 
advantages: 
e leverage effects and economies of scale can be maximised by concentrating the 
bulk financing function in one central point in the industry; 
e joint management by the Fund of loan and grant finance would achieve syner-
gies such as through the simultaneous use of the Grant Fund as a loan guarantee 
fund, to generate income and to attract further capital; 
e subsidy finance can be allocated as fairly as possible over time, rather than 
benefiting only those lucky enough to be electrified at the right time - while 
subsidy finance is available; 
• the impact on price levels will be much smoother than if tariffs were reduced 
and increased according to the amount and cost of subsidy and loan finance 
available in any particular year; 
e this kind of financing arrangement is not dependent upon any specific structure 
of the EDI, and, on the other hand, will not constrain the restructuring of the 
ED I. 
Finally, although NELF itself does not have the capacity to manage an Electrifica-
tion Fund, this could be achieved in the immediate future by the use of existing 
expertise in various Treasury Departments on an agency basis. 
3.2 The financing of fuelwood policies 
Policies affecting the fuel wood sector can be grouped into five categories, each with 
their own financing implications. 
e Firstly, policies will attempt to improve the management of natural woodlands. This 
will depend largely upon extension work by existing networks of rural devel-
opment non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and various levels of govern-
ment. As such, the financing requirements associated specifically with this 
policy will be relatively small. 
• The bulk of additional firewood production should come from a social forestry 
programme. For an annual yield of 400 000 to 600 000 tons of firewood, a network 
of about 4 000 small nurseries may be required at a start-up cost of about R83 
million and annual costs of about R40 million. 
• Thirdly, a network of about 1 500 woodlots could produce a similar amount of 
wood once established and can be relatively self-sufficient once wood is being 
sold. At an average establishment cost of just under R3 000 per hectare, total 
establishment costs will be in the region of R260 million. 
e Commercial small-grower schemes which are operated by forestry companies to 
encourage small farmers, could expand their scope considerably. For a target of 
60 000 hectares, establishment and management costs over the first rotation 
period (roughly eight years), borne initially by forestry companies and partly 
recovered later, would be in the region of R156 million in total. 
• Finally, the transport of fuelwood from areas with surpluses to areas in which 
demand is high could make considerably more firewood available to house-
holds. These costs would be financed by traders. 
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3.3 The financing of a low-smoke coal programme 
In recognition of the likelihood that newly-electrified households, particularly in 
the PWV, will continue to use coal for energy-intensive services such as cooking 
and heating, it has been proposed that a low-smoke coal (LSC) programme be launched 
to eventually eliminate highly-polluting bituminous coal. In order for households 
to switch to LSCs these may require a price advantage (at least initially), and this 
may require some kind of subsidy. This can be achieved by providing a direct 
subsidy to manufacturers, or by taxing conventional coal and cross-subsidising 
LSC. Moreover, one of the prototypes currently being evaluated is relatively 
labour-intensive and can easily be manufactured by small-scale enterprises, co-op-
eratives, or households - thus also having employment spin-offs. The amount of 
the subsidy required to completely replace conventional coal in the domestic 
market, will be a maximum of about R180 million per annum, but will probably be 
much less. Even at this level, a tax of Rl per ton on conventional coal (3% of domestic 
coal prices and 1.2% of export prices) would be sufficient to finance the subsidy. 
3.4 The financing of paraffin and gas policies 
From a financing perspective, there are two areas where paraffin and gas policies 
will be significant. The first relates to the extension of marketing and distribution 
networks into areas presently unserviced by oil companies and distributors. Gener-
ally these investments will be undertaken by private sector companies, such as the 
oil majors, and will be normal commercial investments. 
The second area relates to the production of d1ild-resistant lids and containers for the 
storage and transport of paraffin, so as to reduce the risks of paraffin poisoning in 
infants. Current research by the Medical Research Council indicates that child-re-
sistant lids can be produced at a low cost (of around R1 each), which could make 
this a financially viable, as well as employment-creating, programme. 
3.5 The financing of energy efficiency policies 
In general, most DSM policies entail an initial investment which results in reduced 
cash outflows in subsequent periods. Consequently, the barriers posed by high 
initial investment costs may prejudice those who lack sufficient resources or access 
to credit for making such investments. This suggests that utilities have an important 
role to play in financing DSM programmes. 
Two of the policies proposed in EPRET will have fairly significant financing 
requirements. Firstly, a programme to improve the tllemwl perfomwnce of houses 
would require a moderate investment in ceilings and insulating materials for each 
dwelling. Likewise, a programme to encourage the use of energy-efficientappliances 
such as compact fluorescent light bulbs will require initial finance, for example from 
Eskom or appliance manufacturers, which can then be recovered over time through 
the electricity tariff. Provided the energy saving is sufficient, households should 
pay less for their energy, even with higher tariffs. 
Secondly, the implementation of time-of-use [TOU) tariffs will require the installation 
of appropriate meters. Currently these cost in the region of R1 000 each, although 
costs are likely to fall, as they did with prepayment meters. 
-- __ ..,, 
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4. Impacts of policies on the macro-economy 
4.1 Impacts on levels of investment 
A national electrification programme which seeks to provide access to around 86% 
of households by 2010, would have to make about 6.6 million connections over the 
ensuing 17 years at a total cost of about R22.4 billion (in 1993 Rands). The peak 
annual investment, for 500 000 connections, will amount to about R1.5 billion, 
which is equivalent to 2.9% of the country's GDFI for 1992. 
In the fuelwood sector, investments will be made by forestry companies in small-
grower schemes, to the extent of about R80 million initially. Related maintenance 
and extension expenditures are considered in section 4.2 below. 
Demand-side management strategies also have fairly sizeable investment require-
ments. If one million electricity consumers switch to Time-of-use tariffs and require 
the appropriate meters, then total investrrient requirements will be between R600 
and R1 000 million. Similarly, if each of three million electrified households are to 
use efficient appliances such as compact fluorescent light bulbs, investments will 
be in the region of R240 million. Even more significant may be the investments in 
improved thermal performance of dwellings. For example, if an investment of R750 
is made for all informal and 50% of formal dwellings in cooler climatic areas, then 
investments will total R1.35 billion. 
Clearly, the investment requirements of energy efficiency are not insignificant. On 
the other side of the coin; however, are the decreases in investment resulting from 
policies such as the DSM strategies proposed. Whilst these have not been quanti-
fied, they are likely to be highly significant when the costs of expanding power 
generation capacity are considered. 
4.2 Impacts on fiscal revenue and expenditure 
An accelerated electrification programme will require some government expendi-
ture which will, however, be partially offset by inflows due to increased taxation 
on income and expenditure associated with the programme. If the state is to 
subsidise the excess of connection costs over the 'cost of connection parameter' 
(which will be the maximum amount to be financed by utilities), then it is likely 
that this obligation will be greatest in respect of more remote and dispersed rural 
households. Assuming that one million households fall into this category (almost 
one-third of all rural households) and that connection costs will average R6 000 
each, then the state's total commitment will be about R2.5 billion over the 17 years 
of the programme, peaking at R270 million at the height of the rural electrification 
programme. 
It was stated earlier that the fiscus should guarantee any shortfalls between the 
minimum returns offered to investors in the Electrification Fund, and actual 
revenues derived from newly-electrified customers. Provided the state makes an 
initial grant to the Fund of at least RSOO million as seed finance, then this shortfall 
could be fully met from the income generated by the seed finance. Consequently, 
no 'operational' subsidies would be required from the fiscus. 
On the other hand, inflows to the fiscus due to income taxes and VAT associated 
with direct expenditure on electricity connections would amount to about R200 
million at the height of the programme. Taking these inflows into account therefore 
reduces the net demand on the fiscus for electrification. 
Fuelwood policies comprising social forestry and woodlot programmes will require 
expenditure by the state of about R130 million per annum. Whilst this may seem 
large in relation to the fuelwood sector, it must be noted that the scale of the 
interventions proposed are ambitious and will affect many people. 
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Subsidisation of low-smoke coal will cost, at the most, about R180 million per annum. 
However, production costs of these fuels can be considerably lower and, moreover, 
any subsidy which is required, could be fiscally-neutral by imposing a small tax on 
conventional coal to provide LSC with a price advantage. Furthermore, any expen-
diture which the state does incur on such a programme will also have an employ-
ment dimension in respect of any additional jobs created. 
The amounts being considered here can be placed in perspective by noting that the 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs budgetary grant for 1993/94 was R708 
million and the grant to the nuclear industry was R474 million. Clearly, then, these 
policies which will have a material impact on the living conditions of the poor, must 
have a high-ranking claim on fiscal resources. 
4.3 Impacts on the Balance of Payments 
A national electrification programme will result directly in small outflows on the 
current account in respect of the import of certain materials required for the 
connection process and for some electrical appliances which households are likely 
to acquire. Together, it is estimated that these will amount to about R250 million at 
the peak of the programme. This represents only about 0.5% of 1992 imports. On 
the other hand, it is possible that local manufacturers may benefit from economies 
of scale and from experience associated with a large-scale electrification pro-
gramme, and capture increased export markets. This is possible particularly for 
prepayment meters. 
The only other balance of payments impact of note relates to the import of electric 
appliances such as compact fluorescent light bulbs. As these are fully imported at 
present, almost all expenditure on these would leave the country. 
4.4 Impacts on employment 
This section considers only the direct and formal employment opportunities which 
may result from the policy proposals. In the case of electnjiCJJtion, it has been 
estimated that about 16 000 formal jobs may be created directly by the programme, 
although it is clear that many more opportunities will arise through related spin-
offs and multipliers, especially in the informal sector. 
In the fuelwood sector, the establishment of social forestry programmes, woodlots 
and an increase in extension work will result in significant employment benefits. 
A very rough estimate is that about 16 OOOnew jobs would result from the proposals 
in this sector. 
The production of low-smoke coal is, similarly, potentially labour-intensive, and it is 
possible that about 11 000 people could be employed in decentralised manufactur-
ing enterprises supplying half of the domestic coal market. Similar benefits could 
result from the manufacture of child-resistant paraffin lids and containers in 
small-scale manufacturing concerns. 
4.5 Impacts on environmental sustainability 
The policies proposed in EPRET are not concerned with long-term environmental 
sustainability per se, although many policies are motivated partially or fully by the 
need to improve the immediate environmental conditions experienced by poor 
households. The combination of electrification, LSC, fuelwood policies, child-safe 
paraffin containers and energy efficiency measures will result in many environ-
mental benefits, particularly at the local scale. To the extent that improvements must 
be effected at a local level before larger sustainability questions can be considered, 
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5. Impacts of policies on the electricity supply industry 
Of all the energy sub-sectors, the EPRET policy proposals will have the most 
significant economic impact on the electricity supply industry. Consequently, the 
effects of the proposed electrification programme, together with related proposals 
around tariffs and ESI structure, have been calculated using a financial model 
developed for this purpose. Several assumptions have been mpde for the purpose 
of this exercise, details of which are contained in Chapter Five of the paper. The 
most important assumption relates to the domestic tariff, which is assumed to be a 
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FIGURE 2 Annual capital expenditure and operating losses/surpluses of 
the electrification programme 
Electrification programme financing requirements 
Based on a flat-rate _tariff of 20 c/kWh for all new customers, then the total financing 
requirement over the 17 years to 2010 will be in the region of R22.4 billion. This, in 
tum, can be divided into capital expenditure of R21.9 billion, and cumulative 
operating losses by 2010 of RO.S billion. While the programme as a whole will 
therefore not have broken even by 2010 with respect to operating flows, it is also 
significant to note that after 2003 the programme generates an operating surplus. 
This is shown in Figure 2. 
Financing electrification with pooling of wealthy consumers 
The financing requirement of the electrification programme will be considerably 
reduced by the introduction of a national flat-rate tariff system which applies to all 
consumers, including long-electrified wealthy households. Assuming that the 
additional revenue generated by these consumers shifting onto a tariff of 20 c/k Wh 
is available to the industry, but is phased in over four years to ease the burden on 
those consumers, then the peak financing requirement of the programme will be 
reduced from R22.4 billion to R9.9 billion. This peak would be reached after 11 years 
in 2004, with large operating surpluses (attributable to high-level consumers) as 
shown in Figure 3. 
This financing requirement is of a relatively manageable magnitude, being more or 
less equivalent to the cost of one power station. The impact of this on the debt levels 
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FIGURE 3 Cash flows of electrification with phased pooling of 
high-level consumers 
in the ESI, or on Eskom if it were to take on the whole distribution function (that is, 
there is one national distributor), would be easily manageable. Assuming that 
Eskom achieves its goal of 1:1 debt:equity ratio by 1996/97 (without the effect of 
electrification), that it aims to maintain its debt at par with its equity thereafter, and 
that earnings grow at a modest 8% per annum, then at the peak of the electrification 
programme's debt requirement in 2004, its debt:equity ratio would be about 1.2:1. 
In other words, electrification will have only a small negative effect. 
A sensitivity analysis of the major variables in the electrification programme shows 
that by far the most sensitive variable is the tariff level. A 10% decrease in the tariff 
to 18 cents per unit (net of VAT) increJlses the peak financing requirement to R13.6 
billion: a 153% increase over the scenario in which pooling occurred. Even after 17 
years in 2010, annual cash flows would still be negative. Conversely, an increase in 
the tariff to 22 c/kWh almost eliminates the need to take on any debt at all: 
maximum debt levels would be only R258 million, a 95% reduction. Oearly, 
therefore the setting of the tariff level is a crucial process insofar as the long-term 
viability of the ESI is concerned, which underscores the need for a strong regulatory 
environment in which sound financial and economic policies are followed by 
electricity utilities. 
6. Impacts of policies on household micro-economies 
Poor households typically spend a high portion of their income on energy services, 
and it is not unusual for the poorest urban households to spend between 10% and 
25% of their incomes on energy. Even in rural households, where fuelwood is the 
main energy source and is by-and-large available at no cash cost, energy expendi-
ture may still be significant where households use batteries, candles and paraffin. 
Moreover, even where incomes are low and erratic, energy expenditures are not 
easily reduced, as evidenced by the relatively high percentage of income devoted 
to energy by poor households. 
On the whole, the policies proposed in EPRET will have a positive effect on the 
micro-economies of poor urban and rural households, although it is difficult to II 
Rnancing and economic implications 
quantify these effects. In the case of electrification, a national flat-rate tariff will have 
a variable effect on consumers. For currently unelectrified consumers, expenditure 
on electricity for lighting, media and other small energy services will probably be 
lower than on candles, batteries and paraffin for the equivalent services. For long 
electrified consumers, who are paying much lower tariffs (averaging around 15 
c/kWh), electricity expenditure would increase. For a household consuming 800 
kWh per month, a national rate of, for example, 20 c/kWh excluding VAT would 
translate into a R46 increase (including VAT) in their monthly electricity bill, 
equivalent to a 33% increase. Since this consumer group is generally more wealthy, 
this cross-subsidy would be progressive from an equity perspective. Such increases 
could, however, be mitigated by a shift to time-of-use tariffs, if households are able 
to use electricity more efficiently. 
Expenditure on low-smoke coal should, in principle, be lower than on conventional 
coal, the price of which may be increased by the tax referred to earlier. If paraffin 
and gas policies are effective in reducing end-prices by the amounts anticipated, 
then savings for typical households might amount to about R8 per month for each 
fuel. Fuelwood policies are unlikely to have any major effect on the budgets of 
households which rely on wood. Demand-side management policies, on the other 
hand, should result in lower energy expenditure, due to the net amount of energy 
which may be conserved, or to the more efficient use of energy, such as electricity 
out of peak hours. 
7. Conclusion 
On the whole, it is argued that the EPRET policy proposals will result in real benefits 
to poor urban and rural households which are the targets of these policies. These 
benefits will take the form of improved physical access to electricity, low-smoke 
coal, paraffin, gas and fuel wood, together with more affordable pricing of associ-
ated energy services. Moreover, these equity gains can be achieved within the 
overall constraints of the macnreconomy and without jeopardising the financial 
viability of institutions such as those in the electricity supply industry. 
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South Africa currently faces a situation in which access to adequate energy services 
is very unequally distributed among its population, with this inequality in many 
respects a mirror of the political and economic differentiation produced by apart-
heid. At the same time the country also has the capacity, extremely unusual in 
developing countries, to bring about a real improvement in the living conditions 
of the poor, through policies aiming to widen their a~:cess to adequate and afford-
able energy services. 
In formulating a national household energy policy, financing and economic impli-
cations play a central role. On the one hand, the orientation towards equity 
objectives implies that affordability must be increased for the poor, which may 
necessitate a degree of subsidisation. On the other hand, it is also essential for the 
long-term viability of the energy sector and the national economy in which it plays 
such a dominant part, that conventional economic efficiency criteria are not too 
heavily compromised in attempting to cater to the poor. 
Consequently, the financing requirements and economic impacts of household 
energy policies act as important points of reference and as potential constraints on 
the policy proposals. It is necessary, in developing policy options, to assess their 
financial implications, and whether they are realistic and feasible in the light of the 
limited available resources. In this way, it is important to assess the economic 
impacts of policy proposals on a number of levels: on the national economy, on 
energy subsectors and industries, and on households themselves. Where the eco-
nomic impacts are unrealistic or in conflict with the objectives of the exercise, an 
iterative process may be required whereby policies are revised until they become 
consistent with economic realities. 
This paper forms part of the South African Energy Policy Research and Training 
(EPRET) project, a two-year research programme conducted at the Energy for 
Development Research Centre of the University of Cape Town. In recognition of 
the problems currently experienced in the household energy sector, and of the 
potential for effecting real improvements in these conditions, the project aims to 
identify policies which will widen access to basic energy services for the urban and 
rural poor in South Africa. The project comprises 23 sectoral studies, covering 
demand, supply and cross-sectoral themes, one of which is the financing and 
investment area. 
The two objectives of this paper are: 
• to assess the financing requirements of policy proposals in the main energy 
subsectors and to propose ways of mobilising and allocating finance in areas 
where this is required; and 
$ to assess the potential impacts of policy proposals on important macro- and 
micro-economic variables, in order to ensure the consistency of policy proposals 
with broader macro-economic and development policy conditions. 
The paper begins by contextualising energy investment and expenditure in the 
macro-economic and micro-economic environments currently operating in the 
South African energy sector. In Chapter Three the financing arrangements for each 
of the main policy sectors are addressed. These sectors include electrification, 
fuelwood, low-smoke coal, gas and paraffin, and demand-side management. The 
current financing arrangements are described, estimates are made of the approxi-
mate amounts required to finance the policy proposals in each sector, and, where 
necessary, specific proposals are made regarding potential sources of additional II 
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finance. In the case of electrification, additional attention is devoted to possible 
mechanisms and institutions for the raising and allocation of finance. 
Following this attempt to quantify the investment requirements of the main policy 
sectors, Chapter Four undertakes an assessment of the order-of-magnitude macro-
economic impacts of each policy sector. This is done for two macro scenarios: a 
business-as-usual scenario in which current trends in the energy sector continue, 
but without any further major interventions; and, secondly, an integrated energy 
planning (IEP) scenario in which policy proposals aimed at widening households 
access to energy services are implemented. The macro-economic variables which 
are considered include investment levels, fiscal revenue and expenditure, the 
balance of payments, employment levels and environmental quality. The latter two 
variables, whilst not always included in such analyses, are relevant in the light of 
the importance attached to equity and environmental sustainability objectives in 
energy planning. 
Chapter Five considers the impact of the IEP policy scenario on the electricity 
supply industry. This sector is singled out because of the scale of investment 
implied by the policy proposals. A financial model which was developed for this 
purpose is used to quantify the financial impacts on the industry and to assess the 
sensitivity of the outcomes to changes in the most important variables. 
Then follows a brief consideration of the potential impacts of policy proposals on 
household micro-economies. This is a much more qualitative analysis than those 
preceding it, because of the relative absence of data on household incomes and 
energy expenditures, and the wide variances which occur across space and time. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The development context for energy 
investment 
2.1 Introduction 
The economic environment prevailing in South Africa at present and in the coming 
decade wiJl have a fundamental influence on household energy financing and 
investment. The rate of economic growth, levels of government expenditure, the 
palance of payments situation, the rate of domestic investment, and many other 
variables will have a direct impact on the availability of funds for investment and 
expenditure on energy services, within both the public and private sectors. In tum, 
the resources which are devoted to new energy investments wiJl impact upon many 
of the variables. If, for instance, large sums are directed towards a national electri-
fication programme, this investment wiJl have an impact upon the broader eco-
nomic environment. Consequently, the energy policies proposed in the EPRET 
project will be influenced by, and wiJl have an influence upon, South Africa's 
broader development context. 
It is therefore necessary to locate the financing and investment implications of 
household energy policies in the broader economic context. Inherent in a policy 
research and formulation process should be an iterative process of assessing 
whether the resource requirements of the policies can realistically be met from 
available resources within a changing economic context. This chapter therefore sets 
out to describe the wider economic context which currently exists and which is 
likely to exist in the near future, as it impacts upon the energy investments proposed 
by the EPRET project. The issues addressed in this chapter are more specific than 
those covered in EPRET Paper 3, The development context for energy planning in South 
AjriCQ, which described the general development arena as it pertains to all sectors 
of the country. 
One aim of this chapter is to identify the potential for government, individual and 
other sources to supply the necessary investment capital. The chapter has four main 
sections: first, a description of the macro-economic environment related to energy 
planning; secondly, a brief description of some key micro-economic considerations 
related to household income and energy expenditures; thirdly, several principles 
are offered which, it is suggested, should guide the subsequent analysis of financing 
sources for household energy policies; finally, a brief description of two household 
energy scenarios which are used to assist in analysing (in subsequent chapters) the 
financial and economic impacts of policy options. 
2.2 The macro-economic context of energy 
investment and expenditure 
It is clear that government in South Africa wiJl increasingly have to address the 
demands of the newly enfranchised electorate for improved social and private 
services, such as education, health care, water and sanitation services, housing and 
social security. These demands are likely to be given expression in many forms and 
at all levels of government. At the same time the government has to manage, and 
attempt to reverse, the current economic crisis: unemployment of nearly 50%, a 
trend of negative economic growth, a large budget deficit (nearly 9% of GOP), and 
low levels of investment. Indeed, it has been suggested that the combination of 
these economic and other factors means that South Africa enters the next stage of 
transformation to a political democracy on a very weak economic and social footing II 
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(Tucker & Scott 1992). IUs probably not even correct to say that a democratic 
government will have to 'maintain' macro-economic balance, because the economy 
is currently in, or close to, a state of imbalance. 
While the state of the macro-economy is currently not conducive to ambitious 
energy investments there are, nonetheless, many potential sources of finance to 
which the energy sector has, or can gain, access. One possible avenue, the potential 
for the state to increase expenditure levels or to divert them towards the energy 
sector, will be explored below. 
2.2.1 Current and future fiscal expenditure 
The functional breakdown of general government expenditure for 1982/83 and the 
most recent estimate for 1993/94 is shown in Figure 2.1. It is clear that significant 
shifts have occurred during this period, the most significant being the decreases in 
allocations to defence and economic services (which includes roads, agriculture and 
manufacturing), and the increases in education, social services (such as pensions), 
and 'other' (due mainly to increases in finance charges). 
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FIGURE 2.1 Functional classification of general government 
expenditure, 1982/83 and 1993/94 
(CSS 1990, 1993) 
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It has been argued that there is little scope for the government to increase expendi-
ture levels significantly, without jeopardising macro-economic balance further 
(Van der Bergh 1991: 85). While additional revenue-raising mechanisms such as 
capital gains taxes have not yet been implemented in South Africa, the overall tax 
burden on the economy is already fairly high and offers little scope for large or 
rapid increases (Loots 1991: 56). Taxes such as a capital gains tax are unlikely to 
collect significant amounts for the fiscus. Interesting options exist, however, for the 
government to raise additional sources of revenue within the energy sector. The 
levy on petroleum products is traditionally a major source of revenue in many 
countries. In South Africa, the fuel levy amounts to roughly 50% of the petrol pump 
price, and raised R8 billion in 1992/93, or 10% of fiscal revenue (EDRC 1993: 63). 
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Other energy subsectors, however, are not taxed in a similar way, even though a 
relatively small percentage increase could generate considerable government in-
come. For instance, a 5% surcharge on wholesale electricity prices would be 
relatively easy to administer and would have generated gross revenue of about 
R633 million in 1992, based on Eskom' s sales volumes and wholesale prices (Eskom 
1993a: 2). Likewise, a 5% surcharge on coal prices would have raised R223 million 
from domestic coal sales in 1991 and R213 million from export coal sales (DMEA 
1992: 27). 
These amounts are not insignificant, and are of the same order of magnitude as the 
costs of the policies proposed in this project. Clearly, it would be essential to 
investigate the effects on consumer price levels of such taxes, as well as their 
distributional effects, since such indirect taxes may have greater negative effects on 
the poor than more specifically-targeted mechanisms aimed at wealthy individuals 
iiDd companies. Further, such taxes may disadvantage South African producers in 
relation to international competitors, especially in the short term, although the 
converse could also occur in the longer term, when price increases in historically 
cheap products may encourage greater efficiency and competitiveness. Conse-
quently, for government to seriously consider the imposition of additional taxes 
and levies on other energy commodities such as electricity and coal, it would have 
to weigh the benefits ofadditional revenue against the costs flowing from higher 
prices to individual and corporate consumers. Nonetheless, scope may exist for 
appropriation of revenue from such sources. 
Asi.de from such options, the main prerequisite for an increase in government 
revenue, is rapid economic growth. In the short term, therefore, the main option 
for government seeking to increase redistributive expenditure, will be to alter the 
composition of the budget. It is possible to gain an idea of the potential to effect such 
shifts within the current budget structure, by comparing South Africa's pattern of 
government expenditure with those of other middle-income countries such as 
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FIGURE 2.2 Government expenditure by South Africa and other 
middle-income countries in 1990 
(CSS 1993; World Bank 1992: 239) 
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It is apparent that South Africa's level of expenditure on social services (education, 
health and social security) is comparable to, or even higher than, those of other 
countries with similar income levels and economy sizes. This suggests that rela-
tively limited increases are possible in levels of expenditure on social services. 
Whilst it may be expected that further cuts could be achieved in the defence 
function, sometimes referred to as the 'peace dividend' (van den Bergh 1991: 82), 
this is not likely to be very significant. The portion of this budget allocated to the 
Defence Force has been decreasing steadily since the peak during the Angolan war, 
while the portion allocated to police and prison services has been increasing 
rapidly. Given the current levels of violence, and assuming that these will not 
disappear overnight, future savings in this area may be less significant than hoped. 
This notwithstanding, there remains considerable scope for allocating existing 
budgets in a more efficient and equitable manner. In particular, the fiscal allocation 
to the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) offers this potential. 
2.2.2 Trends in the budgetary allocation to the DMEA 
The budgetary allocation to the DMEA is included under the 'economic services' 
functional allocation. The Department's budget for 1993/94 was R708 million (SA 
Treasury 1993: 17-1), equivalent to only 0.5% of total budgeted government expen-
diture for the year. The historical trend in the DMEA's budget allocation is shown 
in Figure 2.3 in nominal and real terms. 
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FIGURE 2.3 Trends in fiscal allocation to the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs, 1971/72 to 1993/94 
(Auf der Heyde 1993) 
By far the largest beneficiary from the DMEA's budget allocation over the past 20 
years or more has been the nuclear industry. The portion of the Ministry's funds 
allocated to the nuclear sector increased from 40% in 1971/72 to a peak of 89% in 
1986/87 when the nuclear weapons programme was underway (auf der Heyde 
1993). At present, this portion has dropped to around two-thirds of the budget. The 
trend in the portion of the DMEA (prior to 1978 the Department of Mines) budget 
which has been allocated to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) and other 
nuclear agencies is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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FIGURE 2.4 Percentage of DMEA budget allocated to nuclear industry, 
1971/72 to 1993/94 





FIGURE 2.5 Breakdown of DMEA energy expenditure (excluding 
nuclear industry) for 1991/92 
(NEG 1992) 
Moreover, it is highly questionable whether these huge accumulated investments 
in the AEC have delivered benefits which are justifiable from an national perspec-
tive. If the main motivation for the AEC's existence has been to support nuclear 
electricity generation, then its output has been singularly disappointing: fuel for 
four of the nine years of Koeberg's operation to date, and then only for one of its 
two reactors, and this a cost premium in relation to imported fuels (Eberhard & van 
Horen 1993: 33). Not only has the state subsidised the production of nuclear fuels, 
but it has also financed the development of at least six atomic bombs. Clearly, 
therefore, fiscal support for the AEC over more than 20 years has been very 
II 
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expensive and has produced little value added in return. This is an important area 
in which state expenditure can be re-allocated towards socially and economically 
productive purposes. 
Of the total budget allocation for 1993/94, approximately 29% was allocated to the 
minerals section, 67% to the nuclear industry and the remainder to the non-nuclear 
energy sector. Most of the budget allocation to the energy branch is spent on the 
coal sector, although the energy for development sector (concerned mainly with 
household energy issues) is receiving a growing share of the total budget. The 
breakdown for 1991/92 expenditure by the energy branch (excluding nuclear 
energy) is shown in Figure 2.5. 
The total of the items shown in Figure 2.5 represented only 3% of the DMEA' s total 
budget for that year. It is therefore apparent from the previous figures that a 
considerable portion of government energy expenditure is directed towards sup-
porting the nuclear industry's operations, whereas only a very small percentage 
(less than 1% in 1991/92) is aimed directly at household energy policy. It has been 
argued that this allocation is not justifiable on efficiency, equity and sustain ability 
grounds (EDRC 1993). There is therefore considerable scope for more effective 
utilisation of the DMEA's budgetary resources. This is important in relation to, for 
example, the need for subsidy finance for specific areas such as rural electrification 
and low-smoke coal development (as discussed later in this paper). 
2.2.3 Current levels of energy investment and expenditure 
As in many other countries, the energy sector accounts for a significant portion of 
total capital investment in the national economy. When the energy sector is evalu-
ated together with the minerals and related industrial sectors, as part of the 
minerals-energy complex (MEC), then its role in the economy becomes even more 
significant. According to Rustomjee (1992), the MEC accounts for around 25% of 
total GDP, considerably more than the manufacturing sector's 15% contribution. 
Alternatively, total energy sector investment can be disaggregated according to the 
major commercial energy subsectors: electricity, petroleum and coal. Likewise, the 
level of government expenditure in each of the sectors will be addressed below. 
The electricity sector 
The main institutions making direct investments in the electricity sector are Eskom 
and the myriad of municipal distributors. Apart from general investments in fixed 
property and operating assets, two categories of investment can be identified for 
present purposes: expansion to generation capacity, and extension of the domestic 
electricity grid to previously unelectrified households. Capital expenditure by 
Eskom on power stations has, in the past, been responsible for a very significant 
portion of Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI). At its peak in 1985, Eskom's 
capital expenditure was R5.25 billion, or, if inflated at 12% per annum, the equiva-
lent of about R13 billion in 1993 (Eskom 1992: 43). This represented 18% of GDFI in 
1985 (SARB 1991: 58). This level of investment, however, has declined considerably 
because of the over-capacity on the national system, and in 1992 Eskom invested 
about R3.6 billion (less than 25% of the 1985 peak). This represented a more modest 
7% of 1992 GDFI (SARB 1993: 92). 
The second category of capital expenditure in the electricity sector, is for the 
connection of unelectrified dwellings to the national grid. In 1992, about 200 000 
new connections were made at a total capital cost of approximately R600 million. 
Eskom accounted for roughly three-quarters of this, with municipal distributors 
responsible for the remainder. At present rates of connection, therefore, the capital 
requirements for electrification are relatively small in relation to historic levels of 
investment in power stations. Even if the connection rate is increased to 500 000 per 
year, the capital requirements for these connections will still be considerably less 
than the investment required for a large coal-fired power station. 
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While most electricity institutions are in the public sector, the state has historically 
not played any significant direct role in the financing of investment. Generally, the 
electricity institutions are sources of net surpluses, which, in the case of Eskom have 
been retained and reinvested, and, in the case of white municipal electricity 
distributors, have usually been applied to subsidise other municipal services. One 
exception to the general rule of no state expenditure on electricity are the govern-
ment subsidies to Eskom in respect of the connection costs of a number of white 
farmers, who were electrified for the apartheid government's political reasons. 
The petroleum sector 
In contrast to the electricity sector, most institutions in the petroleum sector are in 
the private sector. The exceptions to this are the synthetic fuel corporations: 
Mossgas and, until fairly recently, Sasol- these will be dealt with later. 
The petroleum companies are responsible for significant amounts of capital invest-
ment, in respect of refineries and other fixed assets. Apart from the Sasol and 
Mossgas plants, there are four refineries in Cape Town, Durban and Sasolburg, 
representing total investments of several billion rand. In 1992, expansions to these 
refineries entailed new investment of about R700 million, which was financed by a 
combination of retained earnings and local and foreign capital(EDRC 1993: 58).1t 
js anticipated that investment by these oil majors in the period 1992 to 1995 will be 
in the region of R6.6 billion (EDRC 1993: 58). 
The synthetic fuel industry, on the other hand, has benefited from considerable 
transfers from the public sector since Sasol I was established in the early 1950s. All 
three Sasol plants were financed, at least partially, by the fiscus, at a total estimated 
cost (in 1985 Rands) of about RIO billion (Eberhard & Trollip 1992: 14). In current 
terms, this investment is equivalent to more than double the 1985 nominal cost. In 
the case of Mossgas the total capital cost, according to the Minister responsible, was 
almost R11 billion (Bartlett 1993: 11). At the peak of Mossgas' construction, it 
accounted for 6% of the country's GDFI (Scott et al 1992: 13). The efficacy of both 
synfuel operations has been questioned, as both were motivated largely by the 
state's desire to achieve greater self-sufficiency in the face of international censure 
of apartheid (Eberhard & van Horen 1993). The Mossgas project in particular is 
uneconomical at currently prevailing oil prices, and a recent report by the Auditor-
General acknowledges that the original loan from the state is unlikely to be repaid. 
Not only have the synfuel operations received direct capital investment from the 
public sector, but they also enjoy operational subsidies to cover the excess of their 
production costs over the current oil prices. While Mossgas has only recently come 
onstream, Sasol has received these subsidies for many years. In essence, Sasol is 
guaranteed a floor price of $23 per barrel for its synfuel production, whereas actual 
prices have generally been well below this level. It has been estimated that the total 
transfer from end-users of petroleum products to Sasol in 1992 was about R450 
million (EHR 1993: 24), representing a subsidy to Sasol of 10.8 c/litre of its produc-
tion, and a premium of 3.4 c/litre on all petrol sold in the country. While the synfuel 
industry has created positive spin-offs in addition to the foreign exchange saved, 
such as Sasol' s petrochemical operations, these have been very expensive. 
Tlte coal sector 
The coal sector plays a central role in the South African economy. Coal is the 
feedstock for over 80% of the country's electricity and for the Sasol synfuel process. 
It is also a significant foreign exchange earner, and in 1992 was the second largest 
contributor (R4.3 billion or 15%) to minerals export revenue {excluding diamonds) 
after gold (R18.8 billion or 64%) (von Glehn 1993). From an investment point of 
view, however, the coal sector is presently not in an expansionary phase, and 
current levels of investment are much lower than in past decades. Moreover, capital 
for investment purposes is derived from the private sector. II 
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Consumption of coal by households represents a very small proportion, less than 
2%, of the total volume of coal sales, and even less by value. Consequently, there 
are no major investment implications of household coal consumption relevant to 
this discussion. 
2.3 The micro-economic context of energy investment 
and expenditure 
The levels of household investment in energy-related assets and expenditure on 
energy services is highly variable across the population. Even among the focus 
group of the present study, the urban and rural poor, these levels vary widely. 
Moreover, the availability of income and expenditure data, and its accuracy, is less 
than ideal. 
Nonetheless, several important generalisations can be made. Firstly, poor house-
holds generally spend a higher proportion of their income on energy than wealthier 
households, suggesting that energy displays income-inelastic characteristics. In 
other words, energy is an essential service, or a basic need, so that a lack of choice 
regarding energy use will exacerbate constraints operating on the poor. Secondly, 
income flows in many poor households tend to be erratic and inconsistent. This 
makes it difficult for them to meet regular financial obligations, such as monthly 
rent and service payments, or repayment of credit. This has important implications 
for methods of pricing, financing and delivery of energy services, and is one reason, 
for example, why many poor households prefer prepayment-metering for electric-
ity - they are able to consume only as much as they can afford. Thirdly, access to 
credit is generally very low for poor households. Institutions in the formal lending 
sector obviously view poor households as high-risk customers and accordingly 
require high rates of return to compensate them for this risk, or refuse to provide 
credit. As a result, many poor households rely on informal saving and lending 
associations (such as 'stokvels') to finance large expenditures on items like stoves 
and refrigerators. Again, this is important from a policy perspective, because the 
lack of access to credit represents an insurmountable barrier to entry into markets 
in which there are high up-front costs. The onus should therefore shift to the 
relevant development institutions to facilitate this access to finance for poor house-
holds. Finally, an objective of household energy policy must be to widen the range 
of choices which households are faced with in meeting their energy needs. This 
should enable poor households to satisfy their energy requirements, or at least a 
portion thereof, at a lower cost than is currently possible. In some cases, households 
are forced to use relatively expensive and inefficient fuels for certain end-uses, such 
as candles for lighting and batteries for radio and television. A wider range of 
choices should translate into lower energy expenditure and thereby release finan-
cial resources for other purposes, whether related to energy services or not. 
2.4 Principles to guide the financing of energy 
investments 
This section proposes a number of principles which may guide the financing of 
energy investments, and which constitute a set of assumptions which underlie the 
subsequent analyses. · 
2.4.1 Maintain overall macro-economic balance 
Fundamental to energy policy is an assumption that economic policy will seek to 
maintain (or pursue) overall macro-economic balance: that is, government will 
avoid excessive deficit financing or money creation, and the balance of payments 
will be managed so as to prevent excessive deficits. In other words, economic 
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policy, which will have redistribution as a high priority, must recognise the limita-
tions on available resources and must essentially maintain government activity 
within its means. The importance of maintaining reasonable macro-economic 
balance lies in the dangers of excessive government spending, which would have 
to be financed either by increased borrowings or the creation of more money, or by 
a combination of the two. The former may impose enormous burdens on the fiscus 
in the future due to capital repayments and finance charges which often also entail 
outflows on the balance of payments, while the latter results directly in inflationary 
pressure. Beyond a certain point, these conditions can become self-reinforcing, 
resulting in a 'debt crisis' and/or hyper-inflation. In some respects, this principle 
presupposes that the economic variables are currently in balance but, as mentioned 
earlier, this is not the case. Nonetheless, the importance of maintaining control over 
government spending and expansion appears to be recognised by most political 
actors. · 
2.4.2 Energy and other services to be prioritised 
Whilst EPRET's focus is, by definition, on the energy needs of households, it is 
important to stress that energy is only one of many services urgently requiring 
investment and development. The national priorities in coming years are many, 
and of great scale: including housing, education, health, and water and sanitation 
services. In many respects energy requirements are of lower priority than some of 
these and should not divert resources from areas of greater need. 
Two perspectives are relevant here: firstly, account must be taken, at the micro level, 
of the preferences of end-users, and their priorities must inform the allocation of 
resources. This is more relevant to development at the project or programme level. 
The second perspective is at the macro level, where policy-making must attempt to 
allocate resources according to areas of greatest national need. 
In some respects, there is a danger that the energy sector may attract a greater share 
of national resources than would theoretically be desirable, because it has strong 
institutions and can access resources more effectively than many other sectors. For 
instance, the water and sanitation sector does not have any national water utilities 
equivalent to Eskom, nor are there strong private sector corporations as in the 
petroleum industry. It is difficult to counter this potential bias towards the energy 
sector. One way is by ensuring that the resources within the energy sector are 
employed to the full, before any external allocations are made (such as from 
government budgets). As will be discussed, there are considerable amounts of 
finance available within the energy sector itself. 
2.4.3 Financing and pricing arrangements to maintain financial viability 
of institutions 
It is suggested that the point of departure in establishing financing arrangements 
and setting price levels should be that broad cost-reflectiveness and cost recovery 
are achieved. The experience of numerous utilities and institutions, especially in 
African and Latin American countries after independence, has been that price levels 
have been kept down by governments in order to make services affordable to the 
poor, or to appease their constituencies, to such an extent that utilities have become 
economically crippled. In the longer term, the inability of institutions to meet their 
revenue requirements from their own consumers has severely impaired their 
capacity to deliver services as mandated. Consequently, it is essential that service 
delivery in the energy sector pursue, as a starting point, the principles of cost 
reflectiveness and cost recovery. 
The suggestion that cost reflectiveness should be the point of departure for financ-
ing and pricing policies does not imply that it is also where financing and pricing 
policies must stop; the use of grant finance or cross-subsidisation is not precluded. 
In fact, as will become apparent later, a crucial issue for policy-making in the Ill 
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financing and pricing arenas, is to 'get the prices wrong' while maintaining overall 
economic viability. More specifically, it is possible to design financing and pricing 
regimes in which individual consumer classes benefit by transfers from other 
classes through, for example, cross-subsidisation. Such departures from narrow 
cost-reflectiveness principles are acceptable, provided they can be adequately 
justified, in order, for example, to achieve redistributive transfers, whilst simulta-
neously not compromising overall financial viability. 
2.5 A brief description of two household energy 
scenarios 
This section briefly outlines two scenarios which describe the patterns of, and 
trends in, household energy use over the period to 2010. These scenarios are used 
as tools to assist in the analysis of the financial and economic impacts of policy 
options emanating from the EPRET sectoral studies. 
2.5.1 Business as usual scenario 
Under this scenario, current conditions in the household energy sector are projected 
into the future. Consequently, the main trend here will be that the current electri-
fication programme proceeds with connection rates of about 250 000 per annum, 
before dropping off by the end of the decade to about 150 000. No substantial 
changes are envisaged in the current pricing arrangements, the structure and 
governance of the electricity supply industry or the financing of electrification. 
Under such a scenario, about two-thirds of households will have access to electricity 
by 2010. 
Other energy subsectors are expected to see little change under this scenario, and 
the impact of policy efforts such as the Biomass Initiative will be limited. Likewise, 
the current problems associated with fuelwood scarcity will persist, as will the 
environmental and health hazards experienced by poor households: indoor air 
pollution, paraffin poisoning, and burns and fires from non-electric sources of 
energy. Relatively little attention will be devoted to improving access to energy 
services for poor households or small-scale enterprises in either urban or rural 
areas. 
Essentially this scenario is characterised by a lethargy in household energy policy, 
with poor integration of demand and supply considerations, and a fairly narrow 
focus on increasing electricity supply rather than a providing the optimal mixture 
of energy sources for particular end-uses. Whilst in reality there will clearly be 
policy initiatives other than electrification, these are considered insignificant for the 
present analysis. Where such interventions are likely to be significant, they are 
accounted for in the integrated energy planning (IEP) scenario. 
2.5.2 Integrated energy planning scenario 
This scenario describes a set of household energy· policies for the next decade and 
a half, on the assumption that the principles of IEP are applied and implemented. 
The scenario is informed by the three goals of sustainable development: economic 
efficiency, social equity and environmental quality. Of these three, the principal 
goal is to improve equity- by increasing the access of the urban and rural poor to 
cleaner, more convenient sources of energy at affordable prices. 
The first principal feature of this scenario is the extent of the electrification pro-
gramme, as well as the structural changes which are required to give effect to it. A 
primary goal will be to provide as many households as possible with access to 
electricity by about 2010. The percentage of the population which will be connected 
depends on a number of factors, such as household income levels, connection costs, 
the availability of finance, tariff levels, consumption levels, and availability of 
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alternatives; for present purposes it is assumed that 85-90% of households will be 
electrified by 2010. This would entail an annual connection rate double that of the 
business-as-usual scenario. By the end of the next decade the connection rate would 
be sufficient to keep pace with the rate of new household formation. 
The second feature of the IEP scenario is an explicit recognition that electricity may 
not be the optimal source of energy for all end-uses, and therefore energy policy 
will incorporate other supply and demand interventions to optimise the mix 
between energy sources and end-uses. Consequently, there will be a major thrust 
to replace conventional bituminous coal with low-smoke coal. The main motivation 
will be to reduce air pollution levels both indoors and outdoors; secondary goals 
will be to utilise some of the approximately 40 million tons of discard coal produced 
annually, and to increase the income-earning opportunities of poor people in 
small-scale manufacturing activities. This policy will aim to gradually eliminate 
household use of conventional coal, and to encourage its substitution firstly by 
low-smoke coal, and also by electricity, gas and possibly paraffin (as appropriate). 
At the same time, the IEP scenario envisages an improved distribution network for 
gas and paraffin, especially in rural areas and urban townships. The aim will be to 
reduce the inefficiencies and unnecessarily high mark-ups currently found towards 
the end of the distribution chain. The aim would be to lower prices to consumers, 
to encourage oil companies and distributors to extend their networks into areas 
presently unserviced. 
Firewood is likely to remain the major source of energy for cooking and heating in 
rural areas for many years. Policy will therefore aim to secure energy supplies for 
rural households, through a mixture of natural woodland management, social 
forestry and woodlot development, encouraging small-growers, and the use of 
commercial wastes. At the same time, fuelwood demand may be influenced 
through improvements in access to gas and paraffin supplies, as well as to electric-
ity. 
Under this scenario, demand-side management programmes will attempt to im-
prove the efficiency of energy-use at household and macro levels. Firstly, energy-
efficient structures will be encouraged, in both existing and newly-built housing 
stock. Secondly, specific interventions by electricity utilities will seek to improve 
the penetration of energy-efficient appliances. Thirdly, time-of-use tariffs will be 
implemented to encourage shifts in electricity use to off-peak periods. Finally, 
appliance-labelling programmes will be implemented to provide consumers with 
information about the efficiency of appliances. 
This scenario involves building on existing initiatives of a wide range of actors in 
the energy sector, and implementing policies on both the demand and supply sides. 
Many structural changes are required, for example in the system of policy-making 
and regulation of the energy sector as a whole and its subsectors. These have been 
more fully described in the relevant EPRET papers; subsequent chapters of this 
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energy policies 
This chapter assesses the financing implications of the main energy subsectors 
addressed in the Energy Policy Research and Training Project: including electrifi-
cation, fuelwood provision, low-smoke coal development, a range of gas and 
paraffin interventions, and demand-side management strategies. As such, this 
chapter is essentially concerned with the integrated energy planning (IEP) scenario 
outlined in Chapter 2. Each of the major policy sectors is addressed separately. 
Where relevant, current financing arrangements are described, and proposals are 
made regarding potential additional sources of finance. In some cases, recommen-
dations are made around the establishment or use of specific mechanisms or 
institutions to raise and allocate finance for particular policies. 
3.1 The financing of electrification 
This section has five main components: firstly, it presents a number of principles 
which, it is suggested, should guide the financing of electrification. Secondly, it 
describes the current situation in the electricity supply industry regarding financ-
ing sources and mechanisms. Thirdly, it identifies a number of key questions which 
define the current research agenda and, fourthly, makes several policy proposals 
in an attempt to answer these questions. Finally, it provides an indication of the 
amounts of finance which may be required for an illustrative national electrification 
scenario. 
There are two main reasons for undertaking investment and financial planning in 
EPRET. Firstly, energy policy planning takes place in a situation where finite 
resources are available to meet needs which are, in effect, almost infinite; therefore 
investment planning assesses whether the resource demands are feasible given the 
overall resource constraints or ceiling. If not, then an iterative process will be 
necessary, so as to match the proposed supply and demand interventions with 
available resources. The availability of economic resources is only one (although 
critical) constraint on energy planning, along with others like political, environ-
mental and social factors. Secondly, investment planning represents the final 
translation of the energy policy proposals into a common monetary unit. This 
allows for cost comparisons and cost/benefit analyses, both internal to the energy 
plan, and externally with alternative areas for investment/expenditure such as 
housing, health, and education. 
While the term 'finance' has many dimensions, its meaning should not be too 
controversial. For present purposes it may be useful to highlight a distinction 
between loan and grant finance. The former generally involves a commitment by 
the borrower to repay, at some future date, the amount received; the loan may or 
may not carry interest. Grant finance generally does not include any commitment 
by the recipient to repay the original amount. This distinction is important for the 
discussion which follows. A related distinction occurs around concessionary finance, 
which generally entails the granting of a benefit to the borrower in relation to the 
terms under which finance is granted. Concessionary finance may range from a 
small discount in the interest rate, to a delay in the commencement of interest and 
capital repayments, to an unconditional grant. All sources of finance fall some-
where along the spectrum between market-related and grant finance. 
In many respects the current discussion intersects with electricity pricing policy, 
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another key focus of the EPRET project. Financing and pricing are closely inter-
linked, and the boundaries between the two are frequently crossed in this chapter. 
3.1.1 General principles governing the financing of electrification 
The financing of electrification, and other goods and services which are in or near 
the public domain, is inherently influenced by political and ideological views. This 
cannot be avoided but can lead to unnecessary confusion if the underlying princi-
ples are not spelt out. Consequently, this section attempts to present a number of 
fairly broad principles which should guide the financing aspects of the detailed 
policy formulation process. These might not be supported by all actors in the energy 
f;ector, but it is hoped that they have, at least, a measure of internal consistency. 
{i) Financing and pricing policies should maintain the financial viability of 
electricity utilities 
A financially viable electricity supply industry (ESI) is an essential precondition for 
a reliable and high-quality supply of electricity to households and commercial users 
in the long term. It is a fundamental point of departure of the present proposals 
that electricity utilities, such as Eskom and future electricity distributors, should 
manage their financial operations in such a way as to maintain their status as going 
concerns. This is necessary if utilities are to maintain their capacity to finance 
electrification of households well in to the next century and, in the case of electricity 
generation, for Eskom to be able to finance further capacity expansion as and when 
required. 
Eskom's sound financial track record might cast some doubts as to the primacy of 
this principle or, at least, as to its foregrounding in this discussion. This foreground-
ing is made, however, precisely to emphasise that the present financial viability of 
Eskom and some distributors should not be compromised if the ESI is to deliver on 
social and economic demands more effectively in the future. The experience of 
numerous electricity utilities in Africa, Latin America and Asia suggests over-
whelmingly .that financing and pricing policies must be financially sustainable in 
the long term. This principle should not be misinterpreted to mean, however, that 
utilities should operate exclusively according to narrowly-defined financial crite-
ria, without consideration of the possibilities of, and necessity for, departures from 
conventional market principles. In fact, much of the present discussion is concerned 
with identifying ways of departing from these principles in a manner which is 
economically and financially sustainable in the long term. 
(ii) Public finance is necessary where private funds are inadequate 
Following on from the previous principle, the first choice of sources of financing 
for energy investments should be the direct users or beneficiaries themselves. This 
means that the first responsibility is for people to attempt to pay for energy goods 
and appliances themselves - from income, savings, or funds from family, friends, 
lenders, and so on. In other words, electricity utilities should seek, as a first step, to 
recover costs from their customers. However, it is patently clear that there are many 
reasons why this principle, in isolation, would result in an undesirable situation -
where better-off people would obtain the services they desire, while the worse-off 
would never be able to access improved energy sources. The reasons are obvious 
enough not to have to be listed here, save to say that significantly improved equity 
of access to electricity will not be achieved without direct public intervention. The 
implication of this principle is that financing and pricing policies should, as far as 
possible, be structured according to people's existing abilities to pay and, where 
necessary, should ensure that mechanisms exist to provide access to the service for 
those whose inability to afford it by themselves would otherwise exclude them. 
Essentially, this position accepts that cost recovery is the overall (though not 
exclusive) goal, but that where cost recovery is impossible interventions will be 
required to achieve the policy objectives (such as widening access to electricity). m 
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This position is informed by an interpretation of the South African economy in 
future years which suggests that the public sector will be very stretched to meet 
demands for redistributive expenditure and that the onus should not be automat-
ically placed on the state to meet all the needs of the poor from its own resources. 
Rather, the private sector (which includes not only households but also, for exam-
ple, insurance companies) has significant resources which should be utilised before 
drawing upon state resources. 
(iii) External subsidy finance to be applied first to reduce capital costs for all 
connections 
External subsidy finance (from, for example, the state, or foreign and private 
donors) is likely to become available for electrification at various stages of the 
electrification programme. These inflows are not likely to be smooth, however, and 
are certain not to be sustained. This money could be allocated in many ways - to 
benefit existing consumers, to electrify as large a number of households as possible, 
or to benefit all households which have been and will be electrified under the 
programme. It is proposed here, as a matter of principle, that grant finance desig-
nated for electrification should be allocated to subsidise capital costs of all low-in-
come households which have been electrified in recent years and those which will 
be electrified under the national programme. The reasons for establishing this 
principle are as follows: 
• It is a more productive use of resources to apply them to capital expenditure (new 
connections) rather than to reduce operating costs for existing customers (lower 
tariffs). By their nature, operating discounts will be temporary and will produce 
limited lasting benefits, whereas new connections will increase the flow of 
benefits over a longer time. Moreover, allocation of subsidies to reduce operat-
ing costs would benefit only those who already have electricity. In other words, 
by allocating subsidies to capital costs, the barriers to entry posed by high 
connection costs can be removed or at least reduced, thereby widening access 
to a greater number of people. 
• If grant finance is to be allocated to provide more people with access to electricity, 
then the most equitable approach is to spread its benefits as equally as possible 
among all households in the electrification programme, rather than those lucky 
enough to be participants in electrification projects at the particular time the 
finance becomes available. The mechanisms through which this can be achieved 
are discussed later. 
e There may be a higher risk and cost if grant finance is applied to reduce 
operating costs: operating subsidies can become entrenched insofar as it be-
comes politically difficult to reduce or eliminate them, and they may have higher 
administrative costs over time. 
This principle refers to the use of subsidy finance which may become available from 
external sources, that is, from groups other than domestic electricity consumers. 
The different case of internal cross-subsidies is discussed below. 
(iv) Cross-subsidisation is important, as it can help achieve equity goals while 
maintaining overall cost recovery and financial viability 
The use of cross-subsidies is important, as it can improve the affordability of 
electricity services to the poor through transfers from more wealthy to less wealthy 
consumers. If a balance is maintained, such that the resource base from which the 
subsidy is drawn is large enough not to be adversely affected by the additional 
imposed cost, then the system as a whole can be financially and politically sustain-
able. 
Two kinds of cross-subsidisation are relevant here. Firstly, a straight line tariff (such 
as Eskom's 5-tariff or the tariff proposed in the IEP scenario) contains an inherent 
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cross-subsidy since, at low levels of consumption, the supply authority is under-
recovering its fixed costs from consumers while, above the break-even point (about 
350kWh per month for the 51 tariff), consumers will effectively be paying a surplus. 
A full discussion of pricing policy is beyond the scope of this paper; nonetheless, it 
is suggested that cross-subsidisation within the domestic consumer base can be 
achieved so as to be progressive (that is, redistributive towards the poor), as well 
as being financially sustainable in the consumer base as a whole, provided the over-
and under-recoveries balance each other over time. The second kind of cross-sub-
sidy occurs at a different level: between consumer groups for which tariffs do not 
reflect differentials in marginal costs of supply. At present, this kind of cross-sub-
sidisation occurs, for example, from consumers in the PWV area to consumers in 
the Cape or other areas far from the main generation base in the Eastern Transvaal, 
because domestic tariffs do not fully reflect geographical differences in transmis-
sion costs. Similarly, a national or regional domestic tariff would entail a cross-sub-
sidy from consumers for whom marginal costs of supply are lower than the tariff, 
to those whose supply costs are equal to or above the tariff. As will become apparent 
later, this cross-subsidy can be a major source of finance for the ESI and for 
electrification. 
(v) Considerable local sources of finance are available 
South Africa differs from many developing countries in that it has much greater 
local resources in general and accumulated wealth and savings in particular (even 
though control thereof is highly concentrated and racially skewed). Furthermore, 
the investment requirements for household energy policies are generally much 
smaller than the investment requirements for integrated energy plans in other 
countries, which often involve expansion of generation capacity. These two factors 
combined mean that, unlike in other developing countries, much of the investment 
requirements for a national electrification programme can be met from local 
sources, at least in the short and medium terms. Only if investment levels and 
economic growth pick up dramatically in the coming decade might investment 
funds become scarce (and more expensive) locally, making it necessary to seek 
foreign funding for development investments. The extent of dependence on foreign 
funding to finance electrification is therefore not significant. 
This point is underscored when the scale of investment required for household 
electrification is compared to the sums involved in other large-scale investments 
(either in South Africa in the past, or in other developing countries now). The 
comparison reveals that the capital requirements for electrification are similar to, 
or less than, the requirements for the construction of major power facilities, or for 
the investments in Sasol, Mossgas and the AEC- moreover, the social return from 
electrification is likely to far exceed the returns from some of these investments. 
The South African energy sector is particularly fortunate compared to other local 
development and service sectors, and compared to many other developing coun-
tries, in that it has significant internal sources of revenue and savings which could, 
theoretically, be applied to new investment. In fact, some of the revenue in the 
energy sector is currently appropriated by various levels of government and 
transferred to other sectors: for example, the fuel levy on petroleum sales, which 
contributes about 10% of total government revenue in South Africa, and electricity 
surpluses in white local authorities, which are used to subsidise rates and taxes. It 
is suggested, therefore, that the revenue base of the electricity supply industry 
might be utilised more effectively to support national development goals, such as 
electrification. Possible measures will be addressed later. 
3. 1.2 Current financing a11angement for household electrification 
Electrification expenditure can usually be financed from two sides: by the house-
hold being connected, and by the distributor doing the connecting. If the household 
is unable to organise finance itself, then the distributor generally has to raise Iii 
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finance. From the perspective of the household, there are several ways in which its 
connection to the grid can be financed at present: 
1. If electricity is included in the construction of a house from the beginning, and 
the house construction is purchased with the assistance of a mortgage bond 
from a bank or building society, then the capital connection cost is included 
along with the rest of the cost price, and is also repaid over the lifetime of the 
mortgage (15 to 30 years). This option is available only to people who qualify 
for mortgage lending, which has historically been only the relatively wealthy. 
A stable and adequate income is generally the most important prerequisite for 
this kind of financing. 
2. If a household has sufficient cash to pay for connection, a lump sum can be paid 
(say R2 000 or more, depending on the technology). 
3. For the bulk of households unable to afford this amount of cash or to finance 
the connection through a mortgage or other loan (that is, options 1 and 2 are 
excluded), the only option is a tariff system under which the distributor 
initially finances the capital cost and recovers it, with interest, through the 
tariff, over about 15 years. The Eskom 51 tariff and the tariffs of a number of 
local authorities operate in this way. The effect is that households pay an 
additional six cents or so per kWh in respect of the original capital cost which 
was financed by the distributor (given various assumptions, such as average 
consumption of 350 kWh per month for 15 years, and a low real discount rate). 
Lower tariffs may apply to situations where a portion of the connection costs 
has been paid and, therefore, less has to be recovered through the tariff. The 
advantage of this arrangement, therefore, is that the entry barrier for house-
holds with little or no savings is removed or reduced; the disadvantage is that 
they pay higher tariffs than other customers whose capital costs have already 
been paid off (or financed through a housing bond or other loan): a potentially 
unpopular political situation. 
This third option currently applies to almost all of the new connections being made 
in South Africa. A crucial prerequisite is therefore the ability of the distributor to 
raise the finance necessary to pay for the connection. The present structure of the 
EDI means that this onus rests either on Eskom or local authorities- which have 
very different financing capabilities. 
Eskom 
Eskom has a well developed financing capacity, with a treasury department rated 
as one of the top ten in the world in 1992.1t has outstanding debts of about R27.6 
billion, R9.2 billion of which is from foreign sources, and has consistently been able 
to raise money at a lower interest rate than the government. Its biggest bond, the 
Eskom 168 (E168) is a benchmark in South African capital markets, with approxi-
mately R13 billion having been raised through this bond. In addition to its borrow-
ings through instruments such as its bonds, Eskom also seeks loans in capital 
markets and development finance institutions such as the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA). Much of Eskom's past borrowing, and therefore its 
outstanding liabilities, was necessary to finance power station construction. 
Eskom's expenditure on electrification is relatively small in comparison to genera-
tion capacity expansion. In 1992 actual capital expenditure on electrification was 
about R450 million, or about 12% of the total (R3.6 billion). Total capital expenditure 
was financed almost entirely from its cash flow from operations which, after finance 
charges, was just under R4 billion. 
In May 1993 Eskom raised another R600 million through a different kind of 
borrowing agreement, the Electrification Participation Note (EPN, or simply the 
Electrification Bond). The EPN is an innovative financing mechanism which has 
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potentially great significance for future financing of electrification-and of housing 
and other social investments. The EPN is a dedicated-purpose 15-year b9nd, raised 
specifically to finance electrification, carrying a split coupon (interest) rate, which 
js designed to increase over the lifetime of the bond. Eskom pays investors a return 
linked to actual sales made to newly-electrified customers (based on sales on the 
51 tariff), subject to a guaranteed minimum. In essence, therefore, investors (mainly 
life assurance companies and pension funds) receive a return which is at a lower-
than-market rate in the first few years, but which should increase over time, thus 
yielding a market-related return over the full lifetime of the bond. Long-term 
investors are prepared to invest in the bond according to their normal business 
criteria, because they are concerned not with the short-term returns but with 
~verage returns over the whole 15 years; these should be market-related. Moreover, 
they perceive risk to be sufficiently low, because they have a guaranteed minimum 
return (equivalent to nearly 12% in the first issue) and because Eskom is regarded 
~a low-risk borrower. 
This kind of financing mechanism has several advantages. Firstly, because it still 
provides investors with a market-related return, it is, in principle, attractive to 
commercial investors and can therefore tap into the enormous amounts of savings 
invested by the institutional investors. Secondly, although prescribed asset require-
ments (PAR) were scrapped in 1989 after a long battle by the industry, it is possible 
new PARs will be introduced shortly, but with prescribed investments likely to be 
much smaller than before, and more focused on development needs. An instrument 
like the EPN would probably qualify as a prescribed investment and could there-
fore attract large amounts of funds. Thirdly, the successful issue of the EPN has set 
a precedent for institutional investors and is replicable in many other areas of social 
investment, not least of all housing. More specifically it offers possibilities for 
raising finance in a similar way for players in the energy sector other than Eskom. 
This option will be discussed later. 
].ocal authority distributors 
Local authorities have a range of possible sources of finance for electrification. Their 
capabilities vary enormously, however- from being fairly sophisticated in the 
large, white local authorities (WLAs), to being non-existent in politically and 
financially bankrupt black local authorities (BLAs). The actual number of connec-
tions made by LA distributors in 1992 is not known with as much accuracy as for 
Eskom, although it is thought to total about 40 000. The largest portion of these were 
made by the Durban Electricity Department (about 13 000), which has the second 
largest number of customers in the country (Eskom overtook it in 1992). 
One source of finance for electrification capital expenditure by LAs, is their capital 
development funds (CDFs), which have been built up over the years from operating 
surpluses, and which lend money, within the LA, in respect of new development 
projects (usually with interest). These CDFs can be sizeable in the case of larger 
WLAs. LAs can also raise finance on capital markets through the issue of municipal 
bonds, although these do not generally have the same status and tradeability as, 
for example, Eskom bonds. Municipal bonds fell under the category of prescribed 
investments until1989. Another source of finance utilised by local authorities is 
slightly lower cost finance from institutions such as the DBSA. In 1992 the Bank 
made significant financing commitments for electrification projects undertaken by 
both LAs and Eskom. Again, however, this applies only to WLAs- although even 
small municipalities have issued bonds. BLAs, on the other hand, have historically 
lacked the capacity or legitimacy to raise any finance for electrification. 
The inability of LAs to raise sufficient finance is a key constraint on more rapid and 
widespread electrification at present, along with the central problem of their racial 
fragmentation and political illegitimacy. Thus, while Eskom is likely to succeed in 
meeting its share of electrification targets for the next few years (ranging from m 
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160 000 to 200 000 per annum), LAs will almost certainly make little progress under 
the status quo. This issue will be taken up again below. 
3.1.3 Key issues and problems regarding the financing of electrification 
A number of issues and questions will be identified in this section, which essentially 
outlines the key research questions. Possible answers and policies will be offered 
in the next section. 
(i) What is the most effective and equitable way of dealing with any subsidy 
finance wltich may become available? 
Various propositions have been made so far on this issue. Firstly, that the ESI is 
well-resourced: through Eskom, WLAs, non-domestic consumer base, and so on. 
Secondly, that government will face huge demands for social spending, of which 
electrification will be only one; consequently, electrification should not be reliant 
upon state subsidies. 
Nonetheless, it is important that the financing and tariff system should be able to 
accommodate any subsidy finance which may become available. It is probably a fair 
assumption that this money, from the fiscus and/or from foreign donors, will not 
come in a smooth flow. The question is, therefore, how to ensure that this money 
is used most effectively and in St!Ch a way as to benefit those who need it most. It 
would be unfair if certain households received a subsidy just because money was 
available at the particular time they were electrified, while those being electrified 
just before or just after the money was available lost out. It is therefore essential that 
financing arrangements and tariff structures are able to absorb whatever subsidy 
finance becomes available, so that the benefits of that finance are spread as evenly 
as possible over all intended beneficiaries. How can this be achieved? And what 
must be done to ensure that this money is not appropriated or swallowed up by 
bureaucracies or institutions with little positive impact? 
(ii) Should electrification be cross-subsidised by otlter consumers? 
This is a complex question, and can be further broken down. Cross-subsidisation 
for present purposes could be taken to apply either to the connection costs, or to 
the energy costs. Firstly, should there be any cross-subsidisation at all? If not, 
customers will have to pay for the full connection costs themselves (over 15 years 
through the tariff, unless they benefit from capital subsidies), and for the actual 
costs of energy consumed. Clearly, this is the most clean-cut option and is simplest 
to administer, but may exclude the poorest people. Secondly, if it is accepted that 
cross-subsidisation is necessary, then should subsidies come only from within the 
domestic consumer category? If so, the burden would fall most heavily on high-con-
sumption households- would this be affordable?]Thirdly, if cross-subsidisation is 
necessary, could this come from non-domestic consumers? If so, how would the price 
increases affect them? They might be encouraged to replace electricity with other 
fuels (where technically possible), their competitiveness might be compromised 
(for example, the big exporting beneficiators). Conversely, higher electricity prices 
might encourage different directions in industrial development which may be more 
advantageous in the long term, such as less energy-intensive and more skills-inten-
sive development paths. Finally, if a cross-subsidy is to be drawn from other 
consumers to subsidise electrification, how should that money be applied? It could 
be applied to subsidise the energy (or operating) costs of energy use by households 
(in which case it would be relatively open-ended), or the funds so raised could be 
re-allocated to the capital costs of new connections, possibly via a National Electri-
fication Fund. 
(iii) How to finance rural electrification (RE), and wlten? 
The way Eskom and other distributors are currently approaching electrification, 
poorer and rural areas will be electrified only after all 'viable' (that is, financially 
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viable) areas/homes have been connected. This way, rural electrification (RE) will 
happen towards the end of the programme (1 0-15 years), which means that the poor 
will once again be ignored in the meanwhile- and, maybe, if there are insufficient 
resources, ignored forever. How then can current financial arrangements ensure 
that RE succeeds? And can we avoid the prioritisation of urban/wealthier /higher-
level consumers ahead of rural/ poorer /lower-level consumers? In fact, should this 
timing be inverted? It seems that this is a clear conflict between efficiency and equity 
goals: it makes short-term economic sense to electrify better-off areas first and 
poorer ones later; but equity goals suggest that the poor should be electrified before, 
or at least at the same time as, the more 'viable' areas. How can this be handled? If 
electrification focuses on the less-economic areas earlier, the sustainability of the 
whole process might be jeopardised if the resultant financial burden becomes too 
~eat. 
(iv) Sltould electrification draw upon current and/or past profits of tlte-ESI? 
It is generally held that electrification will come to a halt long before all households 
are connected (perhaps at around 60-70% of total households) if it is driven by 
financial goals only. Consequently, if more widespread electrification is to be 
achieved, there may be a need to draw on the reserves of the ESI. A question is 
whether electrification should be financed only out of current surpluses (that is, 
electrification must not cause Eskom and distributors- to make a loss in any year) 
or whether past surpluses can be utilised (that is, supply authorities can utilise 
their I financial reserves). 
This has implications for the risk rating which Eskom and LAs currently have and 
if, for example, their financial position deteriorated significantly they would be 
more hard-pressed to obtain finance for any major investments (new power sta-
tions, regional grids, DSM programmes, further electrification, etc). Moreover, if 
the situation deteriorated too much, the state would be obliged to step in to support 
them. Clearly, a degree of financial security must be maintained. 
(v) If tltere is a capital subsidy, ltow to maintain tlte incentive to cut costs? 
There is a danger, if capital connection costs receive subsidy support, that Eskom 
and other distributors would lose some incentive to cut connection costs through 
innovation and research. Already, with limited support for electrification research, 
significant savings have been made possible (for example, prepayment meters, 
ready boards, SWER), and these have been driven largely by the needs to bring 
down capital connection costs and reduce financial risk. Whatever subsidies are 
applied, in whatever form, it is essential that there still be an incentive to bring down 
costs (without sacrificing too much in terms of such things as quality and employ-
ment). 
(vi) Wltat roles for Eskom and local authorities in tlte sltort term? 
As outlined earlier, LAs are unlikely to make significant progress with electrifica-
tion in the short-term, which raises the question: do we wait until the electricity 
distribution industry (EDI) and local government have been restructured, before 
increasing the rate of electrification in these areas? The immensity of the country's 
social and development needs suggests that the answer must be in the negative. 
The next question is therefore, how should electrification proceed in the meantime, 
so as to maximise its long-term benefits within the constraints of an imperfect EDI? 
Should WLAs be encouraged to electrify black areas, perhaps through Eskom's 
current incentive scheme? Should this incentive scheme be stepped up to make it 
more attractive? Or should Eskom continue to negotiate the take-over of areas with 
and without electricity - from BLAs, regional and homeland authorities - in the 
meantime? And if so, what must be done to ensure that Eskom's take-overs in the 
short term do not prejudice the long-term goal of a restructured distribution 
industry? m 
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3. 1.4 Policy proposals 
This section will present some key proposals, corresponding to the questions posed 
in the previous section. 
(i) Eskom's role to be increased until the EDI is restructured 
It has already been argued that the electrification programme must be stepped up 
from its current levels, and that local authority distributors are not going to make 
the desired impact until the EDI is restructured. It is therefore suggested that Eskom 
increase its planned role in the electrification programme in the medium term. This 
. will entail increasing its annual connection rate from the present (approximately) 
160 000, and the total planned number of connections from the present plan of about 
1.2 million houses by 1998 to more ambitious levels. 
The exact rate of connection cannot be determined here, but a figure of at lmst 
250 000 per annum should be feasible. The capital requirements for this would be 
in the region of R750 million per annum, which could be met entirely (or largely) 
from the proceeds of annual tranches of the Electrification Bond. The existing 
capacity of local distributors would be stretched to meet these targets, and may 
therefore need to be strengthened. This addition to their cost structures, however, 
should not be resisted too strongly - these are part of the very 'multiplier effects' 
which are supposed to arise from a large-scale electrification programme. 
For Eskom to increase the extent of its involvement, it will have to continue to 
negotiate the take-over of supply areas from LAs and other authorities with legal 
supply rights. These negotiations should be done in an inclusive manner, so as to 
secure the commitment of all parties involved, from civics, to LAs, to the relevant 
national fora, and so on. Moreover, it must be clear that Eskom's take-over of these 
areas is an interim measure and will be subject to the future structure of the EDI 
which should emerge from negotiations in the National Electrification Forum and 
Local Government Negotiating Forum. It may be desirable, however, as an interim 
measure, for Eskom to take over the distribution functions of all supply authorities, 
pending the rationalisation and restructuring of the EDI along more efficient lines. 
In this respect, it is important that any transfers of assets and liabilities to Eskom 
from LAs should not unfairly prejudice any party. More particularly, transfers, both 
under these interim arrangements and in the transition to a restructured EDI in the 
long term, should be done at a fair value which will act as a consistent basis for 
subsequent transfers to distributors in the future ED I. 
Having said all this, existing local authorities must still be encouraged to increase 
their electrification efforts in the interim. In 1992 about 40 000 connections were 
made, with no major increases anticipated in the near future. Eskom's current 
incentive scheme (which generally means LAs get paid R400 per connection) 
should be maintained. In addition, political pressure on WLAs to play more 
proactive developmental roles in their functional urban regions, may facilitate 
electrification initiatives until non-racial municipalities are in place. 
(ii) Maintain a balance between urban and rural electrification 
It is likely that RE will entail a lower level of supply to households, with lower 
connection costs (although perhaps still higher than for urban areas). The minimum 
level of supply will probably be adequate for, at least, lighting, telecommunications 
and a few small appliances. On this basis, RE will impose less of a financial burden 
on distributors and households than if it were to take place on the same technologi-
cal basis as in dense urban areas. 
It is proposed that the electrification programme should aim to achieve a balance 
between urban and rural areas from the beginning. Urban areas may be more 
cost-effective to electrify, but any policy which waits until all urban areas are 
electrified will mean either that RE never happens, or takes place on an insignificant 
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scale many years from now. The prime motivation for devoting resources toRE 
now is as follows: 
• There is a political and redistributive imperative to address the material needs 
of the poorest households; electrification can play a key role in improving the 
quality of life of the rural poor and in facilitating more widespread rural 
development processes. In other words, it is politically and socially necessary, 
if the position of the poorest is to improve, that resources be devoted toRE from 
the beginning of the programme, rather than towards the end. 
Taking this as the point of departure, several factors will help offset the greater 
financial burden on distributors of spreading new connections over both urban and 
rural areas: 
e Firstly, RE can be a central part of rural development programmes and, if 
coupled to productive activities where appropriate, could increase other oppor-
tunities to increase consumption to levels which make RE more viable. Rural 
development programmes are likely to form part of a democratic government's 
development policies and will be implemented in the short and medium terms. 
Electrification should be a part of these programmes. Moreover, the process 
through which rural connections are made initially, and serviced thereafter, is 
one which could involve communities more directly. On the one hand, this 
should be a feature of development interventions, in which local people benefit 
from resources being transferred into the area while, on the other, it may also 
result in lower capital and operating costs through the use of local resources. 
e Rural electrification can benefit considerably from research and development 
efforts, insofar as innovation and research will bring down connection and 
service costs. If RE has a sufficiently high priority immediately, a greater 
incentive will exist to realise these savings. The sooner these benefits accrue, the 
greater will be the total resource savings over time, since these benefits will also 
be realised in urban electrification projects. If RE were to take place on a large 
scale only in, say, ten years' time, the savings which might result from innova-
tions at that stage would be lost in respect of all existing customers. 
e Thirdly, assuming that RE will take place at some stage, then the risk factor 
associated with RE will be lower, if it occurs in parallel with urban electrification, 
than if RE were to take place largely on its own later; Obviously, in the short 
term the risks of urban electrification will be higher than if RE is not also taking 
place simultaneously. However, over time, risk levels may be lower on the 
whole, because of the diversification of risk across urban and rural areas at any 
one time. 
• Finally, the case of rural farm workers presents itself as a unique category of rural 
households, which may provide an important entry point into the broad area of 
rural electrification. Whilst over 70% of farmers outside of the homelands have 
access to the grid, less than 20% of their farmworkers enjoy the same benefit 
(Hofmeyr 1993); moreover, the large number of people in this situation (esti-
mates vary from four to seven million people), means that a large portion of 
rural people could be electrified at a relatively low cost. The connection of 
farm workers' dwellings to the grid where farmers already have such a connec-
tion will result in a more effective utilisation of those existing distribution 
systems. 
The financing implications of prioritising RE earlier rather than later can, it is 
suggested, be accommodated within the financial arrangements proposed in this 
paper. The point being made here should not be misunderstood as meaning that 
RE must proceed at any cost, at maximum service levels equivalent to urban areas 
-it will in all cases, be necessary to consider alternative methods of delivering high 
quality energy supplies for high value applications, and to choose the best mix of m 
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supply options. The assessment must incorporate not only financial measures of 
the expected returns of potential electrification projects, but a more comprehensive 
assessment of the social costs and benefits resulting from electrification. If this is 
the case, RE can play an important role in improving the quality of life for poor 
rural inhabitants. 
(iii) Establish a National Electrification Fund under the NELF 
An Electrification Fund (EF) should be established under the auspices of NELF. 
Preliminary work in establishing the fund could be done by the presently consti-
tuted Finance and Tariffs working group, but the Fund might thereafter obtain its 
own management status within the Forum. The main objective of an EF would be 
to raise finance for electrification and to act as a conduit between financing sources 
and expenditure on electrification programmes. Within this objective are a number 
of ancillary functions which may be served by an EF: 
1. With a reasonable capital base, say RSOO million to Rl billion, the Fund would 
have the leverage to secure much larger amounts of finance from lenders. This 
amount could thus act as a loan guarantee fund for institutional investors, for 
whom the risk of default on their loans would then be sufficiently low to justify 
new investments. 
2. An EF could raise finance for electrification in areas outside of Eskom's current 
supply areas- those areas currently falling within the boundaries of LAs and 
rural areas, which do not have the capacity to raise funds for electrification. 
This might take the form of bonds, whose redemption and returns are guaran-
teed by central government, in much the same way as Eskom provides a 
guarantee of a minimum return on its recently issued Electrification Bond. 
3. An EF can be used to spread the benefits of any subsidy finance which may 
become available, equitably over time among newly electrified households, 
thus preventing a situation where grant finance benefits only those involved 
in projects at the particular time when finance becomes available. The mecha-
nisms through which this can be done will be discussed in more detail shortly. 
4. Significant economies could result from having a single fund, especially insofar 
as it could act as a channel for financing of electrification programmes, from 
both local and foreign funders. In other words, it could have a diversified set 
of funders, including foreign donors, which would reduce its dependence on 
any single funding source and, in turn, spread the risks for lenders or donors 
among a wider range of stakeholders. The risk attached to such a Fund could 
conceivably be lower than if finance was raised by a number of institutions, 
and so loan finance could be obtained on more favourable terms. 
A possible structure for the Fund is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Several important principles should guide the establishment and operation of the 
EF. Firstly, its establishment would require an injection of seed finance, sufficient 
to finance its operations until it is self-sustaining, and to act as a basis for securing 
further investments by local and foreign investors. Possible sources for this initial 
financing include national government, parastatals such as the DBSA and IDC, 
private sector investors, Eskom, foreign governments seeking to invest in new 
infrastructure, foreign development donors, a one-off levy on income or electricity 
sales (possibly repayable) and a range of other possible sources. Secondly, the 
operating structure of such a fund should be lean, so as to reduce its offtake of 
development funds to a minimum. This is largely dependent upon the scope of its 
functions, but it is suggested here that it should not be involved in the spending of 
funds raised. This should remain the responsibility of local government, commu-
nity organisations and development agents. Thirdly, the EF should be accountable 
to NELF for as long as the Forum remains in place, and should conduct its affairs 
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FIGURE 3.1 Proposed structure and operation of an Electrification Fund 
in a public manner. Subservient to this, its accounting procedures should be subject 
to an independent annual audit- especially important in view of the large amounts 
of money passing through its books. Once transitional government arrangements 
are in place, they may subsume the functions of NELF, in which case it may be 
better for the Fund to be accountable to relevant government ministers. 
In order for such a proposal to be practicable, it may be best for Eskom's Treasury 
Department to act as the agent for the EF. Eskom Treasury is a highly-sophisticated 
entity within the corporation, has considerable experience and expertise in raising 
and managing large amounts of finance, and would therefore further reduce the 
risk attached to the operations of an EF. In the longer term an EF might evolve its 
own capacity, more independently of Eskom. In either case, the management of the 
Fund would be accountable to NELF, and subject to wh(ltever regulatory frame-
works will be established in the ESI. 
(iv) Subsidy finance to be channelled througlt tlte Electrification Fund 
As noted earlier, it is probable that at some stage, subsidy finance will become 
available for electrification, either from the state or from donors. There are many 
ways of allocating this finance. One possibility is that money will be channelled 
through a housing/infrastructure development programme, as part of a capital 
subsidy covering all or some of the costs of serviced sites, roads, housing structures 
and electrification. This kind of programme depends upon the mixture of supply 
constraints: the capacity of delivery agents (such as builders and materials suppli-
ers), as well as demands from communities, development agents and individuals. 
In some respects, such a model of delivery would be demand-driven, with funds 
being allocated to projects which qualify for subsidisation. While this makes the 
allocation process relatively simple, it also means that people will not benefit unless 
they are the subjects of development initiatives. Inevitably, funds will flow to 
communities which are better organised, have access to and can negotiate with local 
authority developers and private developers. The very poor are thus unlikely to 
benefit greatly from this kind of intervention approach. 
A second alternative would be to channel all subsidy finance which is designated 
for electrification, through the EF. From here, there would again be various options. 
The EF could allocate finance to development projects on a demand-driven basis, m 
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that is, project by project. This amounts to the same thing as the route described in 
the previous paragraph- and suffers from the same problem of not being equitable 
across communities or over time. Alternatively, subsidy funds could be applied to 
the capital amounts outstanding in respect of the connection costs which were 
financed originally by distributors. Distributors would receive lump sums in 
proportion to the number of new connections they have made since the beginning 
of the electrification programme (say, January 1992). Under present tariff struc-
tures, these would be all S-tariff (and equivalent) customers. The benefit of this 
grant finance would then be passed onto all those customers, in the form of a 
reduced tariff. In effect, that portion of the tariff which represents the repayment 
of capital would then be reduced. This would also save finance charges on that 
portion of the outstanding loan. This option has the advantage of spreading the 
benefits of subsidy finance equally amongst all existing electricity consumers, and 
of not favouring some projects over others. However, it suffers from the major 
disadvantage of benefiting only existing customers, and does nothing to increase 
the number of households connected in the future. 
A third option is for subsidy finance to be utilised by the EF in such a manner as to 
pass benefits on to all low-income households which are already, or will be, 
connected under the electrification programme. This might work in the following 
way: Firstly, a capital base would be established, beginning with grant finance from 
the state, and supplemented by other sources, such as foreign and local donors. A 
core amount of finance, of say RSOO million to R1 billion, would be sufficient, acting 
as seed finance, to attract much larger amounts over time. The EF might operate 
two accounts: a Loan Fund and a Grant Fund. The core grant, or seed finance, would 
go into the Grant Fund. Loan finance would go into the Loan Fund, which would 
have to be adequate at all times to meet obligations for repayment of loans and 
interest. In order to reduce risk further, the state should guarantee the obligations 
of the EF- effectively ensuring that the Loan Fund will meet its commitments. 
Loan finance 
With a guaranteed amount of grant finance to act as security or collateral for other 
financiers, the EF could access large amounts of investment capital from institu-
tional investors, through mechanisms such as the Electrification Bond. Such bonds 
would provide investors with an increasing rate of return over the lifetime of the 
bond, linked to the actual revenue derived from consumption. In addition, they 
would carry a minimum rate of return to investors, say 60-80% of the prevailing 
market returns (as represented by, for example, the yield on the Eskorn 168). This 
would currently amount to about 9-12% per annum. These bonds should be of a 
long-term nature, say 15 to 25 years, since the return from electricity consumption 
is likely to be highest in later years. Repayment of bonds at term, and of interest 
every year, would be met from the following sources, in order of preference: 
e From a portion of revenue derived from sales to newly connected customers 
(calculated as a percentage of revenue). Currently this would be a percentage of 
revenue from all S-tariff (or LA equivalent) customers. This would require that 
all distributors submit returns to the EF, containing the total revenue derived 
from all new customers, and that they transfer funds to the EF accordingly 
(effectively as repayment of capital originally lent by the EF). 
e If these transfers are insufficient to meet the agreed guaranteed rate of return, 
then the EF would make up the shortfall from its capital base and from income 
generated from this base in the meantime (via the Grant Fund). In practice, it is 
likely that, in the short term, actual returns would be lower than the guaranteed 
rate, so that the Grant Fund would intervene. 
• If the financial base of the EF becomes threatened by having to pay in significant 
amounts, then the state would, in terms of its final guarantee, ensure that the 
Fund is able to meet its commitments to lenders. 
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With this kind of arrangement, it is likely that the EF could raise significant amounts 
of invesbnent finance from institutional investors. 
Grant finance 
There would be three main applications for subsidy finance in the Grant Fund. 
Firstly, it would be used to make up any shortfalls between actual returns from the 
distribution of electricity to new customers and the guaranteed return payable to 
investors. If actual returns are very low, then grant finance would also be utilised 
to repay a portion of the capital amount, not just interest. This would mean, 
effectively, that low-level consumers would be subsidised from this fund. 
Secondly, if the Grant Fund has sufficient resources available to meet any obliga-
tions for shortfalls in the Loan Fund, both in current and future years (as would be 
the case, for example, if the fiscus provides support to aRE programme), then those 
sources of finance should be utilised to increase the number of households with 
access to electricity. This would be achieved by allocating grant finance to reduce 
the connection costs where these are high and where utilities would be unlikely to 
recover those costs from their consumers. In particular, this might entail a transfer 
from the Fund to supply utilities in respect of the excess of connection costs over 
the relevant 'cost-of-connection' parameter, which would be financed by the utility 
and recovered through the tariff over time. For instance, if the cost-of-connection 
parameters are set at, say, R3 000 per connection in urban areas and RS 000 in rural 
iU"eaS, then any excesses of connection costs over these levels could be financed by 
a transfer from the Grant Fund. Thus, if connection costs for a particular rural 
elt;ctrification project average, say, R7 000, then the utility would be expected to 
finance only up to the parameter of RS 000, with the balance coming from the Grant 
fund (or, for example, reduced through contributions oflabour by the community). 
Thirdly, in the less probable event that the Fund still has additional grant finance 
available, after having fulfilled its obligations in respect of the above two areas, then 
those additional sources of finance could be applied to reduce the outstanding loan 
commibnents of poor, newly connected households. Thus the Grant Fund would 
have to assess whether its resources were sufficient to make up any shortfalls which 
may arise on current and future loan repayments from the Loan Fund, together 
with capital subsidies for planned connections which cost in excess of established 
parameters. If there were additional subsidy funds available, or there was reason-
able assurance that these would be received in the future, then those funds could 
be applied to reduce capital loans outstanding in respect of newly electrified 
customers. These funds would be applied to reduce the outstanding capital com-
mitments of distributors, who would pass on the benefits to customers in the form 
of pro-rata reduction in tariffs. The national regulator (and, until then, NELF), 
would have to monitor this. Moreover, it would be necessary in the financial 
planning of the Fund's activities and in allocating funds to spread this subsidy 
finance over the period of the electrification programme so that its benefits accrue 
equally over time. Clearly, this financial planning process would be iterative, and 
would be closely tied with the electrification planning process. 
The effect of this kind of arrangement is, therefore, that grant finance would be 
utilised to subsidise those who need it most- those who consume the least amount 
of electricity, and those for whom, in the long term, electrification will always be a 
sub-commercial proposition- in particular, the rural poor. 
The nature of the EF' s operation as suggested here is that it would be able to adopt 
a longer-term view of the financing requirements of a national electrification 
programme, and, moreover, would be able to build up its capital base from 
investment income and by securing further funds in the meantime. Inherent in 
these proposals is an attempt to minimise the actual and perceived risk to investors, 
lenders and supply authorities, by spreading the risk widely and fairly. 
m 
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Obviously, clear principles would be needed to guide the operation of an EF. One 
of these is that the Fund's management and operation should be relatively lean and 
should not consume an unreasonable portion of the funds it manages. Also, 
provision should be made for the eventuality that the Fund is dissolved for 
whatever reason. However, given that electrification is unlikely to drop below a 
rate of 200 000 dwellings per annum, even if only to keep up with the rate of new 
household formation, it is possible that the Fund would have a long lifespan. 
To summarise, the main advantages of channelling grant and loan finance through 
the EF in this way are, firstly, that leverage effects can be maximised by centralising 
funds into a single pool. In other words, this pool of funds can be used to generate 
more funds. Secondly, the Fund could ensure the optimum use of both grant and 
loan finance. Thirdly, the benefits of any grant finance which becomes available can 
be spread as equitably as possible among low-income consumers across the country 
and over time. Finally, this method of allocating subsidy finance will minimise 
fluctuations and distortions in prices, unlike a situation in which tariffs were 
reduced or increased according to the amount of subsidy finance which was 
available in any particular year. 
(v) Cross-subsidisation of new domestic consumers 
While cross-subsidisation is usually considered to be an issue in pricing policy, it 
is also closely related to financing considerations. As noted earlier, there are two 
kinds of cross-subsidy. The first relates to the inherent cross-subsidy from large 
consumers to small consumers which results from a flat-rate tariff. This issue is not 
being debated here. The second kind of cross-subsidy is highly relevant as a 
potential source of finance: the cross-subsidy from consumers whose marginal 
costs of supply are below the tariff, which will be particularly important with a 
national or regional tariff. The effect of this source of finance is described in more 
detail in Chapter Five, although it is clear that a national tariff in the region of 
20 c/kWh would generate a considerable amount of additional revenue from 
high-income consumers: up to about Rl billion per annum. Clearly, there are many 
political issues involved with such a redistributive mechanism, and much depends 
on progress with the restructuring of the ESI. In any event, the impacts on high-in-
come domestic consumers cannot be ignored. In practice, it is unlikely that a 
transition to national tariffs will take place overnight, so this source of revenue is 
more likely to be phased in over a period of a few years. The effect of phasing this 
income source into a national revenue pool is considered in more detail in Chapter 
Five. Even with a phase-in period, this presents itself as an important source of 
finance for electrification. 
(vi) Electrification levy to finance electrification 
Another important source of potential finance for the electrification programme is 
a small levy on electricity sales, based on units generated or transmitted. A levy 
based on total units generated and available for distribution, which (for Eskom) 
amounted to 138 126 GWh in 1992, will spread the burden of financing the 
electrification programme more widely. If a levy is imposed on generation at a level 
equivalent to a 4% price increase, an additional RSOOm would be raised annually. 
This, in tum, would allow the national domestic tariff, which is seen as an important 
source of revenue to finance the programme, to be lower-with all the social benefits 
this entails. 
If such a levy is imposed, then it is proposed that the revenue generated be applied 
to provide more people with access to electricity, by transferring these funds 
directly to the EF. One question revolves around the consumer classes on which 
the levy should be imposed. In principle, it would be preferable to apply it in a 
simple and uniform manner, to all electricity consumers: domestic and non-domes-
tic. This would avoid introducing any distortions between relative factor prices 
within the electricity sector. An objection might be raised by wealthier domestic 
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consumers on the basis that they are paying two additional taxes or cross-subsidies: 
one based on a higher national tariff, another through this levy. However, this 
argument is countered by the fact that the domestic tariff can be lowered consider-
ably because of the revenue generated by the electrification levy, and that it is 
administratively and theoretically preferable to introduce a more neutral, simpler 
levy on all consumers. 
The levy could be imposed as a tax on all units of electricity generated, which would 
have to be paid directly to the Fund on a regular basis by generation authorities, 
including LAs. Clearly it would be in the short-term financial interests of such 
authorities to pass on cost increases to their customers. However, there may be 
cases where the utilities wish to protect their customers from price increases, in 
which case they could negotiate terms with customers. This may be especially 
relevant for large customers such as Alusaf, which have established long-term 
contractual agreements with Eskom. The point is that by imposing the levy on 
generators, based on their output, there would still be sufficient flexibility to allow 
for special agreements to be made. 
A crucial concern with the imposition of such a levy, and the inevitable resultant 
price increases, relates to the impact of higher electricity prices on industry, mining 
pnd commercial users. Clearly it is undesirable for domestic electrification to 
undermine the international competitiveness of major exporters, or the economic 
viability of marginal consumers (such as mines). Although no detailed analysis of 
lhe price elasticities of electricity consumers has yet been done in South Africa, there 
does appear to be some prima facie evidence that an increase in electricity prices 
stemming from such a levy may be less undesirable than conventional wisdom 
suggests. Firstly, the real price of electricity has declined, and will continue to do 
so for as long as the price compact is extended. A 4% levy would therefore only 
offset the effect of the price compact, so that prices would remain constant in real 
terms. Secondly, while historically low electricity prices are a major comparative 
advantage in South Africa, they may result in an industrial development path 
which is undesirable in the long term: most developed countries have grown in the 
opposite direction, that is, away from energy-intensive manufacturing to higher 
value-added sectors. Thirdly, higher electricity prices may act as an incentive for 
greater efficiency -both of which have been prominent features in the economies 
of many developed countries. 
In addition to these economic arguments, it is also possible to make ethical or 
political arguments around the need for mining and other commercial consumers 
to subsidise the electrification of households, most of which have suffered through 
apartheid. 
(vii) Electrification within an economically viable ESI 
International experience with electricity utilities suggests that performance, both 
with regard to existing customers, and to new connections, is related to the 
economic and financial viability of players within the ESI. This suggests that Eskom 
and local distributors should seek to maintain their financial security by following 
principles of cost-reflectiveness. Any departures from this principle (for example 
on the grounds of equity) should be rigorously justified, and should not compro-
mise the long-term stability of the entity. 
This principle does not preclude the use of surpluses accumulated in the past. It is 
lherefore proposed that, as a matter of principle, Eskom and LA distributors be 
encouraged in the short term to utilise accumulated surpluses for investment in 
capital infrastructure, while not jeopardising their financial security by reducing 
!heir resource bases and increasing their risk exposures excessively. In Eskom's 
case, this will hinder its progress in reducing its debt:equity ratio to its long-term 
target of 1:1, although, over time, the electrification programme should yield a 
positive net present value.lt should still be possible to reduce Eskom's debt levels, m 
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in order to reduce its exposure to high interest rates, for example, particularly 
through tight financial management and gains from demand-side management. 
(viii) Maintain incentives to reduce capital connection costs 
The kind of financing arrangements proposed here will maintain the incentive for 
Eskom and other distributors to keep reducing connection costs through further 
innovation and R&D. With the utilisation of capital loan finance through the EF, 
distributors will improve their financial status if they can keep connection costs as 
low as possible. Even if subsidy finance is available through the Grant Fund of the 
EF, it will not be used simply to meet the full capital costs of new connections, but 
will instead be spread over past and future low-income customers through the · 
Fund. Consequently, distributors will still carry some of the risk associated with 
the connection process, and will therefore have an incentive to keep cutting costs. 
This would not have been the case, for example, if subsidy finance was available 
and was allocated directly to cover the full costs of connections - such an arrange-
ment, in fact, could result in profiteering, a feature of subsidised development 
projects especially where these involve developers from the private sector who 
have little or no accountability to intended beneficiaries. 
3.2 The financing of fuelwood policies 
The fuelwood sector is a complex one from a financing perspective, for several 
reasons. Firstly, policies wlhich affect the availability of fuel wood are often integral 
parts of broader development interventions which cannot easily be separated into 
their energy and other components. This means that financial implications of the 
fuelwood components of these policies are not easily isolated from the other 
components. Secondly, this is further complicated by the fact that measuring 
financial flows in the fuelwood sector is very difficult, even where fuelwood 
markets exist. Similarly, weaknesses in accounting systems and the difficulty of 
accounting for fuel wood-related programmes in the first place, make it difficult to 
accurately cost policy options. Thirdly, functional responsibility for fuel wood falls 
between many authorities and institutions, at all levels of government, further 
complicating administrative arrangements related to the management of budgets. 
Finally, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the numbers of households in. 
rural areas, their demographics, income flows, energy consumption and expendi-
ture patterns, as well as the wood resources available to them. This uncertainty is 
further complicated by regional and seasonal variations in many of these patterns. 
Consequently, there is a considerably wider margin of error in estimates of the 
financing requirements of fuel wood policies than for policies in the electricity and 
other sectors. Nonetheless, the estimates which can be made are useful insofar as 
they can be compared with those from other energy subsectors. This section 
provides a rough assessment of the financing implications of the main policy 
proposals in the fuelwood sector. 
3.2.1 Current financing arrangements 
The current financing arrangements in the fuelwood sector depend mainly upon 
the type of wood resource insofar as ownership and access are concerned. While 
some woodlots are managed as commercial enterprises and fuel wood products are 
sold to consumers, this situation applies only in a small percentage of cases. The 
overwhelming bulk of wood currently consumed by households is collected from 
natural woodlands at no cash cost. Thus there are no explicit financing arrange-
ments to speak of. Of course there are social costs associated with these arrange-
ments- in, for example, the labour time devoted by women to wood-collection. 
In most cases where fuelwood has been commercialised, the market for wood is 
established only at the retail or distribution stage. In other words, wood merchants 
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generally still collect wood from areas with a surplus and transport it to areas of 
higher demand. This means that investments in expanding wood-supply are small 
and that the more significant financial requirements occur in respect of the collec-
tion and transport of wood. 
Large amounts are invested in social forestry and agroforestry projects, especially 
by independently funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Again, it is 
difficult to provide financial estimates of the cost of fuel wood generated in this way, 
because of poor record-keeping, the overlap between energy and other products, 
and the problems of valuing many of these benefits. Nonetheless, it is apparent that 
the costs of extension and support in agroforestry projects can be very high. 
Generally, these costs are borne by the NGOs and their funders and are not passed 
on to beneficiaries of those programmes, who would be unable to afford them. 
Social forestry and other fuelwood intervention policies often carry high initial 
project implementation costs, but their aim of empowering local people to sustain-
ably manage their own wood supplies, if successful, removes the need for long~ 
term financial support. 
3.2.2 Financing requirements of fuelwood policies 
Since fuelwood is the most widely accessible fuel for poor rural households, and 
because it is generally available for little or no cash outlay, the potential for 
principles of cost recovery to apply to fuelwood financing arrangements is much 
more limited than in other supply sectors such as electricity and hydrocarbon fuels. 
This does not mean, however, that policy interventions are not justified or that they 
wiil not be sustained. On the contrary, the costs of not intervening to secure 
tuelwood resources in rural areas are high enough to warrant such intervention. 
These costs are environmental, social and political: degradation of fuelwood re-
sources, increased amounts of time spent by women and children in the collection 
of wood, and the additional poverty imposed on poor rural households facing 
resource scarcities. The political implications of such a scenario for a government 
with a strong rural constituency are serious. 
In some respects, therefore, expenditure on fuelwood security may be seen as a 
precautionary investment in the rural environment, while it is also an investment 
in the basic needs of the rural poor and an attempt to reduce poverty levels. 
Moreover, a number of the potential interventions have beneficial impacts beyond 
· mere increase in wood-supply, and can contribute to the development of rural areas 
as a whole. Their financing implications should be seen in this light. 
A number of policies have been proposed in relation to the fuelwood and rural 
sectors: 
• management of natural woodland; 
• social forestry programmes; 
• woodlots and plantations; 
• promotion of commercial small-growers; and 
• transport of wood from areas with surpluses. 
Unless otherwise stated, all the estimates and data in this section are drawn from 
Gandar (1993). 
Management of natural woodland 
As noted earlier, natural woodland currently supplies the bulk of wood used. by 
households, and this is expected to continue into the future. Consequently, policies 
to manage existing resources so that their capacities can be sustained or even 
enhanced will draw upon and enforce traditional land- and resource-management 
practices of tribal and local authorities. These practices include restricting of access 
to heavily depleted areas until they have regenerated, and removing undergrowth 
which restricts the growth of trees. El 
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Policies which aim to strengthen these resource-management practices will utilise 
existing networks of rural development NGOs and extension workers from various 
levels of government. In most cases, these services would form part of multi-faceted 
development projects and programmes, and so the financing requirements related 
specifically to the energy aspects would probably be relatively small. 
Social forestry programmes 
The bulk of the additional production of firewood is likely to come from social 
forestry, which involves the dissemination of trees for planting by individuals and 
communities. Trees are planted not only for fuelwood, but also for use in wind-
breaks, homestead boundaries, community-based and household-based woodlots, 
and agroforestry projects- fuel wood is just one of many products in social forestry. 
This is a typical case in which the allocation of financial requirements between 
energy and other developmental institutions or budgets becomes difficult. The 
figures below are order-of-magnitude estimates only, and should be treated as 
such. 
Assuming that social forestry is to yield 400 000-600 000 tons of firewood per year, 
then a network comprising roughly 4 000 small nurseries may be required, each 
producing 5 OD0-10 000 plants per year. At an estimated establishment cost of about 
R17 000 per nursery, this network might cost about R68 million to establish. In 
addition, start-up costs of about R15 million are anticipated. In subsequent years, 
recurrent costs would be lower, around R40 million. To place this amount of 
fuel wood in context, current sustainable supply for the whole country is estimated 
at about six million tons per annum, so that social forestry might aim to increase 
supply by 7-10%. These amounts should be financed jointly by the energy, forestry 
and agriculture departments, as well as by any rural development institutions or 
departments which may be established in government. 
Woodlots and plantations 
If the target in the woodlot and plantation sector is to supply about 900 000 tons of 
wood, of which about 370 000 tons will be used for firewood and the balance for 
poles and timber, then about 1 500 woodlots of an average of 60 hectares each may 
be required. Working on a fairly modest cost of establishment and maintenance to 
first crop of almost R2 900 per hectare, the total establishment cost of this network 
would be in the region of R260 million. After the first crop most of the recurrent 
costs would be met by revenue from wood sales. Clearly this sector would supply 
fuel wood to that market segment which is already commercialised. 
Promotion of commercial small-growers 
The large forestry companies currently operate small-grower schemes whereby 
they finance the establishment and maintenance costs of small plantations for 
independent farmers, which costs are repaid from the proceeds of the first crop. 
Additional costs (such as for fencing) are borne by the growers themselves. After 
the first crop, the small farmers should be able to manage their operations relatively 
independently. 
With a target under the IEP scenario of 60 000 hectares of additional afforestation 
under these schemes, the total establishment costs which would be financed by the 
large forestry companies would be about R81 million. Extension and management 
costs, also borne by them, would be about R75 million for the first rotation period 
(roughly seven years), thus totalling about R156 million for set-up and mainte-
nance. It is expected that this would produce firewood (as a by-product of the main 
timber produce) totalling about 60 000 tons per annum over the first rotation, 
increasing subsequently to perhaps 180 000 tons. 
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Transport of firewood from surplus to deficit areas 
This policy proposal entails additional support for informal sector operators en-
gaged in the transport and distribution of fuelwood from areas with sufficient 
accessible supplies, to areas where demand is higher. Such support would not be 
very intensive and would involve assistance from government departments to 
6Illall enterprises in gaining access to credit, vehicles and so on. It is estimated that 
about 200 000 tons of additional firewood could be made available to households 
{some of them urban) in this manner. 
3.3 The financing of low-smoke coal development 
An important part of an integrated energy plan for South African households is the 
development of low-smoke coals, with a view to replacing conventional bitumi-
nous coals. This is particularly necessary in the light of the high levels of pollution 
which result from household coal combustion, with adverse effects on the health 
of millions of people who rely on coal for cooking and heating. 
The prime motivation for the development of low-smoke coal (LSC), is therefore to 
alleviate the negative environmental and health impacts of coal combustion. LSC 
}las not yet been produced in South Africa on a commercial basis - at least not on 
a large scale- and various prototypes are still in their development phases. It is 
therefore difficult to make detailed proposals about the financing of LSC, since the 
available cost estimates are tentative and likely to change considerably. Conse-
quently, this section aims to describe the financial aspects of the three main types 
of LSC being developed in South Africa, and outlines proposals for future financing 
ofLSC. 
3.3.1 Current financing arrangements 
There are three kinds of LSC which are the subject of this paper, with different 
technical properties, cost structures, and institutional characteristics (described in 
more detail in McGregor 1993). The financing arrangements applicable to the three 
products are described below. 
(i) Enertek reconstituted coal briquettes 
This is produced by binding coal discards with cement to form briquettes, in the 
ratio of 100 kg of coal to 15 kg of cement and 21 kg of water (Tait 1993). The cement 
acts as a binding agent and reduces the amount of particulates emitted upon 
combustion. Many households manufacture their own briquettes in this manner, 
although Enertek has attempted to optimise the product's performance through 
testing and further development. For example, the addition of a small amount of 
lime to the product may reduce sulphur emissions (although at a fairly significant 
cost). The three main components of the fuel's cost are for coal discards from mining 
houses, cement, and labour. Distribution costs must also be considered, and will 
depend mainly on the distance from the point of production to the point of sale. 
No detailed castings have yet been undertaken for this fuel. Enertek' s preliminary 
estimates suggest that production costs will be higher than the tdtolesale costs of 
conventional coal. However, it is entirely feasible that this product could be cheaper 
than retail coal. There are two main processes involved in manufacturing this kind 
of fuel. The first uses equipment similar to that used for brick-making, while the 
second is more labour-intensive, using large slabs. Some illustrative (and prelimi-
nary) cost estimates are shown in Table 1. By comparison, conventional coal prices 
tor households in the PWV are in the region of RSO per ton at the wholesale purchase 
level (that is, ex-mine), and in a wide range from R160 to R320 per ton at the retail 
level (Palmer Development Group 1993: 26, 61). 
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Brick-making equipment Slab casting (2 tons/day) 
(4 tons/day) 
Capital costs 3 300 
Coal discards (R10/ton) 7 
Cement (R285/ton) 31 
Labour (6 x R30/day) 45 
Depreciation (3 years) 1 
Production cost (R/ton) 84 
TABLE 3.1 Preliminary cost estimates for Enertek 







Of the cost components, cement prices are essentially fixed. While the quantity of 
cement used could be reduced, this would decrease the product's technical per-
formance and therefore its acceptability. The other two main cost components are, 
however, considerably more variable. Discard coal is not traded at present and it 
is therefore necessary to impute a shadow price at which it might be purchased. 
There is scope for arguing that mining houses should not profit unduly from its 
sale: it is presently regarded as a waste product, with, if anything, a negative value 
because of the costs of disposing of it safely .It may therefore be possible to negotiate 
favourable terms for the use of discards suitable for LSCs. 
Labour costs also vary. Both processes are fairly labour-intensive and are suitable 
for decentralised production, possibly at a community or cooperative level. This 
would have the important advantage of providing local people with income-earn-
ing opportunities and retaining expenditure flows within communities themselves. 
However, a disadvantage is that product quality may vary more widely and could 
deteriorate to the point where the product is no longer acceptable to users. This 
suggests that, if this option is to be followed, extension support may be required to 
ensure that small-scale manufacturers conform to product specifications within a 
reasonable range. The expertise which has been accumulated by the CSIR Enertek 
personnel responsible for this product's development is a valuable resource in this 
regard and could be utilised for training and extension work. 
The preliminary castings shown in the table above suggest that this type of LSC 
may have an important role to play. Some financing options will be explored below. 
(ii) Wits/UCP devolatilised coal 
The two main ingredients in this process are waste coal (of a larger size than in the 
Enertek process) and waste heat. The discard coal is exposed to temperatures of 
500° to 600°C for about two hours, to drive off, under controlled conditions, the 
harmful volatile compounds emitted during normal combustion. 
The main cost components of the process are the discard coal and the heat, and the 
product will be economically viable only if both of these are by-products or waste 
products. Again, no detailed costing exercises have been performed, but it appears 
that this kind of LSC can be produced at a cost which will make it competitive with 
normal coal. This is because waste heat is utilised from UCP's industrial char 
production process, while suitable discard coal can be accessed at a low price 
(possibly around R8/ton) from mining houses. Production at a price which will not 
require any external subsidy finance may therefore be possible. 
(iii) 'Wundajuel' solid fuel blocks 
A private company based in Lesotho, Ecofuel (Lesotho) (Pty) Ltd, recently began 
to produce and market a solid fuel which also uses waste coal bound into small coal 
briquettes. The product, 'Wundafuel', is marketed commercially as a smokeless 
alternative to gas and paraffin, although it is technically a closer substitute for coal 
and wood. The DMEA has recently incorporated this product into its research 
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support programme, which originally included only the Enertek and Wits/UCP 
fuels described above. 
From a narrow cost perspective, this fuel will be less affordable for poor households 
than conventional coal, since it retails at a far higher price. According to the 
manufacturer 'Wundafuel' currently retails at Rl.OO to R1.20 per kg, with output 
levels at approximately 120-150 tons per month (Roux 1993). With improved 
packaging, and if economies of scale can be achieved through expansion into a 
number of plants around the country, the manufacturer estimates a cost reduction 
to about RO.SO per kg, equivalent to RSOO per ton (conventional coal retails at about 
R160-R320 per ton). Nonetheless, the product offers several advantages over con-
ventional coal, such as its lower smoke emissions, its ability to light within a few 
minutes, and the fact that it can bum on the ground (like wood) and therefore does 
not require an appliance to be used. If consumers place a high value on these 
advantages the product may begin to replace normal coal at prevailing price levels. 
However, it is more probable that it will compete with more expensive fuels such 
as paraffin and gas, currently the main target market segments of 'Wundafuel'. 
3.3.2 Policy proposals 
It would be premature to make detailed policy proposals regarding the pricing and 
financing arrangements required to promote the use of low-smoke fuels in house-
holds which currently use coal. Further technical, economic and social research is 
required before financing and pricing mechanisms can be designed. Nonetheless, 
various financing policy proposals, at the level of principle, are presented below. 
(i) Intervention is essential to mitigate economic costs imposed by coal usage 
Research into household use of coal suggests that the resultant pollution causes 
significant health problems for the millions of people who are exposed on a 
long-term basis. These health effects carry major economic costs, such as the direct 
expenditure on health care services by affected households and the state, and loss 
of time for productive activity due to illness and absence from work or informal 
income-earning activities. Other indirect costs imposed by pollution include lower 
quality of life for inhabitants of polluted environments, as well as the contribution 
to global and regional environmental problems such as global warming and acid 
rain. While these links may be less direct, it is clear that, on the whole, household 
coal combustion carries huge costs, many of which are borne either by households 
themselves, the state, or society at large. On this basis, therefore, it is considered 
imperative that, in principle, energy policy-making actively intervenes in the 
household coal market, so as to encourage a shift from conventional coal to energy 
sources with less serious environmental problems. The development of LSC is an 
important component of this (as argued for EPRETby van Horen 1993 and McGre-
gor 1993). 
(ii) Legislation may be appropriate once alternatives are available 
As discussed in van Horen (1993), legislation already exists which could be applied 
to enforce smokeless zones in townships, effectively making conventional coal use 
jn households illegal. However, it was argued that this legislation can only be 
applied once alternative energy sources, which do not impose any additional 
financial burdens on households, are available. It is therefore proposed that, as a 
matter of principle, air pollution legislation could be implemented, to eliminate the 
use of conventional coal, once households have access to affordable alternatives 
such as LSCs (or electricity). This means that LSC should be priced so as to· be 
more-or-less competitive with conventional coal. The implications of this will be 
made explicit below. 
(iii) Encourage those LSCs whiclt may be commercially viable 
It is possible that some of the LSC prototypes may be produced on a commercial m 
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basis, either for the target market of this discussion, or for wealthier market 
segments. The ideal situation is one in which LSCs can be sold at prices which are 
competitive with normal coal and, where this is the case, these producers should 
be encouraged by the state to do so, by providing private sector manufacturers with 
a stable and transparent policy environment. This would entail, for example, 
making explicit government policy on conventional and LSCs- by indicating that 
LSC will be supported through further research, that legislation may be applied to 
ensure that conventional coal is replaced by preferred alternatives, and so on. This 
clarity and stability in the policy environment is a prerequisite for the private sector 
to invest in the development of low-smoke fuels which are potentially commer-
cially viable. 
Should LSCs be marketed by private sector producers, be they small-scale enter-
prises, or formal sector organisations, it may be necessary for the Department (of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs) to monitor the operation of this market so as to 
maintain the technical production standards at reasonable levels, and to ensure that 
unacceptable profiteering does not occur. 
(iv) Two potential sources of subsidy finance 
Assuming that some form of financial subsidy will be required to make LSC more 
attractive to households, there are two main sources of finance presenting them-
selves as theoretical options. Firstly, production costs could be subsidised directly 
from the fiscus -an option for which there are several possible justifications: 
• Many of the benefits of reduced health problems would accrue to society as a 
whole, or the state in particular. To the extent that air pollution is reduced, and 
respiratory and other illnesses become less prevalent, the public health care 
service will be relieved of a burden. The effect on the fiscus of the subsidy 
outflow would be countered by a reduced outflow on health care expenditure. 
• The state has a responsibility to improve the material living conditions of the 
vast numbers of people suffering from preventable health problems. In princi-
ple, therefore, it is necessary for the state to actively intervene in the domestic 
coal market, and this may best take the form of direct subsidisation of LSC. 
• Indirect economic benefits should accrue to society as a whole and therefore also 
to the state, through an improvement in quality of life of many people, which 
can be expected to cause a general increase in productivity of those people, 
impacting on their income-earning activities. 
e In the same way as economic benefits will result in the longer-term, so will 
political benefits follow, if the state is seen to be active in improving peoples' 
access to cleaner sources of energy. 
e South African precedents exist for direct state support of fuel prices, such as the 
support for the AEC, Sasol and Mossgas. While the economic and social benefits 
resulting from these projects are questionable, the benefits resulting from LSC 
subsidisation are, in principle, uncontroversial. This is not to ignore the many 
other factors which require consideration to make state involvement effective. 
A major disadvantage of this financing option is that it will impose an additional 
burden on the state's resources in the short term. 
The second option, which is more attractive from a theoretical micro-economic 
perspective, would entail the internalising of negative environmental externalities. 
In other words, a levy would be imposed on the price of conventional coal, so as to 
more fully reflect its associated environmental and health costs. This would raise 
additional revenue for the state, which could be applied to cross-subsidise LSC's 
production costs. Such an approach should not, however, be confused as a general 
revenue-raising fiscal mechanism. 
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The determination of this levy amount is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion, but it appears from the preliminary cost-estimates available for the Enertek 
and UCP fuels that it would not have to be very significant to shift the price 
advantage in favour of LSCs. A question which arises is whether the levy should 
be applied only on coal sales to households, or on sales to other local consumers 
(primarily Eskom, Sasol, and industrial users), or indeed, also on export sales of 
coal. Oearly, these could have negative downstream effects: on the prices of 
electricity, synthetic petroleum fuels and exported coal. On the other hand, the 
jmpact on coal prices would be much smaller if spread over the higher volume of 
local and exports sales. For instance, if the financing requirement for LSC subsidi-
6ation amounted to, say, R60 per ton (a very cautious estimate), then an annual 
subsidy to completely replace conventional coal usage (currently about three 
Jl)illion tons per annum) would have to be in the region of R180 million. If this is 
ftpread over total local coal consumption for 1991 of about 132 million tons then the 
price increase would amount to about Rl.36 per ton, equivalent to a 4.1% increase 
in average local FOR (that is, Free on Rail, or ex-mine) prices (DMEA 1992:26-27). 
If the financing requirement is spread over total coal sales, including exports, the 
increase would be around R1 per ton, or 3.0% of domestic prices, and 1.2% of export 
prices. The effect of this on export revenue is equivalent to a similar fluctuation of 
approximately 1% in the Rand: Dollar exchange rate. 
At a macro-economic level, the advantage of this second option is that it has a 
smaller impact on government expenditures. Negative macro-economic impacts 
may result in the short term if a levy is imposed on coal sales to export and 
no~-household local consumers, in the form of slightly higher electricity and 
synfuel production costs, and reduced margins on export sales. The size of these 
impacts would probably be relatively small - this wiii be addressed in more detail 
jn a subsequent chapter. 
(v) Continued state support for low-smoke fuel development in the short term 
Jt is clear that it will take some time before LSCs are widely available for household 
use in South Africa. Consequently, it is proposed that the Department of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs should continue to support research efforts in this area, with a 
view to facilitating and expediting the development of low-smoke fuels. In many 
respects this process is already underway, and includes a number of important 
areas of research and development: 
e Further enhancement of the technical characteristics of the various prototype 
products, so as to optimise the balance between the amount of pollution emitted, 
easy ignition, and the length of time for which the fuels burn. 
e Also necessary before mass production can commence is a better understanding 
of the social acceptability of the low-smoke fuels in relation to alternatives. 
e Once the technical and social acceptability of the fuels is established it will be 
necessary to evaluate different financing and pricing mechanisms. In particular, 
it will be important to understand the current system of coal distribution and 
marketing, so that LSCs may be distributed most effectively by existing actors 
in the distnbution chain. 
e Another important issue, which wiii impact directly on the costs and financing 
requirements, is the potential for direct community and individual involvement 
in LSC manufacture and marketing. It may be feasible, for example, for the st;ate 
to support the establishment of labour-intensive cooperatives which could 
manufacture the briquette-type of fuel at low cost. This would improve income-
earning opportunities for poor communities and households, and simultane-
ously reduce the leakage of funds from townships. A range of methods of 
production may be feasible, and these should all be adequately investigated. 
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3.4 The financing of gas and paraffin interventions 
Paraffin and gas will continue to be major fuels for domestic use in coming years, 
notwithstanding the shift to electridty following from the electrification pro-
gramme. Both fuels are supplied by the major petroleum companies, with variable 
distribution arrangements coming into play further down the chain, particularly in 
the case of paraffin. The finandng implications of policy proposals suggested in 
EPRET Paper 14B are relatively limited in relation to other policy areas, and many 
of these financing requirements would be met by well established private sector 
partidpants. 
3.4.1 Current financing arrangements for illuminating paraffin and 
liquefied petroleum gas 
The finandng arrangements for the use of domestic paraffin (IP) and gas (LPG) 
differ according to the various stages of the supply and demand chain. The main 
components of this chain pertinent to the present finandng discussion, are the 
households or end-users, the intermediate distribution agents, and the large petro-
leum industry suppliers. 
(i) Household financing of IP and LPG use 
A major advantage of IP and LPG as domestic fuels is that the barriers to entry for 
household use are insignificant compared to electricity and coal. The appliance 
costs (mainly for stoves, but also for heaters and lamps) are generally low enough 
for households to be able to afford their purchase, either in cash or through credit 
arrangements from retailers. Moreover, households are usually able to purchase 
fuels in relatively small quantities to suit their budgets, especially in the case of IP. 
The relative absence of financing constraints on the appliance and fuel purchase is 
one reason why IP and LPG use is so widespread. This is not to suggest, however, 
that real savings cannot still be made in the distribution cost structure. This is 
particularly the case where retailers extract excessive mark-ups from consumers, 
or where the distribution chain has an inefficient structure. 
(ii) The financing of gas and paraffin distribution and marketing 
Households purchase IP from a number of possible outlets. The most common, 
particularly in urban areas, are informal spaza shops and formal trading stores. 
Retailers are allowed a mark-up of 33.3% on the wholesale price although, as noted 
by McGregor (1993), retail prices are not monitored and often far exceed these 
levels. These mark-ups accrue to a very large number of retailers, many of whom 
trade in small volumes and earn their incomes from this on-selling. 
The previous stage in the distribution chain involves the intermediaries between 
the oil companies and marketers. Oil companies distribute their products (not just 
IP) to their depots, of which there are about 178 around the country, via the 
Durban/Reef pipeline, and/ or by road and rail transport (EDRC 1993: 59). Depots 
represent the wholesale level, at which prices are regulated by government. In-
cluded in the regulated price is a component called the service differential, amount-
ing to 9.7 c/litre in April1993, which is intended to finance the distribution costs 
related to delivery of IP from oil company depots to retailers. The service differen-
tial for IP is intended to be suffident to remunerate both the oil companies for their 
costs and the 'routers' who subsequently distribute the products to final retailers. 
These routers are therefore remunerated by a portion of the service differential 
(6.2 c/litre), supplemented by discounts they may receive from oil companies 
reducing their wholesale margins. It appears that this distribution arrangement is 
relatively successful in maintaining a very wide distribution network for IP, al-
though the mark-ups by intermediaries and retailers mean high end-user prices. 
Some of the policy proposals centre around this service differential arrangement-
these will be described later. 
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A similar situation exists with the financing of LPG distribution. Although its price 
is not regulated by government in the same way, the same level of service differ-
ential is allowed for transport, handling and storage costs (9.7 c/litre). This is also 
split between oil companies and other private sector distributors. 
(iii) Financing of supply capacity expansion 
As described in EPRET Paper 14B, IP and LPG are extracted in more-or-less fixed 
proportions from refined oil products. The capital costs involved with refining 
crude oil, or with producing oil from coal (in Sasol' s case) and from gas (in Mossgas' 
case), are very significant. The costs of each of the two synfuel projects run into tens 
of billions of Rands in current terms, although these costs are essentially 'sunk'. 
Further expansions of these refineries are not envisaged under the present industry 
structure. The oil companies, on the other hand, are currently expanding their 
refinery capacities, motivated mainly by growing demand for petrol. Additional 
LPG and IP supply capacity is therefore a secondary effect of these expansions. The 
oil companies' refinery investments amounted to about R700 million for 1992, and 
are expected to total approximately R6.6 billion in the period 1992 to 1995 (EDRC 
1993: 64). These investments are financed entirely by the private sector oil compa-
nies, from their retained earnings, local capital and money markets and foreign 
capital. 
It is anticipated that projected growth in demand for IP and LPG, even under the 
scenarios in which their consumption is highest, will be adequately supplied by 
existing and planned refineries. Current IP consumption by the entire household 
sector amounts to approximately 740 million litres per annum, and is easily met at 
existing levels of production (McGregor 1993). It is expected that even if consump-
tion were to grow in coming years this could be met from current and future 
refinery output. The same holds for the balance between demand for and supply 
of LPG. Consequently, there are no real financing implications for refinery capacity 
which are attributable to the policies proposed around household IP and LPG use. 
3.4.2 Financing of IP and LPG policy proposals 
The policies proposed in EPRET Paper 14B have different financing implications 
because of the mix of public and private sector involvement. Each will be dealt with 
separately. 
{i) Extend involvement of oil companies in distribution chain 
The main motivation for this proposal is that involvement of oil companies further 
down the distribution chain will allow tighter regulation of prices than at present. 
This may eliminate or reduce the inefficiencies and excessive mark-ups currently 
occurring due to the present system of intermediaries and routers. This could be 
iichieved if oil companies retain the discounts which they currently pass on to 
routers, which would provide the companies with sufficient incentive to invest in 
additional distribution facilities. Essentially, the same distribution arrangements 
would then prevail as for petrol, where oil companies distribute their product 
directly to the retailers. 
The financial transfers under this kind of arrangement would entail a shift from the 
current intermediaries, in the form of reduced margins, with the benefits theoreti-
cally being passed on to consumers in lower prices. The role currently played by 
routers would then be spread between them and oil companies, which could also 
~ploy routers directly, so as to avoid unnecessary loss of employment opportu-
pities. Once oil companies are involved in distribution it will also be possible to 
advertise and publish regulated retail prices, and to enforce them more strictly. 
(ii) Encourage bulk purchase by cooperatives and micro-enterprises 
The intention in encouraging bulk purchases by end-users is to be able to buy 
directly from oil companies, at or near to the wholesale price, without having to m 
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finance the profits of the intermediaries. Within this overall policy suggestion, there 
may be several alternatives. Firstly, service-station operators may be provided with 
finance from oil companies to install bulk tanks for IP and LPG (as for petrol and 
diesel), which would then be able to supply households and small-scale enterprises 
directly. Secondly, cooperatives could be established to buy the bulk quantities of 
IP and LPG. These would require fairly extensive support services from various 
sectors, regarding the technical, marketing, administrative and financial services 
they would have to perform. This support would be significant if taken in isolation 
from any other similar initiatives, but it may be possible to dovetail such coopera-
tives with others which may be established around building materials, agricultural 
produce, and so on. In this case, the extension support which would be required 
would benefit a number of aspects of community involvement. In the case of Wand 
LPG cooperatives, it would be necessary for the oil companies to be involved, at 
least to ensure that technical and safety standards are adhered to, and they may 
therefore also be able to play a bigger role in financing the extension support 
services required for these cooperatives. 
A third option is to encourage the establishment of IP and LPG depots which would 
benefit from bulk purchase discounts and which would still be close enough to 
consumers to give them easy access to fuels. It is conceivable that viable small-scale 
enterprises could be established with the support of oil company and development 
finance institutions (such as the SBDC and DBSA) along similar lines to commu-
nity-based cooperatives. 
(iii) Child-resistant paraffin containers and lids 
Paraffin poisoning is a relatively common incident in IP-using households with 
children, especially those in which there are infants between 12 and 36 months of 
age. In many cases, IP ingestion results in severe poisoning, and sometimes death. 
Consequently, as argued elsewhere, the prevention of IP poisoning should be 
regarded as a major area for public policy intervention. 
There appear to be four main areas for intervention: 
• education and publicity measures around the dangers of paraffin poisoning; 
• production and use of child-resistant lids for existing containers; 
• production and use of containers to match the child-resistant lids; and 
• in the long term, possible legislation to tighten up safety regulations. 
In principle, the responsibility for financing these interventions lies in the first place 
with the private sector players whose products are concerned (mainly the oil 
companies), and secondly with the government which has a significant overall 
responsibility for maintaining public health. It can be expected that a real expendi-
ture saving will accrue to the government in the form of reduced health care for 
poisoning victims, once policy interventions begin to have an effect. Nonetheless, 
an argument for government intervention cannot rest upon an assumption that it 
will realise a direct saving on health care expenditure. 
Firstly, education and publicity programmes (such as visual posters) should be 
aimed at adults and older household members to keep IP in safe containers and out 
of the reach of infants. The costs of such programmes should be borne jointly by 
government and the producers. 
The most significant impact may be derived from child-resistant lids (or closures). 
The Medical Research Council (MRC) is currently centrally involved in research 
into the kinds of lids which might be used on the existing containers in which people 
currently store their IP. These containers include, commonly, used bottles from 
alcoholic and other beverages. It is expected that lids will be designed at a cost of 
around R1 each, and it is possible that the lid-manufacture process may be suitable 
for decentralised production by small-scale enterprises in townships (De Wet 1993). 
It is probable that in practice there will be a need for both mass-production plants 
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and these smaller micro-enterprise-based processes. From the initial research con-
ducted by the MRC, it appears that communities would respond favourably to this 
}<ind of intervention, and that they would be willing to pay the full price of such a 
lid if it is in the region quoted. Consequently, there is potential for this to be a 
financially viable project which can operate on a cost-recovery base, and perhaps 
even generate incomes for small-scale manufacturers. This would require the same 
institutional and technical support as any other small business. In addition, estab-
lishment costs would have to be financed for manufacturers, so that institutions 
such as the SBDC, DBSA and the government should assist producers to gain access 
to the necessary finance. 
A subsequent phase may involve the design and production of containers, which 
would probably be designed so as to fit the lids produced in the first phase. This is 
an area, however, which requires further research into the acceptability of various 
container designs and the willingness of households to pay for them. It appears that 
this option may be more costly than the first. Similar financing and pricing arrange-
ments will probably apply to this stage. 
3.5 Demand-side management and efficiency policies 
Demand-side management (DSM) and energy efficiency policies are an integral 
part of the IEP methodology, yet they have until recently received relatively little 
iittention in South Africa. Consequently, there is a lack of experience and of 
institutional support for this approach in the country's energy sector, and so policy 
proposals around DSM and efficiency represent, in many respects, the first such 
attempt in South Africa. As there is relatively little existing experience to draw 
upon, this section therefore describes some of the financing implications of the main 
DSM policy proposals. 
There are four main DSM policy options which have been identified in EPRET 
(Thorne 1993): 
• upgrading existing houses and constructing new houses so as to achieve good 
thermal performance; 
• promoting energy-efficient appliances such as compact fluorescent light (CFL) 
bulbs and solar water-heaters; 
• labelling appliances to indicate to consumers their energy consumption charac-
teristics and life-cycle costs; and 
• implementing time-of-use (TOU) tariffs to encourage more efficient use of 
electricity. 
Some of these policies have been presented as illustrative options and, given that 
none have yet been implemented in South Africa, the next section assesses the 
impact of financing policies on their potential success. 
3.5.1 Financing arrangements for DSM and efficiency policies 
Many energy efficiency policies face financing constraints. Frequently they entail a 
larger initial investment, which then results in subsequent savings. When faced 
with a choice of two investment alternatives, an energy-efficient option and a 
conventional option, a consumer without any financing constraints would choose 
the option with the most favourable net present value. If the present value of future 
savings from the efficient option exceeds the additional initial investment, then the 
consumer should choose that option. This would be the case, for example, with an 
energy-efficient CFL bulb which, although it costs more, saves a greater amount of 
energy over its lifetime. 
In practice, however, especially where poor households are concerned, the lack of 
liquidity and of access to .finance imposes severe constraints on their ability to invest m 
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in energy-efficient options which cost more initially. From a policy perspective it is 
therefore essential that financing arrangements be put in place to overcome these 
barriers. External support is essential, since poor households will generally be 
unable or unwilling to make larger upfront expenditures to realise subsequent 
savings. 
Thenual performance upgralks and efficient appliances 
The principles described above apply to the policy options of installing insulating 
ceilings and materials in new and existing dwellings, and to encourage the use of 
efficient appliances such as CFL bulbs and solar water-heaters. It has been esti-
mated that expenditure of RSOO to R1 000 per dwelling would result in significant 
savings in their energy consumption (Thorne 1993). In the case of electrified 
dwellings, Eskom estimates that winter space-heating contributes about 1kW to the 
after-diversity-maximum-demand (ADMD) of households, since all households 
require heating at the same time and there is little benefit from diversity. Further, 
they expect that roughly half of this could be saved through thermal upgrades of 
those dwellings. Likewise, the use of efficient appliances such as CFL bulbs would 
reduce the amount of energy consumed by households as well as the generation 
requirements of Eskom. 
Since the benefits of such savings accrue both to the household and to the electricity 
utility in the case of electrified dwellings, it may be argued that Eskom should assist 
households in the financing of such DSM interventions. In the case of unelectrified 
dwellings, benefits would accrue to the household in the form of lower energy 
expenditures, but there is no institution as well placed as Eskom to assist in the 
financing function. Consequently, finance could be channelled through housing 
delivery and development agencies. 
Time-of-use electricity tariffs 
The financing implications of TOU tariff implementation are different from the 
previous policy options. The main costs to be borne by the utility relate to the 
metering and billing requirements for TOU administration. With TOU meters 
currently costing about R1 000, the total costs of a move to this tariff system will 
not be insignificant. It is possible that these costs will decline with time as economies 
of scale are achieved and design improvements are effected, as was the case with 
prepayment meters. 
Initially TOU will be applied only to high-consumption consumers who are able to 
shift their loads to off-peak periods and, as consumers will initially have a choice 
to move to TOU, it is unlikely that the meter costs will be incurred immediately for 
all consumers in this category. Nonetheless, assuming that one million consumers 
switch to TOU, and that average meter costs are, say, R600 each, then total costs 
will be about R600 million. Ligoff has estimated that TOU tariffs can result in a shift 
of an average 10% of such consumers' loads to off-peak periods (1993: 12), equiva-
lent to a projected saving on peak demand of 400MW for one million consumers. 
Since this represents a significant saving for Eskom in the long term, the initial 
investment in TOU meters and related systems may be justifiable. 
Appliance life-cycle cost labelling 
This policy option has relatively limited financing implications, since the costs of 
such a proposal will be borne by the manufacturers of appliances such as refrigera-
tors, freezers, washing-machines and stoves. Manufacturers would be required to 
include information on existing labels and packaging, infonning purchasers of the 
appliance's energy-consumption characteristics. Generally they should already 
have such information available and, where not, this would not be particularly 
costly to establish, so that additional costs should not be serious. 
Allied to the labelling process, is the need for independent testing and verification 
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of manufacturer claims, by ari institution ·such as the South African Bureau of 
Standards (SABS). Again, the financing implications of this additional verification 
procedure, which will supplement a range of existing procedures, should not be 
f;ignificant. 
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that the effective return on investments in 
PSM measures is generally far more favourable than investments in expanding 
supply capacity by the equivalent amount. The investment requirements of com-
pact fluorescent bulbs, for example, are relatively modest in relation to the avoided 
future investment in additional generation capacity. Ligoff (1993: 27) has estimated 
that if 50% of all lights installed in the next ten years are CFL bulbs, the saving on 
Eskom's peak demand would be about 1 200MW. According to Eskom's calcula-
tions of its marginal costs (including additions to generation capacity), this would 
result in a cumulative saving or avoided cost (in 1993 Rands) of R1.6 billion (Ligoff 
1993: 44). It is not clear what the equivalent investment in CFL bulbs would have 
to be, but at an average of R40 per CFL bulb, this would be sufficient for 40 million 
light bulbs, or 13 CFL bulbs for each of about three million electrified households. 
This probably exceeds the number of bulbs required to result in a 50% substitution 
effect, and would therefore point towards the DSM strategy being the more 
cost-effective option. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Impact of household energy policies on 
the macro-economy 
4.1 Introduction 
An important component of the integrated energy planning (IEP) process is the 
assessment of whether the policies and plans suggested during the research phase 
are realistic and achievable within overall resource constraints. If the prevailing 
macro-economic conditions are likely to impose constraints on household energy 
policies, then an iterative process must be entered into, whereby policy proposals 
are adjusted until they are feasible on a macro-economic level. 
This chapter assesses the possible macro-economic impacts of the two main invest-
ment scenarios which may apply to household energy policy until the end of the 
next decade. These scenarios were more fully described in section 2.5: 
e a 'business as usual' (BA U) scenario, in which current trends follow their present 
course and in which no major policy interventions occur; and 
e an 'integrated energy planning' scenario, in which a range of policies are 
implemented with the aim of widening household access to energy services. 
Clearly a wide range of macro-economic variables could be considered, and the 
methodology employed could vary equally widely in its rigour and empirical 
strength. The aim here is to assess, for the most important variables, and about 
which sufficiently reliable information exists, the order-of-magnitude impacts of 
policy options. This will indicate whether the policies proposed under the scenarios 
are feasible in the light of available resources. The present exercise is not intended 
to be, or to substitute for, a thorough and sophisticated modelling process, but it 
can give an approximate indication of the macro-economic effects of policy propos-
als. The macro variables considered are as follows: 
• investment levels; 
• fiscal revenue and expenditure; 
• balance of payments; 
• employment; and 
• environmental quality and sustainability. 
The last two variables are sometimes not included in conventional macro-economic 
analyses, but are considered important in the present study, because of the impor-
tance attached to the development goals of equity and sustainability. It is obvious 
that, in some cases, policy proposals may have little or no impact on some of these 
variables. 
This chapter is organised as follows: each of the macro variables will be considered 
in tum and for each variable the impacts of both scenarios will be assessed, allowing 
the impacts of the two scenarios to be relatively easily compared. 
4.2 Impacts on investment levels 
In many respects this is the most crucial macro variable, as it represents the total 
amount of investment required to implement policies. If other demands (such as 
for housing, education, construction and private investment) against available 
funds (in capital or money markets, locally and overseas, and in private savings) 
are very high, then insufficient resources may be available for household energy 
investments. Provided that adequate sources of savings can be identified and 
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mobilised energy investments may be able to proceed, particularly if other sectors 
are not faced with shortages of investible funds. 
The investment requirements of each scenario are assessed below. For each sce-
nario, the major subsectors in which policy recommendations have been made, are 
addressed in turn. 
4.2.1 Scenario one: business as usual 
[i) Electrification 
Capital investment in the expansion of the electricity grid and reticulation systems 
will account for almost all of the investment under this scenario. In 1992 the capital 
amount expended by Eskom on electrification was about R450 million, with local 
authority distributors accounting for about R150 million. The total of R600 million 
represented about 1.2% of Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI) for 1992 (SARB 
1993: 92). Moreover, GDFI is currently at low levels in relation to GDP: only 15.9% 
in 1992, compared to more 'desirable' benchmark levels of about 25% (ibid). 
Under this scenario it is expected that the rate of connection may increase to about 
250 000 for several years, before experiencing bottlenecks related to financial and 
structural constraints related to the fragmented nature of the distribution industry. 
At average connection costs (in 1993 Rands) of about R3 000 each, the maximum 
annual investment requirements would be in the region of R750 million, equivalent 
to 1.4% of GDFI. From a macro-economic perspective therefore, this electrification 
scenario would probably not be constrained by capital shortages and, in tum, 
would have a minimal impact on the availability and cost of capital for other sectors 
of the economy. 
(ii) Other supply and demand sectors (Juelwood, hydrocarbons, DSM) 
Under the BAU scenario, relatively little new capital expenditure would be made 
for the purpose of household energy use in the fuelwood, hydrocarbon and 
demand-side management sectors. The most significant impacts related to these 
policy areas occur in the IEP scenario. 
4.2.2 Scenario two: integrated energy planning 
[i) Electrification 
Under the IEP scenario, the levels of capital investment by electricity supply 
authorities will be considerably higher than they would otherwise have been. On 
the other hand, however, the tariff proposals (for a national flat-rate tariff) will have 
a considerable impact on the financing requirements for the supply industry, 
especially if tariffs are set at a level which causes a transfer from high-consumption 
users to newly electrified consumers. Therefore, in addition to the investments in 
respect of the capital costs of new connections, there will be two further influences 
on the ability of the supply industry to finance this investment: 
e The financing requirement will be increased by the accumulated operating 
losses incurred in respect of under-recoveries from new customers who are 
being cross-subsidised by high-consumption users. 
e On the other hand, the financing requirement will be met partially from the 
surplus generated by high-level consumers and those whose capital connection 
costs have been paid off. 
These two effects are especially important to the electricity supply industry, since 
they will determine the extent of the industry's financing requirement and thus the 
impact on debt:equity levels. These effects, however, will not diminish the total 
investment by distributors (the subject of the present section) and are therefore 
considered separately in Chapter 5. 
Using an average cost of R3 000 per connection, as in the first scenario, the total 
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investment under the electrification programme will rise from R900 million in 1994 
and peak at Rl.S billion per annum from 1997 (500 000 connections). The rate of 
connection would taper off gradually after the turn of the century, until stabilising 
at around 250 000 connections per year from about 2007, sufficient to keep pace 
with the rate of new household formation. The peak level of investment, at Rl.S 
billion per annum in 1993 Rands, is equivalent to just 2.9% of GDFI in South Africa 
for 1992, and is therefore unlikely to impact significantly on interest rates. Over 17 
years from 1994 to 2010, the programme will entail a total capital investment of 
nearly R22 billion, based on the electrification of about 6.6 million households, 
which will result in about 86% of all households in 2010 having access to electricity. 
(ii) Fuelwood policies 
Some of the expenditure which will be required in the fuel wood sector under the 
IEP scenario, will certainly increase the productive capacity of households, com-
munities or institutions and might therefore be classified as 'investment' rather than 
'current expenditure'. However, because of the relatively short life of many such 
investments, such as in establishing woodlots and agroforestry programmes, it 
would be more prudent to exclude these from productive investment and include 
them instead in the 'expenditure' category. 
An exception to this may be the additional investments envisaged for commercial 
forestry companies under their small-grower schemes. Based on estimates by 
Gandar, these investments may amount to about R80 million initially and a further 
R75 million over the first seven-year rotation period, giving a total of about R150 
million. 
(iii) Low-smoke coal 
In order for low-smoke coal (LSC) to be produced on a large enough scale for it to 
have an impact on household consumption, some investment will have to be made 
in production capacity. This level of investment differs, however, according to the 
type of LSC being considered. For present purposes, it is assumed that the most 
expensive of the three products mentioned earlier, Wundafuel', will be produced 
commercially for a better-off market segment than the focus of this study. Any 
investment made for this fuel will therefore be done on a commercial basis. 
The UCP /Wits heat-treated fuel is the more capital-intensive of the other proto-
types, as it utilises waste heat to drive off the volatile compounds. Consequently 
some capital investment may be required if this product is to achieve a significant 
penetration of the target household market (which consumes some three million 
tons of coal per annum). As no detailed analysis has yet been made of this product's 
potential, it is not possible to estimate the amount of investment required, but it is 
clear that the order of magnitude will be in millions (at the most). While this may 
be significant for an individual manufacturer and may cause the production cost 
of the fuel to increase, it is insignificant on a macro-economic level. 
The Enertek cement-based low-smoke fuel is much less capital intensive, requiring 
little investment to be feasible. It can be produced on a large scale, in a factory, in 
which case a number of cement mixers and slab-casting machines may be desirable. 
More interesting for its employment effects, however, is the option which entails 
decentralised production by small-scale enterprises, cooperatives and individuals. 
In this case, the minimum requirements are a shovel and wheelbarrow, with a 
cement mixer being an optional extra. The investment requirements are therefore 
minimal. 
(iv) Gas and paraffin 
Policy proposals around liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and illuminating paraffin 
(IP) have two aspects: those aimed at reducing the prices for both products paid by 
end-users, and safety measures aimed at reducing the risks of paraffin poisoning 
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tor young children. Neither of these have very significant invesbnent requirements. 
In the case of the former, the oil companies may make additional invesbnents in 
the distribution network (for example, the installation of IP tanks alongside petrol 
and diesel tanks), but these are likely to be financed entirely from private capital 
and are not likely to be significant on a macro-economic scale. Likewise, the costs 
of establishing production facilities for child-resistant paraffin lids are not likely to 
be significant on a macro scale. 
(v) Demand-side management 
There are three DSM policies which have notable invesbnent requirements: 
• the metering systems for time-of-use (TOU) tariffs, 
• the capital costs of energy-efficient appliances, and 
• the costs of thermal performance upgrades. 
As noted in Chapter Three, DSM is a relatively new area in South Africa and no 
detailed costings have been made for these interventions; nonetheless, a few 
estimates can be made. With TOU meter costs currently at around R1 000, but 
expected to drop as economies of scale and design improvements are achieved, and 
possibly one million households likely to switch to TOU once the option is available, 
the invesbnent requirements will be significant. Assuming that meter costs drop to 
flbout R600 each, the invesbnent requirements will be in the region of R600 million. 
This amount, however, will be expended over a number of years as and when 
people make the switch to TOU. Consequently, the annual investment will be much 
smaller. 
The most attractive of the energy-efficient appliances is probably the compact 
fluorescent light-bulb (CFL), at an average cost of about R40 each. If an ambitious 
programme were established to encourage their use by all electrified households, 
tmd their costs were financed by electricity distributors and recovered through the 
tariff or some other mechanism, then the invesbnent requirements would be in the 
region of R240 million for the existing three million customers if each household 
were to purchase two CFLs. If newly electrified households also purchase two bulbs 
each, the invesbnent requirements (to be financed by utilities) will rise from R24 
million in 1994 to R40 million at the peak of the programme. 
finally, sizeable invesbnents would be required to install efficient insulating ma-
terials in formal and informal dwellings where this is lacking. Such invesbnents 
could fall into two categories: upgrading of thermal performance of existing dwell-
ings, and invesbnents in new dwellings. In respect of the latter, Ramsay (1993) has 
argued that it is possible to construct a dwelling which has a thermal performance 
to eliminate or significantly reduce the need for space heating, at no additional cost 
to conventional building methods for low-cost housing. Consequently, there could 
theoretically be no additional invesbnent requirements for new dwellings. In 
upgrading existing dwellings an invesbnent of RSOO to R1 000 may be required per 
upgrade (Thome 1993). Assuming that upgrades will be justifiable for all urban 
informal dwellings in the temperate climatic zone, and for 50% of formal dwellings 
in this zone (regions A, D and H), then a total of about 1.8 million upgrades may 
be required. At an average cost of R750 per house this will require a total invesbnent 
of R1.35 billion. This is significant in relation to the other policy sectors addressed 
in this paper. 
The other side of this coin is the avoided investment in generation capacity attribut-
able to reduced demand for electricity. Based on such a calculation it has been 
shown that the avoided costs of installing new generation capacity, due to the 
savings in demand from these interventions, far exceed the amortised invesbnent 
costs of these DSM interventions (Thorne 1993). Over time, therefore, the net 
invesbnent requirements for DSM strategies combined with electricity generation 
will be reduced by these interventions. 
Iii 
Rnancing and economic implications 
4.3 Impacts on fiscal revenue and expenditure 
This refers mainly to the outflows from the fiscal authorities, such as for subsidisa-
tion of capital infrastructure or for research, as well as the inflows from income tax, 
expenditure tax (such as VAT) and other duties and levies. Clearly, any policy 
which makes a claim on the government's budget wiii have to be justifiable on 
grounds of, for example, equity or public health. Given that the 1992/93 excess of 
expenditure over revenue is very high, at R28.6 biiiion or 8.6% of GDP (as reported 
in the Minister of Finance's budget speech, McGregor 1993), it is clear that the 
government budget wiii have to be tightly managed in coming years. 
4.3.1 Scenario one: business as usual 
(i) Electrification 
There wiii be no direct effects on the fiscus associated with electrification, for the 
following main reasons: 
e No state subsidy is envisaged under this scenario; instead electrification will be 
financed by Eskom and local authority utilities. 
• Even though Eskom is a public corporation, it does not have any direct impacts 
on the fiscus. Notwithstanding its large capital requirements it is completely 
self-financing, either through operating surpluses or external borrowings. On 
the revenue side, it does not pay income tax. 
e The other major source of finance for electrification, under the present structure 
of the industry, is from local government. Historically white local authorities 
meet their financing requirements from external debt, accumulated reserves or 
from trading surpluses, while black local authorities are unlikely to play any 
role in electrification. 
Electrification does, however, have some significant indirect effects on government 
revenue and expenditure. Firstly, electrification costs include expenditures which 
are subject to indirect government tax. An approximate breakdown of the average 
connection costs of R3 000 is as follows (EDRC 1993: 9): 
Materials 60% R1 800 
Labour 25% R750 
Transport 4% R120 
Overheads 11% R330 
Value added tax (VAT) is levied on the materials and transport components of 
connections costs, which would have amounted to about R175 per connection in 
1992 (at 10% VAT). At a VAT rate of14%, government revenue will benefit by about 
R245 per connection in current terms. Secondly, the labour and overhead compo-
nents of electrification costs wiii include revenue sources by way of income tax 
which, at an average tax rate of, say 15%, amounts to additional revenue of about 
R160 per connection in current Rands. The net effect on the fiscus of electrification 
wiii therefore be just over R400 per connection. At an annual connection rate of 
250 000, these taxes will result in an inflow for government of about R100 million 
per annum. This is about 0.1% of total government revenue for 1992/93 (McGregor 
1993). 
Government revenue may benefit further from indirect tax sources, assuming that 
newly-electrified households spend more of their incomes on consumable and 
durable goods, such as appliances, food, and so on. These effects are very indirect, 
however, and depend upon a number of uncertain factors, such as the disposable 
incomes of households, and access to credit for purchase of appliances. 
It should also be noted that the state bears large health costs which are related to 
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the use of polluting fuels such as coal and wood, and to incidents of trauma, such 
as bums and paraffin poisoning from accidental ingestion. It is clear that the health 
effects carry enormous economic and social costs (Van Horen 1993). The state 
health-<:are system carries the bulk of the resultant burden, so some savings may 
be anticipated, although these effects will be relatively modest under this scenario 
since coal and wood use will be largely unaffected. 
(ii) Other supply and demand sectors (Juelwood, hydrocarbons, DSM) 
Under the BAU scenario negligible public expenditure would be undertaken in the 
fuel wood, hydrocarbon and demand-side management sectors. Likewise, no addi-
tional sources of government revenue would accrue. 
4.3.2 Scenario two: integrated energy planning 
(i) Electrification 
Under the BAU scenario, it was envisaged that the effects on the fiscus would be 
limited to indirect revenues accruing via income tax and VAT attributable to 
electrification expenditure. In the IEP scenario, however, there will be one impor-
tant additional effect on the fiscus, in respect of direct state support for the 
electrification programme: this in tum, will have at least two elements: capital 
subsidies for electrification, and support for the Electrification Fund (EF). 
Capital subsidies for electrification 
It has been proposed that where connection costs exceed an agreed-upon parameter 
(of, say, R3 500), households should receive a lower level of supply, or should 
contribute resources in order to lower these costs, or external subsidies should be 
provided to lower the cost to the utility (Pickering 1993). In practice this is likely to 
apply especially to rural households which are far from the existing grid, or widely 
dispersed. 
Poor information exists on which to base estimates of the possible subsidies 
required to connect a reasonable portion of these households to the grid or to a 
remote area power supply (RAPS) system. However, using rough estimates based 
on available information, it appears that the total rural population of about 3.2 
million households includes roughly 0.9 million farmworker households, most of 
which may be connected within the proposed parameter of R3 500 (Hofmeyr 1993). 
Of the remaining 2.3 million households (mostly in the 'homelands'), it is likely that 
connection costs will be higher, even for lower levels of supply. Assuming that 
capital costs (grid or RAPS) will be an average of R6 000, and that 55% of this group 
will be electrified by 2010, then about 1.3 million households will be electrified in 
this category. Under such a scenario, total state expenditure over the life of the 17 
year programme will be in the region of R3.3 billion. At its peak this portion of the 
rural electrification (RE) programme will cost the state only about R250 million per 
annum. In terms of the social and economic benefits resulting from RE, this appears 
lobe a highly desirable item of expenditure for the state. 
The mechanism for the disbursement of this subsidy finance should be the EF, as 
argued earlier in this paper. 
Guarantor for an Electrification Fund 
An essential feature of an EF is that it should include a base amount of seed finance 
for the Grant Fund, which can then act as a loan guarantee fund (or security) for 
the private loan finance managed by the Loan Fund (see Chapter Three). It is 
envisaged that the state should make the first and basic grant to this fund, and that 
fuis should be in the region of R0.5 to R1 billion. This would be a one-off grant, 
which would in principle be of a capital nature and therefore not drawn down by 
ongoing expenditure. In practice, it is possible that additional commitments may 
be forthcoming from the private sector as well as foreign donors. m 
Rnancing and economic implications 
A second feature of the state's commitment to the EF would be the guarantee of the 
Grant Fund's obligation to make up any shortfall in the Loan Fund's repayment to 
lenders - essentially the difference between the guaranteed minimum return to 
investors (say 10%) and the actual return derived from electricity revenue. In effect, 
this represents a subsidy for low-level electricity consumers. It is extremely difficult 
to estimate the level of this commitment, since it depends on many unknowns: the 
growth in consumption of new customers, the basis of calculating returns to 
lenders, and so on. For illustrative purposes, however, assuming average monthly 
consumption is at the lower end of the scale, say 100 kWh per month, that the 
flat-rate tariff is at 20 cents per unit, then at the peak rate of 500 000 connections the 
total revenue from these newly electrified consumers will be about R120 million. 
Using the same structure as Eskom' s Electrification Bond (for illustrative purposes), 
the return payable to investors would be the base rate of 6% (6% of R1 500 million 
is R90 million) plus 30% of this revenue (30% of R120 million is R36 million), 
amounting to a total of R126 million or 8.4% on the capital investment. If the 
guaranteed minimum return were to be the same as Eskom' s first EPN bond issue 
(80% of the E168, equal to nearly 12%), which is fairly generous to investors, then 
the shortfall would be 3.6% on the capital amount of R1 500 million, or R54 million. 
In other words, this is the amount which the Grant Fund would have to transfer to 
the Loan Fund to provide investors with their guaranteed minimum return. In fact, 
this would not require any additional state transfer to the Fund, since the Grant 
Fund would generate more than this amount in income on initial seed finance of 
R0.5 billion (R0.5 billion at 15% for only 1 year is R75 million). Consequently, there 
will be no further demand on the fiscus once it has invested the original seed finance 
in the Grant Fund. 
In summary, the total drain on the fiscus associated with this kind of electrification 
scenario will be the ongoing capital subsidies for electrification of mainly rural 
households, which peaks at R250 million and amounts to about R3.3 billion over 
the life of the whole programme, and the initial one-off injection of between RSOO 
million and R1 billion into the Grant Fund of the EF. 
Revenue inflows due to electrification 
As in the BAU scenario, the state will benefit from a number of indirect inflows due 
to income tax and VAT arising out of capital expenditure under the programme. 
Assuming that, as before, each connection results in an inflow of about R400 in 
respect of these taxes, the total revenue will double from present levels to about 
R200 million per year. This almost fully offsets the capital subsidy required for the 
consumer class described above. 
As before, there may be further benefits from indirect tax sources, once newly 
electrified households spend more of their incomes on consumable and durable 
goods, such as appliances, food, and so on. These effects are very indirect, however, 
and are not quantified in this paper, even though they may be very significant in 
practice. 
Further, it should also be noted that the state may realise additional savings in 
health care expenditure due to reduced health problems resulting from coal and 
wood combustion, paraffin poisoning and bums and fires. 
(ii) Fuelwood policies 
The main macro-economic impact of fuelwood policies will be on government 
expenditure. Apart from expenditure which is allocated to rural development 
functions through departments such as forestry, agriculture and energy, and which 
is directed towards the policy of securing wood supplies from natural woodlands, 
there are two main areas in which additional state expenditure is envisaged. 
Firstly, the network of nurseries oriented towards social forestry programmes, as 
described in Chapter Three, will cost in the region of R70 million to establish and 
Impact on the macro-economy 
R40 million per annum thereafter to maintain. Clearly the initial expenditure would 
not be incurred in a single year and would gradually build up to the point where 
the full network has been established, after which only maintenance costs would 
be incurred. The peak expenditure would then be about R40 million per annum (in 
1993 Rands) and would come from the range of government departments which 
are concerned with rural energy and development. 
The second main item of government expenditure will be in respect of woodlots 
fU\d plantations which, under the scenario described earlier, would cost about R260 
million to establish. Again, this would be incurred over a period of more than one 
year, so that the annual burden on the fiscus would be considerably lower: perhaps 
about R60 million for four years. 
(iii} Low-smoke coal 
In the short-term, LSC will require direct state support if product development is 
to reach the point where mass production is possible. This support will principally 
take the form of funding by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) 
of research into the feasibility of the existing prototypes. Such a research pro-
gramme already exists within the Energy for Development section of the DMEA 
and should continue until sufficient clarity exists over the viability of the options 
currently being pursued. The extent of this state expenditure is only a few million 
rand. 
Thereafter, in the longer-term, it is possible that state support may be required to 
giv~ LSCs a price advantage over conventional coal. The Wits/UCP fuel may not 
require this support (Horsfall1992), while in the case of the Enertek variety this 
subsidy may amount to a maximum of about R180 million per annum (see section 
2.2). This is less than half of the 1993/94 allocation to the Atomic Energy Corpora-
tion (AEC), and 25% of the DMEA' s total budget (auf der Heyde 1993). On the other 
hand, savings would be likely to accrue to the state in respect of reduced health 
care expenditure resulting from reduced respiratory illness in coal-using house-
holds. The second option for the financing of LSC described earlier, namely the 
imposition of tax on conventional coal, would be revenue-neutral for the fiscus if 
the tax was levied at a level of about Rl per ton. 
(iv} Gas and paraffin 
The first area of policy, around theW and LPG distribution and retailing network, 
is likely to be fiscally neutral, since investments and expenditures will be carried 
out by private sector players such as the oil companies. 
With regard to the health and safety effects of paraffin and gas, it has been argued 
that the primary responsibility for the safety of users rests with the suppliers of 
those products and that the state should not have to make direct expenditures in 
respect of, for example, reducing paraffin poisoning. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
the government will have to support small-scale enterprises or community coop-
eratives which could produce the child-resistant lids. This kind of support, how-
ever, will probably be channelled through existing institutions such as the Small 
Business Development Corporation with their existing budgets. Any additional 
state expenditure will therefore be small. 
(v} Demand-side management 
Energy efficiency policies are unlikely to have any direct effect on government 
revenue and expenditure, unless the state embarks on a programme to invest 
directly in household efficiency, for example, in the form of thermal upgrades. 
However, most of these interventions could be of a loan rather than grant nature, 
because households should benefit directly in the form of reduced energy expen-
diture, and could apply a part of these savings to finance the initial investments. 
Other indirect effects on the fiscus may arise through shifts in the allocation of m 
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research budgets, and in the monitoring of efficiency practices such as appliance 
labelling. These, however, will not be significant. 
(vi) Total fiscal requirement of IEP policy proposals 
The combined effect of the IEP policy proposals on the fiscus will be relatively 
modest. More significantly for present purposes, the fiscal expenditure require-
ments could be met fully from the existing fiscal allocation to the AEC. The 
estimated government cash-flows described in this section are summarised in Table 
4.1. 
Policy proposal One-off Annual expenditure 
expenditure Rm Rm 
Electrification: capital subsidies - 250 
Electrification Fund: seed finance 500-1 000 -
Electrification: taxation income - (200) 
Fuelwood: nurseries 70 40 
Fuelwood: woodlots (about 4 years) - 60 
Low-smoke coal - 0- R180 
Total expenditure 570-1 070 150-310 
TABLE 4.1 Summary of estimated one-off and annual fiscal expenditure 
and revenue resulting from IEP policy scenarios (Rands 1993) 
It is evident from the table that net fiscal expenditure required for these policies 
will be relatively small. Even if indirect revenue associated with electrification 
(VAT and income tax) is excluded from the above figure, and if the maximum possible 
government subsidy of LSC is included, then total government expenditure would 
need to be R560 m. By comparison, the 1993/94 fiscal allocation to the AEC was 
R474 million and to the DMEA was R708 million (see Chapter Two). At its peak, 
the government allocation to the nuclear industry was R776 million (in 1986/87 
Rands) which, in today's terms, is well in excess of the amounts being proposed in 
the present project. Consequently, a very strong case may be made for a shift in 
government spending away from the AEC (which has, in any case, delivered highly 
questionable results) towards the policies identified in the IEP scenario, which will 
have a significant impact on the welfare of large numbers of people, as well as 
producing real economic benefits. 
4.4 Impacts on balance of payments 
The balance of ayments is frequently posed as a potential constraint on ambitious 
development projects such as electrification, insofar as the foreign exchange re-
quirements for imports may draw heavily upon foreign reserves. 
4.4.1 Scenario one: business as usual 
(i) Electrification 
The balance of payments implications of an electrification programme have three 
main aspects, which will be discussed separately: 
• direct imports of the some of the materials required for connection to an 
electricity supply; 
• second-round (and subsequent) leakages stemming from appliance purchases 
by newly electrified households; 
• potential foreign exchange gains from the export of commodities produced for 
a national programme. 
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Direct imports 
Of the average connection cost of R3 000 given earlier, it has been estimated that 
the imported portion of materials requirements are around 20%, equivalent to 
about R360 per connection (EDRC 1993: 9). These imports include components of 
transformers, electronics and chemical inputs. Imports included in labour and 
overhead costs are negligible, although transport costs are likely to have a relatively 
}Ugh import component (say 70%). This will bring the cost of imports to, say, R450 
per connection, or 15% of total cost. 
Assuming that the Rand more or less maintains its current level against foreign 
currencies, the annual import bill in respect of these direct costs will be in the region 
of Rl12.5 million, equivalent to 0.2% of 1992 imports (SARB 1993: 92). 
Import of appliances and capital equipment 
Import leakages are likely to occur in the second-round and subsequent effects of 
electrification during which electrical appliances are purchased by newly electri-
fied households. The South African appliance sector may be divided into three 
categories, with the following market values and import propensities (Baumann 
1993): 
1. Consumer electronics (TV, radios, audio-visual equipment): current market 
value is approximately Rl 800 million per annum, of which an average of 42% 
is imported. 
2. Small appliances (kettles, irons, toasters, etc): market value approximately 
R339 million, of which about 66% is imported. 
3. Large appliances/'white goods' (refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, 
stoves, etc): market value approximately Rl 600 million, 13% of which is 
imported. 
The South African electrical durables sector is currently functioning well below 
capacity and faces strong competition from foreign producers who generally are 
able to achieve the economies associated with large-scale production. Moreover, it 
js not expected that electrification will by itself give a major boost to the local 
appliance industry because of its poor competitiveness in relation to foreign pro-
ducers. Detailed forecasts have not been made, but rough estimates are possible. 
Assuming that households spend an average of R200 on new appliances, and an 
average import propensity of 30%, appliance imports will amount to R60 per 
connection. With these assumptions under the BAU scenario, imports would be 
about R15 million per year, which is hardly significant. 
Oearly, the more money households spend on new (as opposed to second-hand) 
appliances after electrification, the higher the import cost. 
Potential exports resulting from electrification 
Many indirect balance of payments benefits may result from electrification, 
through, for example, improved worker productivity due to better living stand-
ards, which may ultimately be reflected in greater competitiveness and exports; 
however, these effects are too indirect to be quantified for the present purposes. 
One spin-off from an electrification programme which has direct export potential 
js in the manufacture of prepaid meter systems (also called electricity dispensers, 
EDs, or budget electricity controllers, BECs). Even though approximately 40% of 
the value of the finished product is imported (mainly electronic components and 
parts of the casing), there is good potential for economies of scale and therefore 
exports. According to members of the industry, considerable interest has been 
shown by countries in Latin America, Africa and the Middle and Far East, with 
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It has been estimated that existing productive capacity can supply approximately 
seven times current domestic demand: in the region of 1.4 million EDs per annum. 
At an average unit price of about R350 per ED, the export market is potentially very 
large. After accounting for domestic demand for EDs, sufficient capacity exists to 
produce about one million units for export annually, without any major new 
investment in productive capacity. Before this market materialises, large orders for 
EDs will have to be secured from countries involved with electrification pro-
gi-ammes of their own. On the other hand, the South African export market may be 
undermined by low-cost manufacturers, such as those in Taiwan or South Korea . 
. With the large number of unknown variables in the export equation, it is very 
difficult to predict the likely size of the ED export market. 
Although some pilot export projects are underway at present, it is unlikely that 
exports will increase substantially in the next year or two. Thereafter, it is possible 
that volumes will increase and, assuming that 100 000 units could be exported, net 
export revenue of about R21 million per annum would result. This is insignificant 
on a macro scale, but would offset the foreign exchange leakages in respect of 
appliance imports. 
The aggregate effect of these three factors on the current account is an outflow of 
just over R100 million per annum, which is very insignificant in relation to current 
imports and exports. The balance of payments is therefore not likely to act as a 
constraint on electrification under the BAU scenario. 
(ii) Other supply and demand sectors (juelwood, hydrocarbons, DSM) 
Again, under this scenario, no major balance of payments impacts would occur for 
the fuelwood, hydrocarbon and demand-side management sectors. 
4.4.2 Scenario two: integrated energy planning 
(i) Electrification 
As in the first scenario, three impacts of an electrification programme on the balance 
of payments will be considered: 
• direct imports of materials required for connection; 
• subsequent leakages due to appliance purchases; 
• potential exports associated with electrification. 
Direct imports 
With approximately 15% of expenditure on connection costs flowing out of the 
country, or R450 per connection, the IEP scenario will cause imports to rise to R225 
million per annum at the peak of the programme - equivalent to less than 0.4% of 
1992 imports (SARB 1993: 92). 
According to an. Eskom investigation, suppliers of locally-sourced components will 
be able to satisfy much higher levels of demand without having to invest in any 
significant new capacity. The first anticipated bottleneck is expected to occur in the 
supply of concrete poles; however, it is easy to expand their production capacity, 
and they are in any event readily substitutable by wooden poles. Thereafter, the 
next constraint occurs at a rate of about 700 000 connections per annum: well in 
excess of the peak rate of total planned connections under the IEP scenario. 
Import of appliances and capital equipment 
Using the same analysis as for the BAU scenario, based on appliance imports of R60 
per connection, imports would then rise from about R18 million per annum in 1994, 
to about R30 million from the peak of the programme in 1997. Oearly, these levels 
are insignificant. 
Potential exports resulting from electrification 
It is difficult to estimate the potential for exports of products such as electridty 
Impact on the macro-economy 
dispensers (EDs) under the IEP scenario, as it is not clear whether a scaled-up 
domestic electrification programme will have any influence on the size of export 
orders. At the very least, therefore, the same levels of export volumes as under the 
first scenario may be realised, equivalent to about R21 million per annum. It is 
possible that export volumes may increase if the increased domestic demand pro-
vides local industries with a springboard for exports: economies of scale in produc-
tion can be more easily achieved, local markets will provide a testing ground to 
encourage foreign purchasers to invest in these products, and local manufacturers 
will have added experience compared to foreign competitors. On the other hand, 
it is possible that South African producers may be undermined by other lower-cost 
producers who will capture export markets. Consequently, it is still too early to 
discern any definite trends in this market, other than to say that the potential for 
exports is very significant. 
The aggregate effect of these three factors on the current account is an outflow of 
just over R200 million per annum at the peak of the programme, which is very 
insignificant in relation to current imports and exports. The balance of payments is 
therefore not likely to act as a constraint on electrification, even under the IEP 
scenario. 
(ii) Fuelwood policies 
The fuelwood policies proposed in EPRET are unlikely to have any direct impact 
on the balance of payments. 
(iii) Low-smoke coal 
The development of LSCs would probably have no direct effect on the balance of 
payments. The only possible effect would arise if a levy was imposed on the sales 
of all bituminous coal, including export sales. In this case, the export price would 
increase by about 1.2%, which, provided that export volumes would be unaffected 
by the price increase (which could possibly be offset by ongoing devaluations of 
the Rand), would result in additional foreign exchange inflows of about RSO million 
per annum. This is based on export volumes of about 49 Mt at prices of about R87 
per ton (DMEA 1992: 27). Clearly, however, the goal of such a levy would not be to 
improve the balance of payments, and such effects would be incidental. In practice, 
it will be important to assess whether coal exports would be compromised on 
international markets before including them in the scope of this levy. 
(iv) Gas and paraffin 
There are unlikely to be any balance of payments effects associated with the policy 
proposals in this sector. Both LPG and IP are residual fuels in the local refining 
process and any change in consumption patterns (for example, an increase in LPG 
consumption), is unlikely to require any change in the refining mix and can be met 
with existing crude refining capacity. 
[v) Demand-side management 
DSM strategies will have limited direct effects on the balance of payments. Indirect 
benefits may flow in the longer term through reduced imports of capital goods 
ilSSociated with constructing additional power stations, or for imports of electricity 
from the region. On the other hand, there may some leakages in respect of the 
import of appliances such as compact fluorescent lights and solar water-heaters. 
CFLs are fully imported, so that, based on the assumptions made earlier, demand 
from already-electrified households may account for imports of about R240 million, 
and demand from new connections under the electrification programme, for R24 
to R40 million worth of imported appliances. 
m 
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4.5 Impacts on employment 
The employment variable in the current context corresponds with a broad concern 
for improving equity. This is a complex issue which can be approached with 
varying degrees of sophistication. Unfortunately, estimates usually attract a certain 
amount of controversy on political and economic grounds. The analysis in this 
chapter is rather crude and probably represents the least optimistic end of the range 
of possible effects. 
4.5.1 Scenario one: business as usual 
(i) Electrification 
Considerable debate surrounds the likely impact of electrification on employment 
levels. Some very optimistic estimates have been made, by De Wet et al (1989) from 
Pretoria University, of the employment benefits of a programme making 300 000 
connections per year. Using input-output tables they estimated that electrification 
would have enormous employment effects (mostly in downstream sectors and due 
to higher personal consumption expenditure), with a minimum of 300 000 new jobs 
after five years, and up to 2 250 000 after 25 years. These figures, however, have 
been felt to be very optimistic, and amongst other problems, do not account for the 
over-capacity inherent in most economic sectors (Theron and van Horen 1992). 
Research which has approached the question from the opposite angle- that is, from 
the perspective of particular firms in the industry and their current capacity 
utilisation and ability to expand - suggests that additional employment due spe-
cifically to electrification will be positive, although much lower (Baumann 1993; 
Goode 1993). 
Employment may be affected in three areas: 
Labour component of the electrification process: 
This is an area in which considerable opportunities exist for transferring income to 
local communi ties through the use of local labour and the building of local capacity. 
However, for the purpose of the BAU scenario, it is assumed that relatively 
standard labour employment procedures are used. As noted earlier, labour costs 
comprise about 25% of average connection costs, excluding those labour costs 
which are included in overheads (design, management, administration). This 
amounts to about R750 per connection, or R187.5 million for a total of 250 000 
connections (1993 Rands). Working on an average gross cost (per employee) of 
R30 000 per annum, this is equivalent to one additional employee for every 40 new 
connections. Assuming constant wages and labour productivity, this would 
amount to about 6 250 new jobs for 250 000 connections. In practice this may mean 
that fewer people lose their jobs, but either way employment spin-offs are impor-
tant. Unfortunately many of these benefits will be transient, unless the temporary 
employment process also results in a transfer of skills which can subsequently be 
used to generate incomes. 
Upstream of electrification itself, are the additional jobs created in materials sup-
pliers. Once again, this sector is currently able to expand its output considerably 
without having to employ large numbers of new employees. The number of people 
employed in this sector is dependent to a greater extent on the overall level of 
economic activity and will not receive a massive boost from an electrification 
programme. It is estimated, from industry-specific research, that about 2 500 new 
jobs would be created to meet the additional demand for electricity materials 
(EDRC 1993: 13). 
Together, therefore, about 9 000 formal jobs may result directly from the connection 
process itself under this scenario. 
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Labour effects in downstream industn'es -appliances: 
New employment in the appliance sector will be limited in the short and medium 
terms, due mainly to the strength of overseas producers, and the low capital and 
labour productivity in local manufacturers. In fact, the industry is currently under-
going shrinkage with a shedding of labour to attempt to improve international 
competitiveness and so it would be imprudent to assume major employment 
opportunities exist here. 
Informal employment opportunities: 
This is an area in which electricity is likely to deliver enormous benefits, although 
these are also the most difficult to quantify. It is accepted that access to electricity 
can improve the potential for households to generate additional income from 
small-scale enterprises, such as beer-brewing, hairdressing, welding, and baking. 
Indeed, the experience in several newly electrified areas, particularly where elec-
trification has been accompanied by other interventions such as improved access 
to credit, has been that the number of micro-enterprises has increased dramatically, 
with obvious benefits not only for those households' disposable incomes, but also 
for employment levels in the area. There is no definite basis for estimation of these 
effects, other than to assert that significant benefits will accrue to households. 
On the negative side, electrification may cause a decrease in the demand for labour 
in the sectors in which consumption spending decreases as a result of electrification, 
such as coal, paraffin and gas. The effect on employment, however, is likely to be 
negligible, because the domestic sector accounts for a very small percentage of the 
total market in these products. Employment in these sectors is dependent to a far 
greater extent on the demand from their major customers. For coal these include 
export customers, electricity generation, synthetic fuel production and industry. IP 
and LPG are essentially residual products in the oil refining process. 
On the whole, therefore, the impact on employment of a BAU electrification 
programme is likely to be positive, although not enormous. An order-of-magnitude 
indication of the number of formal jobs which might be created under this scenario 
is around 9 000. Informal sector activity, on the other hand, will be boosted by 
electrification, although the effect cannot reasonably be estimated. Over time, it can 
also be expected that more employment opportunities will present themselves in 
the maintenance and repair sector, both for appliances and the electricity distribu-
tion network. 
(ii} Other supply and demand sectors (fuel wood, hydrocarbons, DSM} 
As before, no major employment effects will result in these energy subsectors under 
the BAU scenario. 
4.5.2 Scenario two: integrated energy planning 
(i} Electrification 
Again, this is a contentious issue on which many different estimates have been 
made. For present purposes, the same three categories of employment effects will 
be considered as under the first scenario. 
Labour component of the electrificotion process: 
As noted earlier, labour costs comprise about 25% of average connection costs, 
equivalent to about R750 per connection. Working on an average gross cost (per 
employee) of R30 000 per annum, this is equivalent to one additional employee for 
every 40 new connections. Assuming constant wages and labour productivity, this 
would amount to about 7 500 new jobs for 300 000 connections, rising to about 12 
500 jobs at the peak of the programme in 1997. Whilst no detailed analysis has been 
done of these possibilities, it is also evident that the process of electrification could 
be such as to provide the affected communities with significant benefits from 
employment, subcontracting and involvement in decision-making processes and 
Rnancing and economic implications 
responsibilities. Whilst this may compromise on the speed of the programme, it 
will certainly cause greater benefits to flow to communities themselves, in the form 
of income, skills acquisition, experience in development projects and institution-
building. These aspects should be maximised, subject to maintaining a reasonable 
rate of progress with respect to new connections. 
Upstream of electrification itself, additional demand will be encountered for the 
products and services of materials suppliers. As noted before, this sector is able to 
expand its output considerably without having to employ large numbers of new 
employees. Since there is not a linear relationship between output and the number 
of employees, this scenario may result in, say, half as many extra jobs for a doubling 
of output compared to the first scenario. This is equivalent to about 3 750 new jobs. 
Together, therefore, about 16 000 formal jobs may result directly from the connec-
tion process itself under this scenario. 
lAbour effects in downstream industries -appliances: 
New employment in the appliance sector will be limited in the short and medium 
terms, due mainly to the strength of overseas producers, and the low capital and 
labour productivity in local manufacturers. In fact, the industry is currently under-
going shrinkage with a shedding of labour to attempt to improve international 
competitiveness and so it would be imprudent to assume major employment 
opportunities exist here. 
Informal employment opportunities: 
As before, it can be expected that significant benefits will accrue in the informal 
sector through widened access to electricity. With a programme which aims to 
electrify over 85% of the population by 2010, it can be expected that these benefits 
will be highly significant. Unfortunately, because of the difficulty of measuring 
these impacts, no estimate will be made here as to the number of income-earning 
opportunities which might be facilitated by electrification. 
On the negative side, electrification may cause a decrease in the demand for labour 
in the sectors in which consumption spending decreases as a result of electrification, 
such as coal, IP and LPG. The effect on employment, however, is likely to be 
negligible, for the reasons already given above. 
On the whole therefore, the impact on employment of an electrification programme 
is likely to be positive, although not enormous. An order-of-magnitude indication 
of the number of formal jobs which might be created under this scenario is around 
16 000. Informal sector activity, on the other hand, will be significantly boosted by 
electrification, although the effect cannot reasonably be estimated. Over time, it can 
also be expected that more employment opportunities will present themselves in 
the maintenance and repair sector, both for appliances and the electricity distribu-
tion network. 
(ii) Fuelwood policies 
The employment effects of the fuel wood policies proposed in this project are likely 
to be very favourable. In the first place, a better supply of fuelwood will signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of time spent by women in the collection of fuelwood, 
and will therefore release that time for other purposes. Secondly, increases in 
employment and income-earning opportunities for rural people should result from 
expenditure on social forestry, woodlots and plantations, and small-grower 
schemes. Unfortunately, no detailed assessment has been made of the numbers of 
people likely to benefit from such programmes, although it is clear that many will 
benefit. The establishment of the network of 4 000 small nurseries will provide 
employment for at least double that number of people, while the establishment and 
management of 1 500 woodlots will probably employ a similar number of people. 
The small-grower schemes would likewise generate considerable amounts of in-
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come for the small-scale fanners involved. 
Consequently, these policies are likely to be more labour-intensive and employ-
ment creating than those from other energy sectors and this should be seen as a 
major boost for the development of rural areas where unemployment levels are 
high. 
(iii) Low-smoke coal 
A potentially important spin-off of the Enertek cement-based LSC is its potential to 
create employment and income-earning opportunities for large numbers of people. 
The estimates quoted in Chapter 3 suggest that individual production units, with 
about six workers using concrete-mixers, could produce about four tons per day, 
or 800 tons per annum. Assuming that half of the domestic coal market (that is, 1.5 
Jl'}illion tons per annum) could ultimately be supplied by decentralised LSC pro-
ducers, this would require about 1 875 similar production units, which would 
provide employment for just over 11 000 people. Moreover, the opportunities for 
such small-scale manufacturers would also increase considerably: for example, in 
the areas of brick and block production. 
(iv) Gas and paraffin 
A potentially negative result of the proposals around extending oil companies' 
involvement down the distribution chain, will be the loss of employment for the 
distributors or routers. It would be undesirable from an equity and employment 
perspective if large oil companies gained further market share at the expense of 
these small businesses. However, it has been proposed in EPRET Paper 14B that 
the incomes of these routers could be maintained by absorbing them into the oil 
companies' distribution networks. This is a sensitive area, which may require 
further investigation. 
'The current policy research (based at the MRC) around the production of child-re-
sistant paraffin lids is oriented towards maximising the opportunities for the 
production of these lids within communities themselves, in much the same way as 
for LSCs. If the products can be designed so as to be produced on a small scale by 
local enterprises, then significant employment opportunities could be created. 
[v) Demand-side management 
No detailed analysis has been made of the employment effects of DSM policy 
options in South Africa, although it is possible that there may be reasonable benefits 
from a national programme to upgrade dwelling insulation performance. It is likely 
that these benefits would flow directly to households and communities themselves. 
4.6 Impacts on environmental sustainability 
Environmental sustainability is seldom considered as a criterion in conventional 
macro-economic analyses, except in the environmental literature where it obvi-
ously has a very high profile. It is included here, however, because of the impor-
tance attached to the three developmental goals of equity, efficiency and 
sustainability. 
No index or easily-quantifiable measure exists upon which to base an assessment 
of changes in sustainability related to the present discussion. However, the house-
hold energy policy arena has important environmental interfaces, changes in which 
can be assessed either quantitatively or qualitatively. The perspective on 'sustain-
pbility' which is adopted here is therefore that of the quality of the immediate 
environmental conditions experienced by the poor. Whilst this perspective may not 
conform to a conventional understanding of 'sustain ability', which usually refers 
to the manner in which resources are utilised, it is considered appropriate for the 
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present context because the immediate environmental conditions of the poor 
should be the first step towards broader sustainability of an economy. Until the 
household environment is of adequate quality, it would be a misdirection of 
resources or effort to consider macro resource sustainability as usually defined. 
4.6. 7 Scenario one: business as usual 
(i) Electrification 
An electrification programme will have several positive and negative environ-
mental effects. These have been considered in more detail in EPRET Paper 16 but, 
for present purposes, the following are important: 
• The main negative effect would result from the additional electricity generated 
to meet demand from new customers. This would entail slightly more consump-
tion of coal, emission of pollutants (such as sulphur dioxide) and carbon dioxide, 
and impacts on water and land environments. However, the marginal contribu-
tion to these negative effects which could be attributed to newly electrified 
domestic consumers will be very small in relation to the effects arising from 
electricity consumption by existing domestic, mining and industrial consumers. 
e Improvements in environmental conditions can be expected insofar as consum-
ers substitute electricity for coal, paraffin and wood. Rates of respiratory illness, 
paraffin-poisoning and bums may decrease. However, it is likely that a supply-
oriented electrification programme would pay relatively little attention to the 
reasons for multiple fuel-use among households which have access to cheap 
alternatives to electricity such as coal and wood. Consequently, by not recog-
nising that use of wood and coal would probably persist, possibly even with 
access to electricity, the environmental and health problems associated with 
their use would probably remain serious. 
e Without any interventions to address the profile of electricity demand in poor 
households, it is likely that the 'peaky' consumption of newly electrified house-
holds would contribute further to the poor load factor on the national electricity 
system. DSM strategies do not form part of this scenario and efficiency gains 
and shifting of loads would therefore not materialise. 
(ii) Other supply and demand sectors (fuel wood, hydrocarbons, DSM) 
Under this scenario existing trends related to the fuelwood and hydrocatbon 
sectors would continue. Consequently, the social and economic costs of fuel wood 
collection would remain high, and in those cases where women spend increasing 
amounts of time collecting wood where supplies decrease, these costs would 
increase. Likewise, the effects on peoples' health due to continued combustion of 
coal and wood, as well as paraffin-poisoning, bums and fires, would remain 
problematic. 
4.6.2 Scenario two: integrated energy planning 
(i) Electrification 
Many of the environmental benefits under the IEP scenario will accrue not from 
electrification per se, but from the way electrification is integrated into a range of 
other demand and supply policy options, such as the use of LSCs for certain 
end-uses. Nonetheless, an electrification programme of the scale considered in the 
present study will have several important environmental impacts in its own right. 
While these are detailed more fully in EPRET Paper 16, for present purposes the 
following are important: 
• The main negative effect would result from the additional electricity generated 
to meet demand from new customers, as discussed in relation to the BAU 
scenario. 
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e Improvements in environmental conditions can be expected insofar as consum-
ers substitute electricity for coal, paraffin and wood. Rates of respiratory iilness, 
paraffin poisoning and burns may decrease. However, as noted before, electric-
ity is not likely to substitute fully for coal and wood, and so greater benefits will 
be achieved through interventions aimed at those sectors, such as LSC and 
improved ventilation of wood fires. 
e An important feature of the IEP scenario wiii be the emphasis on DSM strategies 
to improve the efficiency of, or even to conserve on, energy use. Benefits may 
accrue both to households, for example through the use of more efficient 
appliances with lower life-cycle costs, and to the electricity suppliers because of 
the more efficient use of their systems, resulting in lower peaks and better load 
factors. The latter will arise, for example, through an efficient multiple-fuel use 
package which will utilise coal or gas heaters instead of more expensive electric 
heating. 
(ii) Fuelwood policies 
It can be expected that the fuelwood policies proposed in this project will have a 
favourable impact on the rural environment. Social forestry initiatives such as 
agroforestry are generally sustainable in the context of their micro-environments, 
and will reduce the pressure on natural woodlands and the natural habitats they 
support. Thus, while fuel wood collection is only one cause among many of wood-
land denudation, afforestation approaches such as social forestry will have a very 
favourable impact on wood resources in rural areas. This is because social forestry 
delivers numerous other benefits to households over and above fuelwood, and 
therefore helps meet household needs for timber, poles, fruits, and herbal or 
Jlledicinal products. Pressure on existing woodlands will be significantly reduced 
through interventions on the scale envisaged in the IEP scenario. 
On the other hand, woodlot development, especially if this involves mono-crop 
plantations, can have negative effects on the surrounding environs through, for 
example, the displacement of the natural biological diversity found in savannah 
and natural woodland areas. In addition, water supplies can be affected through 
increased water uptake by plantations. Nonetheless, it is possible, with sensitive 
environmental management in the siting and operation of woodlots, to minimise 
any such negative effects. 
A secondary spin-off of these interventions will be the slight amount of carbon 
dioxide which will be absorbed by these trees- assuming that the net amount of 
standing trees increases, or decreases at a slower rate due to these policies. How-
ever, this benefit will be marginal on a global scale, and should not be misconstrued 
as a justification for afforestation programmes. 
(iii) Low-smoke coal 
The use of LSC instead of normal coal would have two important environmental 
effects. Firstly, the levels of particulate matter to which people are exposed should 
decrease, particularly once LSC is widely used; indeed, this is the prime motivation 
for the development of this kind of fuel. Once these pollution levels are decreased, 
many secondary effects should result: reduced incidence of respiratory illness in 
exposed populations, reduced health care expenditure, and improved air quality 
jn coal-burning townships where pollution levels are severe. 
Secondly, the production of LSC would utilise a portion of the 40 million tons of 
coal wastes produced annually, carrying negative environmental and economic 
costs of their own. It is estimated that approximately four million tons of the total 
waste has a suitable energy content for use in LSCs. This would reduce the amount 
of waste to be otherwise disposed of, and would lower the risks of burning coal 
dumps. 
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Clearly, LSCs are not the definitive answer to all environmental problems as they 
still emit a number of gaseous pollutants, as well as carbon dioxide, a principal 
greenhous~ffect gas. Nonetheless, their use can result in significant environ-
mental gains, particularly for the poor. 
(iu) Gas and paraffin 
The main environmental problem currently experienced with respect to these fuels 
is paraffin-poisoning. The explicit aim of the policy proposal for the production of 
child-resistant lids is to prevent this, and it is expected that a high percentage of 
such accidents could be avoided with the use of such lids - it is possible that the 
lids being currently designed could fit over 80% of the most commonly used 
paraffin containers. The problem of fires and burns is likely to be mitigated as 
electrification of households results in the gradual replacement of IP (and candles), 
which are associated with the highest number of such accidents. 
(u) Demand-side management 
Environmental considerations are a major motivation for embarking'on energy 
efficiency programmes, the other being the economic gains which can be made. To 
the extent that these measures result in a saving of energy, whether electric, coal, 
wood or other, there will clearly be environmental benefits in the form of reduced 
emission of pollutants and greenhouse gases, reduced depletion of non-renewable 
coal reserves and of renewable wood resources, as well as improved quality of life 
for household members. Whilst these benefits have not been quantified, it is clear 
that they are significant. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
A central reason for undertaking this assessment of the macrcreconomic effects of 
the policy proposals of the main sectors in EPRET was to assess their feasibility in 
the broader macro context. A second objective was to assess whether there will be 
any contradictions between the policies in various sectors, and between the policies 
and the three objectives of the present study: namely to improve equity in the 
household energy arena, whilst maintaining a balance with efficiency and environ-
mental goals. Thirdly, there may also be an intellectual interest in the effects of the 
policies on the macro-economy, especially where the household energy sector is 
analysed in the context of the economy as a whole, or together with other sectors 
such as education, health and housing. 
Based on the analysis in this chapter, it can be fairly safely concluded that the policy 
proposals in EPRET appear to be feasible within the context of the national econ-
omy, and that no major constraints appear to exist in the specific subsectors. 
Moreover, many of the policies proposed will have potentially significant positive 
effects on the economy, through the stimulation of productive investment. An 
important aspect of these effects include the environmental benefits which should 
result under an IEP scenario. 
The policy sector of greatest macro-economic significance is the electrification 
programme, which has several impacts relevant at a macrcreconomic level, al-
though the anticipated level of investment and government spending appear to be 
affordable. The impacts of these scenarios on the electricity supply industry, 
together with proposals around electricity tariffs and industry structure, are con-
sidered in more detail in Chapter Five. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Impact of policy proposals on the 
electricity supply industry 
5.1 Introduction 
An important principle in the financing and pricing arenas is that the financial 
viability of the supply industry should be maintained, even when pursuing equity 
objectives. Of the major supply sectors, such as electricity, petroleum, fuelwood 
and coal, it is in the electricity supply industry (ESI) that the proposed policies will 
have the most profound impact on the financial viability of the industry; this 
chapter describes the possible financial impact on the ESI of some key policy 
options. 
A financial model has been constructed which calculates the financial impacts of 
electrification scenarios, given a number of assumptions regarding most of the key 
variables which will affect the finances of the programme, such as connection rates, 
capital costs, tariffs and operating costs. The inputs to the model include all of these 
variables and more, while the main outputs are the annual cash flow and the 
cumulative financing requirement (which could be met through debt or equity 
financing). Additional outputs include the overall net present value of the pro-
gramme and the internal rate of return. The detailed assumptions for various 
scenarios are described below. 
5.2 Assumptions in the IEP scenario 
For the purpose of this analysis the total population has been characterised accord-
ing to housing type, and eight such categories have been identified. The data for each 
of these categories has been drawn from the EPRET data base, which has synthe-
sised a number of sources as at 1990 (Trollip 1993). The data for 1990 has been 
updated for present purposes to 1993, by assuming the following: 
• the total number of households grew by 300 000 during 1991 and 1992, which is 
equivalent to about 2% per year; 
• in the absence of better information, it is assumed that these new dwellings were 
split equally between informal planned, informal unplanned and backyard 
shacks; 
• a total of about 250 000 new electricity connections were made during 1991 and 
1992, 70% of which were in low-income formal households, and the balance in 
planned informal dwellings. 
In addition, since no information was available regarding the split between rural 
dense settlements and rural scattered (or dispersed) settlements, a 50:50 split was 
assumed. 
Based on these sources of data and assumptions, an estimate of the number of 
houses in each category as at the beginning of 1993 is shown in Table 5.1. The 
number of houses in each category is an approximation only. Also included in Table 
5.1 are the approximate percentages of each category which currently have access 
to electricity. · 
m 
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Housing category No of houses 1993 Percentage access 
High income formal 2 100 000 100 
Low income formal 800 000 72 
Planned informal 600 000 12 
Unplanned informal 500 000 0 
Backyard shack 700 000 17 
Rural farmworkers 900 000 15 
Rural dense 1 150 000 4 
Rural scattered 1 150 000 1 
TOTAL 7 900 000 39 
TABLE 5.1 South African population segmented according to housing 
type in 1993, and percentage with access to electricity 
This segmentation is necessary for electrification planning purposes, because there 
are significant differences in the connection costs and likely consumption patterns 
for each of these categories. For instance, it is probable that rural households will 
consume relatively small amounts of electricity since they will continue to use wood 
for some or all of their heating and cooking requirements. Likewise, the urban 
population has been segmented into two broad categories: those households which 
will consume relatively high amounts of electricity (using, for example, geysers and 
stoves), and those likely to use electricity only for such things as lighting, radio, 
television and a few small appliances. The class of long-electrified, wealthier 
consumers almost exclusively reliant on electricity constitute an important market 
segment, since it is a potential source of cross-subsidies for poorer consumer 
classes. 
The financial model has been designed to allow for varying consumption patterns 
between these categories, as well as varying rates of connection. In practice, it is 
likely that certain categories will be electrified sooner than others, and so these 
broad sequencing trends have been incorporated into the model. 
Several of the assumptions used in the baseJEP scenario are shown in Table 5.2 for 
each of the housing categories. The variables include the average capital connection 
costs for each category, the initial monthly electricity consumption in kWh, and the 
maximum consumption. The latter is the level at which consumption stabilises, and 
is obviously also an average. Whilst it could be assumed simply that the annual 
connections are divided equally or proportionately among all unelectrified catego-
ries over time, the model is able to incorporate assumptions about the emphasis 
between categories over three time periods: the first and second five-year periods, 
and the third period of seven years (2004 to 2010). In other words, assumptions can 
be made about the percentage of total annual connections being made in each 
category. The table also shows the percentage access for each category which would 
result under this scenario by 2010. 
From this table it is evident that the biggest category of houses to be electrified 
under the programme is planned shacks, which account for about 45% of annual 
connections. Under this scenario, the low-income formal housing category receives 
a significant amount of attention in the first five years, and then tapers off. The same 
applies to farm worker dwellings- which can probably be electrified fairly rapidly 
at low cost compared to other rural sectors. The converse applies to the other rural 
categories and to unplanned and backyard shacks. 
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Housing category Capital cost Initial kWh Max kWh Yrs 1-5 Yrs 6-10 Yrs11-17 2010 
%total %total %total % access 
High-income formal 0 800 800 - - -
Low-income formal 3 000 100 500 15 5 5 
Planned informal 3 000 100 500 45 45 45 
Unplanned informal 3 000 100 500 5 10 10 
Backyard shack 2000 80 200 5 10 10 
Rural farmworkers 3000 60 150 15 10 5 
Rural dense 5000 60 150 10 10 15 
Rural scattered 7 000 60 150 5 10 10 
TABLE 5.2 Assumptions regarding capital costs, consumption patterns and sequencing of connection 
for each housing category 
A number of variables are common to all categories. They are as follows: 
Monthly fixed service costs 
Annual growth in consumption 
Real discount rate 
Bulk supply costs 
Technical losses 
Non-technical losses 








It might be argued that fixed service costs will differ between categories, and, in 
practice, they would. However, it is also probable that they will be relatively 
comparable on average, since any excesses over the general cost of service parame-
ter will be reduced either by negotiating a lower level of service, or by involving 
communities themselves in maintenance and service (or both). 
Possibly the most important variable in this financial analysis, is the tariff level. To 
begin with, it is assumed that the status quo prevails insofar as new customers are 
charged on a basis similar to the current 51 tariff, and that there is no pooling of 
revenues and expenditures between electricity distributors. In this way, the finan-
cial impacts of the electrification programme can be assessed independently. Sub-
sequently, the effects of national tariffs and revenue pooling will be included to 
determine the effect on the ESI. 
5.3 Gross financing requirements of electrification 
When the electrification programme is isolated from the other activities of the ESI, 
it is easier to assess its real financial costs. Based on the assumptions noted earlier, 
particularly those of the rate of annual connection, capital connection costs, con-
sumption patterns, and at a tariff of 20 cents per kWh, the total financing require-
ment of the electrification programme over the 17-year period 1994 to 2010, would 
be in the region of R22.4 billion (in 1993 Rands). This financing requirement is shown 
in Figure 5.1 on an annual and cumulative basis. 
It is evident from this figure that the programme will absorb a considerable amount 
of resources over its full duration and that, at a tariff level of 20c/kWh (in 1993 
terms), the programme will continue to be a net absorber of funds, even in 2010 
when the cashflow from the programme remains negative. This 'financing require-
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FIGURE 5.1 Annual and cumulative financing requirement of the 
electrification programme 
financed by the ESI from one or other source. The two main kinds of finance 
available to the ESI (excluding external sources for now) include debt and equity 
finance. Clearly, if all of this were to be met through additional borrowings, then 
the risk exposure of the industry would increase dramatically, especially through 
the high finance charges which would result from the large capital debt. On the 
other hand, equity finance (in the form either of operating surpluses or direct 
private investment) also carries costs insofar as that finance could have been 
applied to other investments which would have earned a different rate of return. 
It is useful to separate the financial flows taking place under the programme into 
two categories: 
e the capital cost of investment in additional infrastructure: over the full period of 
the programme, this capital expenditure will amount to about R21.9 billion 
(corresponding to the figures referred to in Chapter 4); and 
e the operating losses and surpluses resulting from the difference between revenue 
from consumers and expenditure incurred by supply authorities: by the end of 
the planning period, in 2010, the cumulative operating loss will be about RO.S 
billion. 
The latter point is significant: under the set of assumptions used in this analysis 
(especially with a tariff of 20c/kWh), the programme as a whole will not yet have 
reached break-even point with respect to operating costs, let alone capital recovery. 
It is important, however, to disaggregate these cumulative figures further, and to 
identify trends in cashflows. Presenting the same data on the basis of annual 
cashflows, reveals that cash flows from operations turn positive in the eleventh year. 
The cumulative operating deficit therefore decreases after 2003. This is shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
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FIGURE 5.2 Annual capital expenditure and operating losses/surpluses 
of the electrification programme 
On this basis, over a sufficiently long period, and at a very low discount rate, the 
electrification programme would yield a positive net present value (assuming 
capital expenditure ceases). Clearly, however, the payback period would be very 
long and, in practice, the cost of capital will be much higher than zero, thus 
discounting future (positive) cashflows more strongly. 
Another interesting distinction can be made between the financing requirements 
of the rural and urban components of the programme, since these display very 
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FIGURE 5.3 Annual financing requirement associated with the rural 
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FIGURE 5.4 Annual financing requirement and contribution associated 
with the urban component of the programme 
It is clear from these two figures that the rural electrification programme will have 
to draw upon resources from elsewhere for it to be sustained, whereas the urban 
component of the programme generates sizeable operating surpluses by the end of 
the period (almost RSOO million per annum). Some of the possible sources of finance 
for the rural programme include cross-subsidies from urban households, non-do-
mestic consumers, as well as direct grants from the fiscus. The financial impacts of 
these options will be described below. 
5.4 Financial imiPact of electrification under 
the I EP scenario 
Under the IEP scenario proposed in the EPRET project, there are two fundamental 
assumptions which affect the finances of the electrification programme: 
• A single IUltioiUll flat-rate tariff applies to all of the consumer categories listed 
earlier. The most important implication of this is that the consumer class which 
has paid off its capital costs, and which generally consumes the largest amount 
of electricity ('formal high-income'), will be cross-subsidising the newly electri-
fied classes. Depending on the tariff level, this can significantly reduce the total 
financing requirement for the ESI. 
e The distribution function in the electricity supply industry is ratioiUllised, such 
that surpluses generated from some domestic consumer classes are pooled and 
offset against any deficits from other consumer classes. In other words, either 
there is complete horizontal integration in the distribution industry, or there are 
equalisation mechanisms to transfer funds between regional distributors. It is 
assumed that all distributors apply the same tariff to their domestic eustomers. 
With regard to these assumptions, in order to ensure that they are not unrealistic, 
it is assumed that the high-income domestic consumers who currently pay tariffs 
below the likely level of the national tariff, will move to the national tariff on a phased 
basis. Clearly, this involves a political process which may see resistance by some of 
these consumers to higher tariffs, although the negative impact on this group can 
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be mitigated by phasing in their tariff increases over a number of years. From an 
income distribution perspective, the impact of a national domestic tariff would be 
progressive. Consequently, the analysis below assumes that there will be a real 
increase in their tariffs of 10% per year, until they reach the national tariff. From a 
base of 15.5c/kWh, it would take four years to reach a national tariff of 20c/kWh. 
An important issue regarding this upward shift in price levels faced by high-income 
consumers, concerns their likely responses (if any) to the real price increases 
resulting from a move to national tariffs; in other words, their price-elasticities of 
electricity demand. If their demand for electricity is price-elastic, then there would 
be a proportionately larger decrease in their consumption levels in response to a 
price rise. This would have adverse implications from a financing perspective, since 
this consumer group is a major source of cross-subsidies. If, on the other hand, their 
demand is price-inelastic, they will not respond to a price increase by cutting back 
as significantly on consumption, and this portion of the supply industry's revenue 
base will be preserved. Unfortunately, there is not much information available on 
which to base any estimate of elasticities; for simplicity's sake it is therefore 
assumed that there will be no material decreases in electricity consumption by high 
income consumers. This is not unlikely in view of the probability that price 
increases will be more gradual (at least as suggested in this analysis). In addition, 
these households already own the large appliances and products in their homes 
which cause their consumption levels to be higher than average, and so general 
consumption patterns and lifestyles are not likely to change dramatically if electric-
ity tariffs rise by about 30% over four years or so. 
J3ased on the assumptions outlined earlier, and with a national tariff of 20c/kWh 
excluding VAT (or 22.8c/kWh including VAT), which is slightly lower than the 
present 51 tariff, the peak financing requirement will be reached after 11 years in 
2004, at R9.9 billion. The financing requirements associated with the electrification 
programme will thereafter decrease, due to a positive net cashflow from the twelfth 




Jl~nllnlll · · 









-1 0000 +--+--+--+--t--+--+--+--t--t___,f-""-t-=t-+--+--+--+--l 
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0910 
Year (1994-2010) 
• Annual financing requirement 
~Cumulative financing requirement 
FIGURE 5.5 Cumulative and annual financing requirement of the 
electrification programme at a national tariff of 20 c/kWh with a phase-in of 
high-income formal households 
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Rnancing and economic implications 
The dramatic decrease in the financing requirement from R22.4 billion to R9.9 
billion is attributable to the cross-subsidy from high consumption categories, which 
amounts to just under R1 billion per annum. This means that, with the phased 
pooling of their revenue, this group will contribute approximately R12.5 billion 
over the 17 years of the programme, which is equivalent to an average of just under 
R30 per month for each of these households. To place this total financing require-
ment in context, it can be compared with the financing requirement for a 3 600MW 
coal-fired power station in 1993 terms, which was estimated to be in the region of 
R10 to R12 billion (EDRC 1993). 
Impact of an electrification levy 
If, as suggested in Chapter Three, a levy is imposed on all electricity generated and 
is dedicated for electrification financing, this could further reduce the financing 
requirements for the ESI. Moreover, it would permit the national domestic tariff to 
be lowered, with all the favourable social and political implications this will have. 
An electrification levy imposed on generation or transmission, and equivalent to 
(for example) a 4% increase on the bulk supply cost, would raise just under RSOO 
million per annum at current output levels. Assuming modest growth in electricity 
sales of 2% per annum over the period of the programme, this levy would generate 
RlO billion in additional finance for electrification. If these funds are channelled 
directly into an Electrification Fund and allocated to the electrification programme, 
as suggested, then the financing requirement to be met by the ESI will decrease to 
only R4.6 billion under the conditions described previously. As noted earlier, this 
will offer scope for reducing the domestic tariff. If the national tariff is set at 18Cik Wh, 
for instance, the financing requirement associated with the electrification pro-
gramme would then be around R9.2 billion, although, as shown in Figure 5.6, the 
annual net cash flow by the end of the period would be fairly stable, just greater 
than zero. 
2000~----------------------------------. 
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FIGURE 5.6 Cumulative and annual financing requirement of the 
electrification programme with an electrification levy of 4% and a national 
tariff of 18c/kWh with a phase-in of high-income formal households. 
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Impact of electrification on debt/equity levels 
For purpose of the ensuing discussion, reference will be made to the financing 
requirement of the electrification programme without an electrification levy, with a 
domestic tariff of 20c/kWh, and with phased pooling of high-income consumers, 
CiS shown in Figure 5.5. In this case, the financing requirement amounted to R9.9 
pillion. This will be referred to as the 'base IEP scenario'. Even if the whole of this 
financing requirement is met through additional debt, then such a scenario would 
have a relatively easily-manageable impact on the debt levels in the ESI. If Eskom 
were to take on all of this debt (that is, as if there was one national distributor), then 
this would have a relatively small impact on its debt to equity ratio. Its current 
debt! equity ratio is about 2.2:1, while its goal is to reduce this to 1:1 by 1996/97 (Els 
1993: 3). Assuming that retained earnings increase by a modest 8% per annum (in 
1992 actual growth was 14%), then by 1998 equity will be in the region of R19.8 
billion. At that stage the cumulative debt from the electrification programme will 
be just under R6 billion, which would cause the debt/ equity ratio to increase from 
1:1 (assuming Eskom achieved its target) to 1.30:1. Assuming that Eskom aims to 
maintain its debt at par with its equity after 1998 (excluding electrification), and if 
earnings continue to grow at 8% per annum, then at the peak of the electrification 
programme's debt requirement in 2004, the debt/ equity ratio would be about R41.3 
billion to R31.4 billion, or 1.32:1. Even at the peak of the programme, therefore, debt 
levels will be well below their present levels in relative terms. 
The net present value of the cashflows associated with the electrification pro-
~amme under the base IEP scenario yields a negative amount of R7 .9 billion under 
this-set of assumptions. Whilst this suggests that the programme is not viable over 
the 17 year period, and should not be pursued if evaluated according to narrow 
financial principles, it is also clear that the programme would yield a positive NPV 
over a much longer period since the cash flow is positive in the latter quarter of the 
programme. Moreover, the NPV analysis takes no account of the associated eco-
nomic, political and social benefits of electrification, which make the exercise more 
desirable. 
Conclusion 
Under these assumptions, therefore, it appears that the electrification programme 
can be relatively easily managed by the ESI and that the ESI' s financial viability will 
not be threatened. Oearly, this analysis makes a ceteris JXlribus assumption with 
regard to exteTTUll variables: that all other things stay equal (for example, demand 
for electricity from non-domestic sectors grows sufficiently to provide Eskom with 
the anticipated growth in earnings, that excess generation capacity is allocated to 
currently unelectrified households, and so on). However, the variables which are 
inteTTUll to the ESI and the electrification programme will have a major influence on 
the finances of the industry - for example, tariffs, connection costs, consumption 
levels, and fixed service costs. The following section performs a sensitivity analysis 
on some of the key variables. 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to test the sensitivity of the financial outputs to changes in the inputs, each 
of the major variables which are likely to change from the assumptions used in this 
analysis can be varied by 10% either way, and the impacts on peak financing 
requirement observed. The results of such an analysis are summarised in Table 5.3. 
Variances relating to operating costs have been included in this sensitivity analysis, 
since any changes in these costs will have significant impacts on the industry, which 
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Variable Peak financing % Variance 
requirement (Rm unfavourable! 
1993) (favourable) 
BASE IEP SCENARIO 9 914 -
UNFAVOURABLE VARIANCES 
Tariff -10% 19 097 93 
Bulk supply cost +10% 16 042 62 
Connection cost + 10% 11 562 17 
Monthly fixed cost +10% 11 454 16 
Consumption by high-income 
consumers -10% 11 373 15 
Initial consumption -10% 10 382 5 
Consumption growth -10% 10 257 3 
Maximum consumption -10% 10 159 2 
FAVOURABLE VARIANCES 
Tariff +10% 6257 (37) 
Bulk supply cost -10% 6 374 (36) 
Connection cost -1 0% 8 265 (17) 
Consumption by high-income 
consumers + 1 0% 8 505 (14) 
Monthly fixed cost -1 0% 8 536 (14) 
Initial consumption +10% 9 495 (4) 
Consumption growth +10% 9 621 (3) 
Maximum consumption +10% 9 722 (2) 
TABLE 5.3 Sensitivity analysis of key variables in the 
electrification scenarios 
From this analysis it is apparent that the level at which the flat rate tariff is set will 
have a profound influence on the financial status of the industry. A decrease of only 
2c/kWh, to 18 cents per unit, causes the peak financing requirement to almost 
double, to R19 billion. The model's results show that even after 17 years of the 
programme, annual cash flows would be negative at this tariff level (in 1993 terms). 
Conversely, a 2 cent increase in the tariff to 22c/kWh would cut the financing 
requirement by over a third, to R6.3 billion. Bulk supply costs show a similar degree 
of sensitivity to changes in the tariff, as would be expected. 
Of the remaining variables, three show similar sensitivities: capital connection 
costs, monthly fixed service costs and consumption levels of the high-income 
consumer class. The latter is clearly an important variable, since this group is a 
major source of cross-subsidy finance for the programme. Each of these variables 
reflect greater than unitary responsiveness: their elasticities are greater than 1. In 
other words, a 10% change in any of those variables results in a greater than 10% 
change in the financing requirement. 
The last three variables, related to consumption patterns of new consumers, show 
relatively low sensitivities, causing variances in the financing requirement of less 
than 5%. This suggests that the financial results of the programme are relatively 
independent of consumption levels of new customers, which is a surprising result. 
This may be attributable to the fact that their consumption patterns have been 
isolated from those of long-electrified customers, who are much more significant 
as a source of revenue in the programme than new customers themselves. 
It is clear therefore that the process by which tariffs are set in the industry is vitally 
Impact on the electricity supply industry 
important, and will determine whether the industry achieves its developmental 
objectives without undermining its long-term viability. This underscores the need 
for a strong and effective regulatory environment in the ESI which will govern the 
process of tariff-setting. The key issue will be to achieve a balance between social 
imperatives for lower tariffs, and economic and financial imperatives for higher 




Impact of energy policies on household . . 
m1cro-econom1es 
6.1 Introduction 
Poor households typically spend a high proportion of their income on energy 
services and, while there are obvious dangers in attempting to make generalisa-
tions, it is not unusual for the poorest urban households to spend between 10% and 
25% of their incomes on energy. Even in rural households, where fuelwood ac-
counts for the largest part of the energy consumed and is by-and-large available at 
no cash cost, energy expenditure may still be significant where households use 
batteries, candles and paraffin. Moreover, where income flows tend to be erratic 
and highly variable, energy expenditures are not easily reduced, as evidenced by 
the relatively higher percentage of income devoted to energy by poor households. 
The absolute amounts expended on energy vary widely, with most urban house-
holds probably falling within the range of about R30 to RlOO per month. In rural 
households (where data is more scarce) energy expenditure is generally lower. 
Clearly it is not possible to generalise across the whole population, and it is not the 
objective of the present discussion to provide a comprehensive picture of current 
income distribution and energy expenditure patterns. Instead, the aim is to make 
an assessment of the likely directions and, where possible, orders of magnitude of 
changes in household energy expenditure patterns which may result from the 
policies proposed by EPRET. Consequently this chapter describes, in a qualitative 
manner, the possible impacts on household budgets of the main policy sectors 
addressed throughout this paper. Where sufficient data exists, and the result may 
be meaningful, these effects have been quantified. 
6.2 Impact of electrification on household economies 
Household economies will be affected differently depending on the range of fuels 
currently used, the extent to which electricity will replace those fuels, and the prices 
currently paid for energy services. Some of these impacts may be as follows: 
e In the case of already electrified households in historically white areas, electric-
ity tariffs will increase if a national flat-rate tariff is implemented. If this tariff is 
set at around 20c/k Wh (excluding VAT) then the increase could be in the region 
of 4.5c/kWh for most customers in this category. For a household consuming 
800kWh per month this will translate into a R41 (including VAT) increase in 
their monthly electricity bill, equivalent to a 30% increase. For those households 
electing to move to a time-of-use tariff, their electricity bill may then be reduced 
from this level if they are able to manage their demand patterns effectively. 
e For newly electrified households consuming about 150kWh per month, expen-
diture on electricity would be in the region of R34, including VAT. This would 
be balanced by reduced expenditure on battery-charging, candles and paraffin 
and gas for lamps. Unfortunately, insufficient data exists to assess how much is 
currently expended on these services and how this compares to expected 
electricity expenditure. 
e In the case of the more energy-intensive services such as cooking and heating, 
it is probable that the substitution effect of electricity will be smaller, since 
alternatives such as wood and coal will almost certainly be cheaper options for 
those households which have easy access to these fuels. Consequently there will 
be little change in expenditure patterns in most of these households. 
Impact on household micro-economies 
e The better-off households, especially those in urban areas, are likely to make a 
more substantial shift to electricity, and will probably expend a greater portion 
of their budgets on electricity and electrical appliances than at present. These 
are households in which demand for electricity has been suppressed by their 
lack of access. 
There are a number of other effects on households, which are social and environ-
mental in nature, and which would have a less direct effect on household budgets. 
These effects include better quality of lighting at night, reduced time spent purchas-
ing or collecting fuel, improved access to telecommunication services, and many 
more. 
6.3 Impact of low-smoke coal (LSC) on household 
economies 
The introduction of LSCs should not result in any additional expenditure by 
households currently using bituminous coal. If anything, LSC should trade at a 
slight discount on conventional coal if it is to achieve a significant penetration into 
the domestic market. Consequently, households should experience a direct de-
crease in their expenditure for the same quantity of coal. Of possibly more impor-
tance, however, will be the indirect effects of LSC use on households. Once there 
has been a substantial substitution of conventional coal by the low-smoke variety, 
it can be expected that peoples' particulate pollution exposures will decline and 
this should result in lower respiratory and other illnesses. This, in tum, may have 
a sizeable impact on the levels of health and medical expenditure, a portion of which 
is currently borne by households (and not the state), and which benefit would 
therefore accrue to them. 
6.4 Impact of paraffin and gas interventions on 
household economies 
Several policies have been proposed, with the aim of reducing the mark-ups in the 
later stages of the distribution and marketing chain for paraffin and gas. It appears 
as if some of these mark-ups are attributable not only to transport and handling 
costs, but also to profiteering, which, if reduced or eliminated, will result in 
significant savings to households using these fuels. According to McGregor's (1993) 
calculations, reductions in these retail price increases of 40c/litre of paraffin can be 
achieved. For households consuming 20 litres per month, a net saving of about R8 
would result each month. Similar interventions in the LPG distribution chain could 
result in savings of 77c/litre (ibid). For household consumption of 10 kg per month, 
the corresponding saving would be almost R8 per month. 
Another policy area which may have an indirect effect on household economies, 
relates to the use of child-resistant paraffin lids. Whilst the direct cost of these would 
be very low (around R1 each) and affordable for even the poorest households, the 
more significant impact on household expenditures patterns is likely to result from 
the avoided expenditure otherwise incurred when an incident of poisoning occurs: 
transport costs to a hospital or clinic, costs of medical care and medication and 
possibly lost income for parents who have to leave work or their own small-scale 
businesses. These benefits would accrue only to households which would other-
wise have suffered additional expenditures, and will not increase their disposable 
incomes, but will nevertheless probably still be significant to those households 
otherwise affected. 
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6.5 Impact of fuelwood policies on household 
economies 
The policies aimed at improving the supply and management of fuelwood re-
sources are unlikely to have any major effect on household budgets in the short-
term. Small additional amount may be expended on the purchase of young trees 
from nurseries for planting by individuals or groups of households, but these will 
probably be insignificant. If anything, future expenditure on commercialised fuels 
such as paraffin, and including wood, may be avoided or delayed if the depletion 
of wood resources is slowed through such policies. 
It is also possible that households which engage in agroforestry and other social 
forestry practices may experience income benefits, through, for example, the sale 
of fruit and other products grown by them. On the whole, however, it is unlikely 
that fuelwood policies will result in any major changes in the income patterns of 
poor rural households, which are generally centred around remittances, pensions 
and farming incomes. 
6.6 Impact of demand-side management (DSM) 
policies on household economies 
It is probably fair to generalise that many DSM interventions entail a relatively large 
cash outflow initially, in return for lower subsequent cash outflows. This is the case, 
for example, with efficient appliances such as compact fluorescent light (CFL) 
bulbs, which have a higher capital cost but a lower operating cost. Consequently, 
where financing mechanisms can be employed to remove the initial barrier to entry 
imposed by high capital costs, then households may experience real savings in their 
energy expenditure in every period over the life-cycle of the product. This applies 
not only to policy proposals around the use of energy efficient appliances such as 
CFL bulbs, but also to options such as the fitting of ceilings and insulating material 
to poorly-insulated households. If the initial costs can be financed by energy 
utilities, retail or other institutions, then it is possible that households will experi-
ence immediate benefits, since the reduction in energy expenditure should be 
sufficient to more than offset the repayment of the loan and finance charges. 
Another important DSM policy proposal which was mentioned earlier, is around 
the implementation of time-of-use tariffs in households which are able to shift 
significant portions of their load out of peak hours. This tariff system should result 
in direct savings to households which attempt to economise on electricity use -
using geysers, for example, outside peak times. (Solar water-heaters will become 
more cost-effective for households with geysers if tariffs reflect the real costs of 
providing electricity to heat water during peak hours via the national grid.) 
6. 7 Conclusion 
On the whole, it should be apparent that the EPRET proposals would result in real 
benefits to the poor households which are their target. Many of these benefits will 
be translated into reduced expenditure on energy and other services such as 
medical care, which will therefore release some income for different purposes 
related to energy services as well as other needs. 
An exception to this generalisation will arise if a national flat rate tariff is imple-
mented for all electricity consumers, in which case that consumer class which 
currently pays lower tariffs will clearly pay a premium for their electricity. This is 
an issue closely tied up with broader debates in the South African political arena 
around redistribution and equity. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Concluding summary 
This paper has described the financing and economic impacts of the household 
energy policies emanating from the Energy Policy Research and Training Project. 
In doing so, it is hoped that it will have become clear that, although the policy 
proposals have significant investment requirements, it is not unrealistic to suggest 
that they are affordable to the national economy and its components. In other 
words, it is possible to implement a national household energy policy which will 
bring about a real improvement in the living conditions of the poor, by widening 
their access to adequate and affordable energy services. 
As noted in the introduction, this paper had two main objectives: 
e to assess the financing requirements of policy proposals in the main energy 
sub-sectors and to propose ways of mobilising and allocating finance where this 
is required, and 
e to assess the potential impacts of policy proposals on important macro- and 
micro-economic variables, in order to ensure the consistency of policy proposals 
with broader macro-economic and development policy conditions. 
The first of these objectives formed the basis of Chapter Three (Current financing 
arrangements and policy proposals in energy sub-sectors), while the second objec-
tive was addressed by Chapters Four to Six, which assessed the impacts of pro-
posed policies on the national economy, on the electricity supply industry, and on 
household micro-economies. 
The paper began by contextualising energy investment and expenditure in the 
macro-economic and micro-economic environments currently operating in the 
South African energy sector. It was noted that increases in government expenditure 
as a whole, or specifically on social services are unlikely to occur or to provide scope 
for additional energy expenditure. However, there is considerable scope for re-al-
locations within the existing budget grant to the Department of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs, and in particular from the nuclear industry to development sectors such as 
electrification and fuelwood-related policies. 
In Chapter Three, the financing arrangements for each of the main policy sectors 
were addressed. These sectors include electrification, fuelwood, low-smoke coal, 
• gas and paraffin, and demand-side management. The case of electrification re-
ceived additional attention because of the need to raise additional sources of finance 
for a national electrification programme, and to allocate grant finance in the most 
equitable and effective means possible. Consequently, proposals were made 
~und the establishment of an Electrification Fund, which would have as its goals 
the raising and allocation of finance specifically for electrification. In the cases of 
tuelwood policies. low-smoke coal development, gas and paraffin, and demand-
side management strategies financing requirements are more modest, but are 
significant in their specific contexts. 
Chapter Four contained an assessment of the impacts of two household energy 
scenarios on five macro variables: investment levels, fiscal revenue and expendi-
ture, the balance of payments, employment and environmental quality. The latter 
two variables, whilst not always included in such analyses, are considered relevant 
jn the light of the importance attached to equity and environmental sustainability 
objectives. This assessment was done for two macro scenarios: a business-as-usual 
scenario in which current trends in the energy sector continue, but without any 
major intervention, and secondly an integrated energy planning (IEP) scenario in Iii 
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which policy proposals aimed at widening households access to energy services 
are implemented. The results indicated that several of the policy proposals would 
have impacts which were not insignificant on a national scale, although in no case 
were the adverse impacts of such as a scale as to present real constraints on policy 
implementation. On the other hand, it was shown that many of the policies were 
likely to have significant positive effects, on, for example, employment levels and 
environmental quality. 
The following chapter then considered the impact of the IEP policy scenario on the 
electricity supply industry. This sector was singled out because of the significance 
of the impacts of pricing, financing and governance policy proposals on the indus-
try. A model which was developed for this purpose was used to quantify the 
financial impacts on the industry, and to assess the sensitivity of the outcomes to 
changes in the most important variables. It was highly significant that the effect of 
cross-subsidisation from high-consumption domestic customers to newly-electri-
fied and low-consumption customers could be to reduce the peak financing re-
quirement of the electrification programme to less than R6 billion if tariffs are set 
at around 20 cents per kWh (excluding VAT), The sensitivity analysis showed that 
changes in the tariff level will have a profound effect on the total debt levels 
resulting from the programme. 
In Chapter Six, some of the potential impacts of policy proposals on household 
micro-economies were considered. This was a much more qualitative analysis than 
those which preceded it, because of the relative absence of data on household 
incomes and energy expenditures, and because of the wide variances which occur 
across space and time. It was suggested, on the basis of identifiable trends and 
impacts, that the EPRET policy proposals will have a positive impact on the 
economies of the poor, thereby contributing towards the principal policy objective 
-to widen access to adequate and affordable energy services for the urban and rural 
poor. 
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
A major two year research project was launched by the Energy for 
Development Research Centre in April1992. It aims to investigate policy 
options for widening access to basic energy services for the urban and 
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A concludir.g document will draw together key policy conclusions 
" The scope of these studies is restricted to energy issues concerning 
the urban and rural poor. 
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